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Abstract 
 Much attention has recently been given to the psychological capacity for ‘episodic 
foresight’, which involves imagining, preparing for, and actively shaping specific future events.  
Because of the relative youth of the field, however, many questions about the nature, ontogeny, and 
phylogeny of this capacity remain unanswered.  Here I present a number of theoretical perspectives 
and empirical investigations that attempt to answer some of these questions.   
 In Chapter 2, I provide the first review of evidence for the development of numerous 
cognitive components that have been implicated in episodic foresight, and the future-oriented 
behaviours these components enable.  I find that the components develop along varying trajectories 
throughout childhood and beyond, but between ages three and five critical milestones are achieved 
in each of them.  And indeed, around this time children also begin to show evidence of flexible 
future-oriented behaviour in diverse contexts.  I then present four chapters describing empirical 
studies of novel future-oriented behaviours in children around these ages.   
 In Chapter 3’s study, I measured children’s capacity to recall a problem from the past and 
select an object that could solve that problem in a deferred future episode.  Previous studies 
assessing children’s future-oriented object selection had involved future episodes that were merely 
hypothetical or occurred immediately after the selection.  I found that 4-year-olds could remember a 
problem from 15 minutes ago in another room, and select an object that would solve the problem 
upon return to the room after a 5-minute sand-timer had completed a cycle.  When compared with 
previous findings, this result suggests that acting for a deferred future episode may place no extra 
demands on children’s episodic foresight than acting for an immediate future episode. 
 In Chapter 4’s studies, I measured children’s capacity to seek information that would only 
be useful in a specific future episode.  This behaviour forms a crucial aspect of human learning 
(e.g., during schooling), but studies had so far focused only on children’s information seeking to 
achieve an immediate goal.  In Study 1 (two experiments), I again used the two-room paradigm to 
show that many 5-year-olds could recall a problem from the past and seek information to solve that 
problem in the future.  Four-year-olds did not perform above chance level when low-level 
associative explanations were controlled for, but it remained unclear what caused their poor 
performance.  In Study 2, I relaxed memory demands and gave children the opportunity to seek 
information in the same context as the future problem.  Again, 5-year-olds but not 4-year-olds 
performed above chance level, although even the older children did not perform at ceiling level.   
 In Chapter 5’s study, I measured children’s capacity to remember to carry out an intended 
action at a particular future time, in both the presence and absence of cues to perform the action.  
Previous studies of time-based prospective memory had included event-based cues (e.g., a visible 
clock) that can externally remind participants when to perform the crucial action.  I administered 3-, 
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4-, and 5-year-olds a novel paradigm in which they had to remember to ring a bell at the end of a 1-
minute sand-timer’s cycle, while also engaged in a secondary ongoing activity.  I found that most 4-
year-olds could remember to ring the bell when the passage of sand through the timer was visible, 
but even 5-year-olds struggled when the passage of sand was hidden. 
 In Chapter 6’s study, I measured children’s capacity to prepare for multiple, mutually 
exclusive outcomes of a single future event.  Previous studies of this capacity had included complex 
intermediate steps between the preparatory behaviour and the future outcome, while also relying 
heavily on language comprehension.  I designed a novel minimalist task in which 2-4 year-olds 
were given the opportunity to catch a ball dropped into a forked tube with one opening at the top 
but two openings at the bottom.  I found that many 3-year-olds and most 4-year-olds spontaneously 
covered both bottom openings of the tube in their first attempt to catch the ball, suggesting they 
possessed insight into the task contingencies and some understanding of future uncertainty.  Many 
younger children demonstrated their capacity to cover both openings on later trials, but the 
particular pattern of results suggested this may have been due to simple trial-and-error learning. 
 Because the paradigm used in Chapter 6’s study has minimal language demands and relies 
on simple behavioural responses, I was also able to administer a preliminary test to three 
chimpanzees.  None of these subjects spontaneously prepared for both potential outcomes of the 
immediate future event on the first trial, although one learned to reliably do so after many trials.  In 
Chapter 7, I expand on a discussion point raised by these findings, and present a novel theoretical 
perspective suggesting that non-human animals may lack one of the crucial components of episodic 
foresight (metarepresentation) described at the beginning of the thesis.   
 In Chapter 8, I conclude with a general discussion summarising the empirical findings and 
making detailed suggestions for future research.  I also provide an age-based analysis of the overall 
results, suggesting they offer additional evidence for the proposal that children’s episodic foresight 
shows important developments throughout the preschool years.  Finally, I revisit the componential 
analysis of episodic foresight and recommend some additions and alterations to the components in 
light of my novel empirical findings and theoretical proposals. 
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General Introduction 
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 One of the most remarkable features of human cognition is the ability to embed imagined 
scenarios within a specific future context and prepare accordingly.  This capacity enables us to act 
in the present to shape future events to our own desire, which may explain much about why humans 
have been able to dominate the environment and many other species on this planet (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997).  Yet, despite the fact that behaviour can only affect present and future event 
outcomes, the psychological sciences have traditionally focused on the various forms of memory, 
rather than future-directed faculties (e.g., Bauer, 2006, 2007; Clayton, Griffiths, Emery, & 
Dickinson, 2001; Gathercole, 1998; Schacter, 1996; Squire, 1992; Tulving, 2002).  Only in recent 
years has widespread theoretical and empirical attention been given to the capacity to envision 
specific future events, or ‘episodic foresight’ (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Klein, 2013a, 2013b; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). 
 For the purposes of this thesis, episodic foresight is defined as “the capacity to imagine 
future scenarios and use such imagination to guide current action” (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011, p. 
296).  It can be described as the future-directed counterpart of episodic memory, and indeed both 
capacities are considered expressions of the general faculty known as ‘mental time travel’ 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  Consistent with this view, one of the most reliable findings across 
domains is the commonality between imagining past and future events (Schacter et al., 2012; 
Suddendorf, 2010a).  Episodic memory and episodic foresight both engage similar networks in the 
frontal, temporal and parietal lobes of the brain (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Østby et al., 2012; 
Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009; Viard, Desgranges, Eustache, & Piolino, 2012); both capacities are 
impaired in hippocampus-lesioned amnesiacs (Barba, Cappelletti, Signorini, & Denes, 1997; 
Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002), older adults  
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008), and various clinical populations (e.g., D'Argembeau, Raffard, & 
Van der Linden, 2008; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Williams et al., 1996); and both capacities appear 
tightly linked in development, as children who report accurate details about events from yesterday 
are also more likely to report accurate details about events from tomorrow (Busby & Suddendorf, 
2005; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; Suddendorf, 2010b).   
 Aside from these well-established links with episodic memory, however, many fundamental 
questions about the nature and development of episodic foresight remain contentious.  For instance, 
should episodic foresight be considered as a single encapsulated cognitive module, or is it 
composed of a number of cognitive components?  When do children become able to imagine 
specific future episodes, and when do they become able to apply this capacity to engage in flexible 
future-oriented behaviour in diverse contexts?  Do all future-oriented behaviours become available 
to children at roughly the same age, or is there a developmental asynchrony owing to different loads 
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placed on the underlying cognitive mechanisms?  And are any aspects of episodic foresight 
uniquely human, allowing children to develop certain future-oriented behaviours that remain out of 
reach for other animals?  The aim of my thesis is to go some way towards answering these 
questions. 
Structure of the Thesis 
 Central to my thesis is the overarching theme that episodic foresight is a multifaceted 
process involving a number of interconnected cognitive components (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007).  In Chapter 2, I review evidence for the development of the proposed components and the 
future-oriented behaviours they enable in children, while also identifying areas requiring further 
research.  In the following four chapters, I describe empirical studies investigating the emergence of 
novel future-oriented behaviours in preschoolers, and embed my findings within the broader 
developmental literature.  These behaviours include solving deferred future problems (Chapter 3), 
seeking information for specific future episodes (Chapter 4), remembering to carry out intended 
future actions in the presence and absence of external cues (Chapter 5), and preparing for alternative 
versions of the future (Chapter 6).  The study presented in Chapter 6 also includes a preliminary test 
of three chimpanzees on the same nonverbal task given to the children.  In Chapter 7, I build on a 
discussion point raised by this test and consider one central component of episodic foresight in the 
context of whether it makes human mental time travel unique.  I conclude with a general discussion 
(Chapter 8) summarising the findings of the empirical studies and discussing them in the context of 
the componential analysis presented in Chapter 2 and the theoretical proposal outlined in Chapter 7.   
The nature and participants of the studies in the body chapters (2-7) are summarised in Table 1, and 
over the following pages I outline the more specific objectives of the thesis with reference to the 
theoretical, developmental and comparative episodic foresight literatures.
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Table 1 
Summary of the Nature and Participants of the Studies in each Body Chapter of the Thesis 
Chapter Title Nature of Chapter Participants 
Chapter 2 The development of mental scenario 
building and episodic foresight 
Theoretical and empirical review 0-10 year-old children (reviewed only) 
Chapter 3 Foresight beyond the very next event: 
Four-year-old children can link past and 
deferred future episodes 
Empirical study 4-year-old children (N = 24) 
Chapter 4 The development of future-oriented 
information seeking and encoding 
Empirical study 4- and 5-year-old children (N = 76) 
Chapter 5 The development of time-based 
prospective memory in the presence and 
absence of event-based cues 
Empirical study 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children (N = 72) 
Chapter 6 When can children spontaneously prepare 
for alternative future event outcomes? 
Empirical study 2-, 2.5-, 3-, 3.5-, and 4-year-old 
children (N = 90); chimpanzees (N = 3) 
Chapter 7 Does metarepresentation make human 
mental time travel unique? 
Theoretical proposal Non-human animals, children and 
adults (reviewed only) 
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Background and Objective of Chapter 2 (Review) 
 Reviews of the data from various clinical disorders and brain lesion case studies support the 
view that the episodic system consists of a number of cognitive components working in concert 
(Klein, 2013c; Klein, German, Cosmides, & Gabriel, 2004).  Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) 
introduced a theatre metaphor to describe the components that might be implicated in episodic 
foresight, with various cognitive processes analogous to the theatrical roles of stage, playwright, 
set, actors, director, executive producer, and broadcaster.  Together, these components enable a 
virtual ‘play’ within the mind’s eye.  Suddendorf and Corballis discussed this metaphor from the 
perspective of comparative psychology, with each theatrical analogue examined in light of whether 
non-human animals display any evidence of possessing the cognitive mechanisms required.  And 
yet, given that animals may lack one or more of these mechanisms, comparative psychology can 
only go so far as an empirical base for theories regarding the structure and function of episodic 
foresight in humans.  Indeed, it may be just as fruitful to examine when and how the critical 
components develop in children, and when and how these components support the emergence of 
future-oriented behaviour in diverse contexts.  More practically, the identification of ages at which 
various components and future-oriented behaviours typically emerge may eventually lead to the 
formulation of interventions aimed at improving the skills of developmentally delayed children. 
 Previous reviews of the development of episodic foresight and related concepts have 
generally focused on the role of self-projection (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Hudson, Mayhew, & 
Prabhakar, 2010) or temporal representations and executive functions (e.g., McCormack & Atance, 
2011) in children’s future-oriented behaviour.  Such approaches make a valuable contribution to the 
literature, but they may come at the cost of neglecting the crucial roles played by other components.  
In Chapter 2 of my thesis, I provide the first comprehensive review of the development of each 
episodic foresight component identified in Suddendorf and Corballis’ (2007) theatre metaphor, 
before discussing when and how these components combine to allow various forms of future-
oriented behaviour in children.  Throughout this review I highlight areas that remain open for 
research, and in the following four chapters I describe novel empirical studies in some of these 
domains.   
Background and Objective of Chapters 3-6 (Empirical Studies) 
 In Chapter 2, it becomes clear that many future-oriented behaviours remain entirely 
unexamined in children.  Steps must therefore be taken to devise novel methods that can answer the 
questions of when and how these behaviours emerge.  In each of Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, I first 
identify and discuss a future-oriented behaviour that has been largely neglected by the previous 
developmental literature.  I then describe and implement a methodological innovation aimed at 
measuring that behaviour in children.  The particular future-oriented capacities under consideration 
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were chosen not just because of the lack of prior research into their development, however, but also 
because they represent especially important aspects of well-adjusted adult human behaviour.  
Indeed, it could be said that each of the examined behaviours plays such a crucial role in adult life 
that a person who did not efficiently acquire them in childhood would be substantially 
disadvantaged compared to their peers.  It is therefore pertinent to identify the ages at which these 
behaviours typically begin to appear, such that further steps can eventually be taken to ascertain the 
precise cognitive mechanisms involved and potentially devise interventions aimed at correcting the 
behaviour of developmentally delayed children.  Given Chapter 2’s conceptualisation of episodic 
foresight as a multifaceted capacity dependent on specific task demands, it was broadly predicted 
that the various future-oriented behaviours examined would develop at inconsistent ages throughout 
the preschool years and beyond. 
 Chapter 3.  One future-oriented behaviour that remains unexamined in children is the 
ability to recall a problem from the past and act to solve that problem for a deferred future episode.  
Humans often act to secure long-term future benefits, and we rely on our memories for what was 
required in similar past situations when doing so.  When preparing for a trip to the beach, for 
example, you may recall the last time you went and forgot to take sunscreen, and draw on this 
recollection to make sure you take some this time.  Initially, parents assist children in their 
preparations for deferred future events, for example when packing their bags with items they will 
need throughout a day at preschool.  Eventually, however, children will have to rely on their own 
capacity for episodic foresight in such contexts. 
 Previous studies of children’s future-oriented object selection have involved future problems 
that were merely hypothetical (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005), occurred almost immediately after the 
object was selected (Scarf, Gross, Colombo, & Hayne, 2013; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 
2011), or were marked by temporal terms such as ‘tomorrow’ (Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010), 
which many young children have great difficulty understanding (Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2011).  
In Chapter 3, I adapt the two-room paradigm previously used by Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) 
and give children the opportunity to solve a problem for five minutes into the future.  Four-year-
olds are first introduced to a problem with no solution available, before being taken to a second 
room and distracted for 15 minutes.  They are then given a selection of items (one of which can 
solve the problem) to place into a bucket, which they are to take back to the first room after a 
familiar 5-minute sand-timer has completed a cycle.  The question of interest is whether the 
children will select the item that can solve the future problem marked by the sand-timer above 
chance level, just as they did in the original study when the future episode was to occur in the 
immediate future (‘now’).  Acting for a deferred future episode may or may not be more cognitively 
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demanding than acting for an immediate future episode, and either finding would have important 
implications for theories regarding the nature of episodic foresight. 
 Chapter 4.  Another important future-oriented behaviour that remains unexamined in 
children is the ability to selectively seek information that will only be useful in an anticipated future 
episode.  Humans sometimes seek information not because they will receive an immediate benefit, 
but rather because they expect that information to become useful with time.  During schooling, for 
instance, activities like studying and homework are often aimed at improving outcomes on future 
tests and other future situations in the real world.  Initially at least, children’s information seeking is 
scaffolded by parents and teachers, such that the children do not necessarily have to consider the 
future benefits themselves.  Children who do consider these benefits, however, may be more 
efficient in their own future-oriented information seeking practices, and in their ability to apply that 
information when appropriate. 
 Previous studies have shown that even infants have a natural preference for certain novel 
information (Friedman, 1972; Slater, Morison, & Rose, 1984), and 2.5-year-old children are able to 
seek information to achieve a present goal (Call & Carpenter, 2001).  In Chapter 4, I again adapt the 
two-room paradigm to see when children can apply this capacity to achieve a future goal.  
Specifically, I give 4- and 5-year-old children the opportunity to recall a past problem from another 
room and selectively seek information that will solve the problem upon return to the room in the 
future (Study 1).  Nevertheless, because the two-room paradigm places heavy demands on accurate 
episodic memory, I also develop a novel paradigm aimed at measuring when children can study 
information for a future test (Study 2).  This paradigm has relaxed memory demands because the 
information search and future problem occur in the same spatial context.  The central question in 
both tasks is whether the children can narrow their search to information that will be relevant in the 
future, while ignoring structurally similar information that will not be relevant in the future. 
 Chapter 5.  One future-oriented capacity that has received a moderate amount of attention 
from the developmental literature is ‘prospective memory’.  This capacity is broadly defined as the 
ability to remember to carry out an intended future action given an appropriate event or at an 
appropriate time (Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & Messer, 2008; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  Humans 
often rely on prospective memory in everyday life, for instance when we must remember to buy 
milk at the shop or get dinner out of the oven at 7:00pm.  Such actions can be triggered 
automatically by an external cue (e.g., seeing the shop or the clock on the oven), but performance is 
nevertheless greatly enhanced by internal rehearsal of the prospective intention before it must be 
carried out (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  Initially, children will rely somewhat on cues (such as 
parental requests) as reminders to complete intended actions.  As they get older, however, they must 
increasingly rely on their own ability to internally rehearse and implement such intentions. 
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 Considerable research suggests that children become able to carry out intended future 
actions when cued during the middle preschool years (e.g., Aberle & Kliegel, 2010; Guajardo & 
Best, 2000; Kliegel & Jäger, 2007; Kvavilashvili, Messer, & Ebdon, 2001).  It remains unknown, 
however, when they become able to carry out such intentions in the absence of reminders.  
Measures of event-based prospective memory necessarily require environmental cues to signal 
when the action should be carried out, but even time-based prospective memory measures have 
almost universally contained such cues in the form of visible clocks or other timing devices.  In 
Chapter 5, I administer 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds a novel time-based prospective memory paradigm in 
which the presence or absence of an external cue is varied.  The children’s basic task is to 
remember to ring a bell when a familiar 1-minute sand-timer has completed a cycle.  In half of the 
conditions the timer is visible, such that the children can rely on the passage of sand as an event-
based cue when deciding when to ring the bell.  In the other conditions, however, the timer is 
covered, such that there is no external reminder.  In some conditions the timer appears as a single 
task, whereas in others it is embedded within a secondary ongoing task.  The central questions are 
(i) whether the hiding of the event-based cue makes any difference to children’s propensity to 
perform the future action, and (ii) at what ages children typically become able to interrupt the 
ongoing task and carry out the intended future action in both the presence and absence of the event-
based cue. 
 Chapter 6.  Another future-oriented behaviour that remains largely ignored by the 
developmental literature is the ability to prepare for multiple potential outcomes of a single 
undetermined future event.  Humans may possess the incredibly useful capacity for episodic 
foresight, but this is not to say we are able to predict all future events with a high degree of 
accuracy.  One effective way in which we deal with uncertainty about the future is to prepare for 
alternative, even mutually exclusive possibilities.  We may prepare for a pleasant hike in the 
mountains, for example, but we also carry wet-weather gear and first aid kits in case misfortune 
strikes.  Despite the importance of this capacity to represent and prepare for multiple futures, 
however, little is known about when and how it develops in children. 
 The only two previous studies of children’s capacity to prepare for alternative future 
outcomes have included complex intermediate steps between the preparatory behaviour and the 
future event, while also relying heavily on language comprehension and unnatural behavioural 
responses (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Robinson, Rowley, Beck, Carroll, & 
Apperly, 2006).  In Chapter 6, I develop a minimalist paradigm that can measure even very young 
children’s ability to prepare for multiple potential outcomes of a single future event.  Specifically, I 
give 2-4 year-old children the opportunity to catch a ball that is dropped into a forked tube with one 
opening at the top but two openings at the bottom.  The central question is when children can 
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prepare for both potential outcomes of the single ball-dropping event by covering both bottom 
openings of the tube in their attempt to catch the ball.  Spontaneous preparation for alternative 
outcomes on the first trial indicates insight into the contingencies of the task and some 
understanding of future uncertainty, whereas success on later trials might also be achieved through 
trial-and-error learning. 
 Summary.  Throughout the discussion sections of each empirical chapter, I consider the 
results obtained and discuss which components of episodic foresight may have been crucial in the 
implementation of the children’s future-oriented behaviours.  I also make suggestions for future 
studies that could uncover whether differential levels of competence in these components may have 
been responsible for the specific developmental trajectories observed.  I expand on these ideas in 
the final general discussion (Chapter 8), by revisiting the theatre metaphor described in Chapter 2 
and discussing whether any additions or alterations to the components may be required.  
Background and Objective of Chapter 7 (Theoretical Proposal)  
 Developmental psychology has a long history of sharing theoretical concepts and 
experimental methods with comparative psychology (e.g., compare Call & Tomasello, 1999; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  Indeed, much of the early focus of the 
developmental episodic foresight literature was on the need to devise nonverbal testing methods, 
not only to avoid the pitfalls associated with young children’s language deficits but also to allow for 
testing of non-human animals (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005).  While the bulk of my thesis is focused 
on children’s episodic foresight, I also make a novel theoretical contribution to the comparative 
literature in Chapter 7.  This contribution again falls under the framework of the theatre metaphor 
outlined in Chapter 2, while also enhancing the interpretation of the empirical findings presented in 
Chapter 6.   
 Suddendorf and Corballis laid out the first systematic treatise on mental time travel across 
species in 1997, proposing that the capacity was unique to humans among extant animals and that 
episodic foresight in particular was a prime mover in hominin evolution.  Since then, a multitude of 
studies have claimed to provide behavioural evidence for the capacity in non-human animals (e.g., 
Cheke & Clayton, 2012; Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Naqshbandi & Roberts, 2006; Raby, 
Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007), with special attention given to the future-directed faculties of 
humans’ closest living great ape relatives (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath, 2009; Osvath & 
Karvonen, 2012; Osvath & Osvath, 2008).  Suddendorf and Corballis responded to these initial 
claims with scepticism, suggesting that the evidence could all be explained by more parsimonious 
mechanisms such as associative learning or instinctual predispositions (Suddendorf, 2006; 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008; Suddendorf, Corballis, & Collier-
Baker, 2009).  In recent years, however, Corballis has changed his mind (Corballis, 2013a, 2013b, 
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2013c, 2014), on the basis of neurological evidence suggesting that rodents mentally represent 
novel maze trajectories and then are more likely to take these paths in the future (e.g., Gupta, van 
der Meer, Touretzky, & Redish, 2010; Pastalkova, Itskov, Amarasingham, & Buzsáki, 2008; 
Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013).  He now believes the difference between human and non-human mental 
time travel to be quantitative only, rather than qualitative. 
 In Chapter 6 of my thesis (described above), I include a preliminary test of three 
chimpanzees’ ability to prepare for multiple versions of an immediate future event, using the same 
paradigm administered to the child participants.  In Chapter 7, I build on a question raised in the 
discussion section of Chapter 6, and suggest that there may indeed be something unique about 
human mental time travel.  Specifically, I suggest that non-human animals may lack the capacity to 
form metarepresentations, which allows humans to reflect on the relationship between their mental 
representation of a given event and the event itself (Perner, 1991; Pylyshyn, 1978; Suddendorf, 
1999).  Without this component, an agent cannot embed their representations within a certain 
representational context (e.g., the future) or understand that such representations can be misleading.  
I describe how the aforementioned neurological evidence from rodents and behavioural evidence 
from other animals can be explained without necessarily ascribing these animals a capacity for 
metarepresentational insight.  Finally, I suggest how empirical progress might be made on this 
problem, including a recommendation that future research test animals on paradigms such as the 
one described in Chapter 6.  I return to the issue of metarepresentation in the general discussion 
(Chapter 8), in which I propose an expanded, overarching role for the capacity in all components of 
the theatre metaphor of episodic foresight. 
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Preface 
 Having given a general introduction to the relevant literature in the previous chapter, I now 
move onto the main body section of my thesis.  I begin by reviewing evidence for the development 
of various cognitive components of episodic foresight and the future-oriented behaviours they 
enable.  This chapter is an adapted version of a review article1 published with my supervisor, 
Thomas Suddendorf.  He was invited to write the article with colleagues, on the condition that he 
remain the first author.  It was his idea to frame the paper in the context of the theatre metaphor of 
episodic foresight (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), although the first draft was written by me 
(including initial versions of both figures and many of the novel ideas).  We retained all sections of 
this initial draft and edited the paper together to produce the final version.   
 
1Suddendorf, T., & Redshaw, J. (2013). The development of mental scenario building and episodic 
foresight. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1296 (1), 135-153. 
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Abstract 
Episodic foresight is the future-directed counterpart of episodic memory.  It is a sophisticated, 
potentially uniquely human capacity, with tremendous adaptive consequences.  Here we review 
what is currently known about its development through early childhood.  We tackle this from two 
distinct perspectives.  First, we present the first systematic evaluation of the development of 
purported components of mental scenario building as highlighted by a theatre metaphor: the stage, 
the playwright, the set, the actors, the director, the executive producer and the broadcaster.  We find 
that, although there are diverse developmental trajectories, by four years of age children have 
acquired the basic cognitive components required to mentally construct specific future events.  
Second, we examine recent attempts to test children’s episodic foresight more directly and find that 
results are in line with those examining the development of required components.  This is not to say 
that children younger than four have no inkling of upcoming events, or that older children have 
nothing left to learn about constructing the future.  Episodic foresight, and its neurocognitive 
foundations, continues to develop throughout childhood. 
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The idea of a central Cartesian theatre in the brain has been rightly criticised (Dennett & 
Kinsbourne, 1992).  Yet, the wholesale rejection of this idea should not obscure the fact that 
humans can envisage scenarios in their minds, however those may be instantiated in the brain.  We 
can build mental scenarios, communicate them and act them out.  Over the last half dozen years 
cognitive and neuroscientific studies have (finally) begun to pay special attention to our capacity to 
imagine future situations (Bar, 2011; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007), which has arguably given humans crucial adaptive advantages over other animals 
(Suddendorf, 2006; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  As adults, this faculty allows us to act with 
foresight, to prudently prepare for threats and opportunities, to hatch complex plans, and to design 
much of our world aiming at what we think we would like.  For most problems, we can generate 
multiple scenarios of potential solutions, evaluate them in terms of likelihood and desirability, and 
decide to pursue one of these options with an apparent sense of free will.  Young children, however, 
require adults to structure and support their future-oriented behaviour (Hudson, 2002).  Here we 
review the growing literature on the development of their ability to imagine and shape the future in 
their own right. 
Like other sub-disciplines in the behavioural and cognitive sciences, developmental 
psychology has long overlooked foresight in favour of research on memory (Bauer, 2007; Fivush, 
2011; Hayne & Rovee-Collier, 1995; Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Yet, from an evolutionary 
perspective, cognitions about the present and the future are much more important than 
representations of the past per se.  Natural selection can only work on how a cognitive capacity 
affects an organism’s present and future survival or reproductive chances (Suddendorf & Busby, 
2003).  It has even been suggested that episodic memory evolved as an adaptive design feature of 
the capacity for episodic foresight (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005), a proposal supported by 
neuroscientific evidence suggesting that both capacities activate similar brain regions (Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Okuda et al., 2003; Spreng, Mar, 
& Kim, 2009; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007) and impairment in one is associated with 
impairment in the other (D'Argembeau, Raffard, & Van der Linden, 2008; Hassabis, Kumaran, 
Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, 
& Moscovitch, 2009).  In many contexts the past is the best predictor for the future.  Therefore, 
memory of a past event can offer useful guidance as to what to expect in a similar future event.  
However, we can do a lot more.  The future is uncertain and regularly dishes up situations that are 
entirely novel.  There is debate regarding just how episodic foresight contributes to future-oriented 
behaviour (Corballis, 2013a, 2013b; Eacott & Easton, 2012; Klein, 2013; Suddendorf, 2013), but it 
is clear that representing novel future events requires more than just a system that projects the past 
into the future (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf & Busby, 2003).  
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We can imagine whatever, wherever, whenever by recombining basic elements, such as 
actors, objects and actions, in novel ways, just as we can generate new sentences from words or 
melodies from tones (Suddendorf & Busby, 2003).  Consider the following brief example.  Imagine 
you remember giving a lemon cheesecake to a friend and confidently predict that if you did it again 
he would be just as delighted as on the previous occasion.  To illustrate that you can also imagine 
things that have not happened before, let’s imagine you entertain the idea of putting hot English 
mustard on the cake.  Without ever having tasted this before, you can quite confidently predict that 
the combined flavour would be awful.  You can go on and picture the reaction that taste would draw 
from our friend, and the repercussion this would have, for instance, in terms of retaliation.  You 
may attempt to recruit someone else as a partner in crime, but she may not be compelled, pointing 
out the consequences this prank would have on your reputation amongst your friends.  And so, 
while you might briefly entertain the mischievous idea, perhaps while recognising the similar 
colours of lemon icing and mustard, you would probably select to refrain from such a naughty deed. 
We frequently consider potential future scenarios and act, or refrain to act, with anticipated 
future consequences in mind.  We often get it wrong, of course.  But foresight has been a 
tremendous survival tool.  We pursue short and longer-term goals, shape the future to our design, 
recognise opportunities and prepare for the worst.  Our actions reflect our thoughts about 
temporally displaced events, be they next week’s work commitments, this summer’s holiday or 
one’s retirement plan.  Much of our adult thinking depends on episodic foresight.  Yet, infants very 
much live in the here and now and even young children display few obvious signs of prudently 
plotting the future, instead relying on adults to imagine and structure their future activities.  We 
pack their lunches, bring their jackets and schedule their play dates.  An important task for 
developmental psychology, then, is to identify and explain the development of episodic foresight 
(Suddendorf & Moore, 2011). 
Current neuroscientific data (Addis & Schacter, 2008; Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, 
Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012a, 2012b; Weiler, Suchan, Koch, 
Schwarz, & Daum, 2011) support the notion that episodic foresight is more than just episodic 
memory placed into the future—it also requires the ability to recombine episodic elements into 
novel constellations (Addis & Schacter, 2012; Schacter et al., 2012; Suddendorf, 2010a).  However, 
episodic memory and detail recombination are not the only components driving successful future-
oriented behaviour.  Instead, episodic foresight often critically depends on various sophisticated 
cognitive skills, such as: placing the episode at a specific time in the future; thinking about one’s 
own and others’ future minds; judging the future episode on dimensions such as likelihood and 
desirability and altering it accordingly; inhibiting immediate impulses so that the future episode can 
be envisioned and actualised; and discussing the future episode with others.  In the following 
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sections we review recent research on (i) the development of cognitive components implicated in 
episodic foresight, and (ii) the development of future-oriented behaviours that these components 
support.  Our suggestions for future research include open questions within these two domains, as 
well as a discussion of how findings from developmental psychology can guide searches for the 
neural underpinnings of episodic foresight.  
The Components of Mental Scenario Building 
Suddendorf and Corballis proposed the metaphor of a theatre production to help identify the 
diverse cognitive components involved in episodic foresight (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  Here 
we review what is known about the development of cognitive analogues of the stage, playwright, 
set, actors, director, producer and broadcaster (see Figure 1).  We are, of course, not making the 
case for some homunculi performing such tasks nor for any Cartesian theatre in the mind/brain 
(Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992).  The components may well depend on widely distributed, 
interconnected and parallel processes.  The theatre metaphor was originally advanced in the context 
of evaluating whether nonhuman animals might have the cognitive capacities required to travel 
mentally in time (as shortcomings in one or several of the components may significantly limit their 
foresight).  Here we adopt this approach to systematically examine when children acquire 
competence in these purported components.  We then compare the findings of this indirect approach 
with a review of research aimed at directly measuring the development of episodic foresight and 
future-oriented behaviour.  We find that, by four years of age, human children have all of the basic 
cognitive components required to mentally construct specific future events.  This is not to say, 
however, that younger children have no inkling of upcoming events, or that older children have 
nothing left to learn about constructing the future.  The components mature along different 
trajectories and episodic foresight capacities continue to develop throughout childhood.  
22 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the components in the theatre metaphor for episodic foresight. 
The executive producer can override online processes and engage offline scenario building. The 
playwright fills representational space (the stage) with set features and actors and generates 
simulated interactions. The director judges the mental construction on dimensions such as 
likelihood and desirability, and either (1) rejects the scenario and sends it back to the playwright for 
modification, or (2) accepts it and passes it on to the executive producer. This evaluation can be 
assisted by an audience, if the director broadcasts the anticipated future scenario and receives 
feedback in return. The executive makes the final decision on any implementation of an action plan. 
 
1.  The Stage 
  The first component required for any successful theatre production is a stage on which 
reality can be suspended for the duration of the show.  Similarly, in order to mentally construct 
potential future events, we require a virtual space in our minds able to entertain offline 
representations. In addition to perceiving a lemon cheesecake, we need to be able to imagine 
something that is not there, such as a layer of mustard.  By 18 months of age, children show some 
basic capacity to go beyond immediate perception to entertain alternative states of the world 
through pretend play (Fein, 1981).  Toddlers start to bring to mind offline representations and exert 
some top-down control over them.  So a stick becomes a doll or a gun, and toddlers do not mistake 
one for the other.  They actively imbue the real object with pretend characteristics, keeping in mind 
two models of the world, the pretend and the real (Perner, 1991; Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001).  This 
is not to say, however, that mental object substitution implies that toddlers can construct and 
23 
 
compare multiple scenarios as typically required for effective episodic foresight (Harris, 2000; D. 
M. Peterson & Riggs, 1999).  Only from around ages three to four do children show signs of 
counterfactual thinking, allowing them to contrast an event that did happen with a similar event that 
did not happen (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996), and some data point to an even later time of 
emergence (Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & Perner, 2010; Rafetseder & Perner, 2010). 
 Working memory is typically considered to be the mental stage where such offline 
representations are temporarily combined and manipulated (Baddeley, 1992).  And indeed, working 
memory storage capacity increases throughout childhood and adolescence (Gathercole, Pickering, 
Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004).  In a monumental study involving 709 children, Alloway and 
colleagues (2006) tested the development of working memory capacity with a number of tasks, 
documenting linear increases from ages four to eleven.  Though it is tempting to conceptualise 
working memory capacity as merely the quantitative limit of the qualitative ability to represent 
offline material, this may not be the entire story.  An increase of only one chunk in working 
memory could herald the emergence of an entire range of qualitatively distinct cognitive operations 
(Read, 2008; Suddendorf, 2013).  Limits to the number of items and relations that can be 
entertained have been proposed to explain fundamental differences between humans and nonhuman 
animals and between the cognitive capacities of different age groups (Balter, 2010; Halford, 
Wilson, & Phillips, 1998).  Note, however, that a correlational study of three to four-year-olds 
failed to find an association between working memory capacity and counterfactual reasoning (Beck, 
Riggs, & Gorniak, 2009).   
2.  The Playwright 
 A theatre production requires a playwright providing the narrative and mental scenarios too 
may require some kind of script.  Humans have top-down access to a database of elements for such 
a script in declarative memory, which comprises both semantic and episodic memory (Squire, 
1992).  The early development of declarative memory in non-verbal infants has traditionally been 
assessed through deferred imitation (Meltzoff, 1988), an ability sometimes impaired in adult 
amnesia (McDonough, Mandler, McKee, & Squire, 1995).  By six months of age, children can 
imitate a novel action they were first exposed to 24 hours earlier, and over the subsequent year 
imitation over greater delays becomes evident (Barr, Dowden, & Hayne, 1996; Barr, Vieira, & 
Rovee-Collier, 2001; Jones & Herbert, 2006).  Though deferred imitation may require semantic 
memory, however, it need not require mental revisiting of the initial learning episode (Clayton & 
Russell, 2009).  Unequivocal evidence for episodic memory appears only around age 3 to 4 (Scarf, 
Gross, Colombo, & Hayne, 2013; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011), although some 
authors have made the case for earlier developments (Bauer & Dow, 1994; Bauer & Leventon, 
2013).  Accumulation of information in both declarative memory systems over the life span offers 
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an increasingly rich database—also referred to as crystallised intelligence (Horn & Cattell, 1967)—
from which to construct future episodes. 
  We have seen earlier that recurring events may be predicted by simply redescribing the 
representation of a past event as a future event, and declarative memory may be crucial for this 
process.  But to imagine novel future constellations, such as mustard on cheesecake, we must also 
be able to combine and recombine declarative elements in flexible ways.  Suddendorf and Corballis 
have argued that such open-ended generativity to plot whatever, wherever, whenever is achieved 
through recursive rules (Corballis, 2011; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007).  Recursion, or the 
ability to embed concepts within similar concepts, allows humans to generate a virtually infinite 
number of scenarios from a finite set of elements from memory, just as we can recursively combine 
words into sentences (Chomsky, 1966; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002).  Although recursive 
grammar, in the broadest sense, appears during the third year, it is only during the fourth year that 
English-speaking children begin to embed clauses within other clauses (Owens, 2008; Wells, 1985). 
From around this age children also become increasingly capable of generating multiple solutions to 
the same problem and predicting what might happen tomorrow (Claxton, Pannells, & Rhoads, 
2005; Suddendorf, 2010b; Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999; Urban, 1991).  
3.  The Set 
 In order to imagine a realistic future episode, one may need some basic appreciation of the 
physical laws that govern relations between objects in the environment.  Several lines of research 
have demonstrated that infants begin to grasp some of the basic principles of physical causality 
during the first year of life (Baillargeon, 2002; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Spelke, Phillips, & 
Woodward, 1995).  The crucial dimension for our purposes, however, is time.  By four years of age, 
many children can correctly distinguish between daily future events such as next dinner and distant 
future events such as driving a car, by appropriately placing these events on a visual timeline 
(Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2009).  Only by five, however, can children distinguish between 
annual and distant future events (Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2009), and plan an intervention for an 
early time that will help a character instead of planning it for a later time that will not help the 
character (McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hanley, 2011). And until around six, 
many children mistakenly believe that annual events from the recent past (e.g., a Christmas or 
Valentine’s Day that occurred a week ago) will occur again in the near future (Friedman, 2003; 
Friedman & Kemp, 1998), suggesting that younger children may fail to grasp at least some 
important differences between the past and future (Friedman, 2008). 
The ability to place future events appropriately in time may be facilitated by an 
understanding of cultural time patterns such as days of the week and months of the year.  English 
speaking children acquire the names of days by around age seven, and the names of months by 
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around age nine (Friedman, 1986, 2005).  However, they can reliably judge temporal distances 
between days only by about age nine, and between months only by about age 11 (Friedman, 1986, 
2005).  Surprisingly little is known about the development of children’s understanding of seconds, 
minutes, and hours.  In a survey, fewer than half of 5-year-olds’ parents reported that their children 
used ‘minutes’ or ‘hours’ correctly (Busby & Suddendorf, 2011), and so development appears to 
continue throughout middle childhood.  Temporal concepts are cultural heritage that help in the 
conceptualisation of the time dimension and in the coordination of future-directed activities.  
Without them, children’s planning and thinking about the future may be severely limited.  
Unfortunately, it remains unclear what formative role cultural time concepts have on children’s 
thinking.  We are not aware of cross-cultural developmental data from societies that have different 
systems of reckoning time and perhaps different emphasis on matters temporal.  It remains to be 
seen what is universal about these developments.    
4.  The Actors 
 In order to successfully predict future events involving self and others, children need to 
understand the relationship between their current and future self, and may require some 
understanding of why people behave in the way they do (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  The most 
common developmental test for early self-awareness is the mark test for mirror self-recognition, 
even if its interpretation is debated (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup, 1970, 1997; Heyes, 1994; 
Suddendorf & Butler, 2013).  Children reliably recognise themselves in mirrors by the end of the 
second year (Asendorpf & Baudonniere, 1993; Lewis & Ramsay, 2004; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 
2001).  However, it is identification with one’s future self that is critically important for episodic 
foresight, as one needs to care about one’s future in order to motivate current actions aimed at 
securing future well-being or preventing future harm (Lemmon & Moore, 2001; Moore & Lemmon, 
2001).  The mark test has been adapted in attempts to measure a temporally extended sense of self 
by presenting children with delayed video images (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996).  Only 
from around age 4 do children retrieve a sticker from their head after seeing themselves marked in a 
3 minute old video (Povinelli, et al., 1996; Suddendorf, 1999a; Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 
1999). Unfortunately, there are numerous methodological and theoretical problems with the 
‘temporally extended self’ interpretation of task performance (Povinelli & Simon, 1998; 
Suddendorf, 1999a).  One problem with these delay studies is the baseline.  Self-recognition in live 
video, even when matched to mirrors in terms of reversal and image size, appears to emerge about 
year later than self-recognition in mirrors (Suddendorf, Simcock, & Nielsen, 2007).  Whether the 
task measures self-awareness in any sense other than an expectation about one’s appearance in a 
medium remains debated (Butler, Mattingley, Cunnington, & Suddendorf, 2012). 
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Mental time travel has long been argued to draw on the same cognitive resources as theory 
of mind (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  Indeed, several  authors have pointed out various ways in 
which theory of mind and episodic foresight might be linked (see Moore & Lemmon, 2001).  It 
would seem likely, for instance, that representing the content of other minds involves many of the 
same mechanisms as representing the content of one’s own future mind.  The development of false-
belief understanding has drawn particular attention in the theory of mind domain because it shows 
an appreciation that others act on their representations of the world, whether these are correct or not.  
Such understanding hence demonstrates a capacity for representing representational relations—or 
metarepresentation.  The acquisition of this capacity around age 3 to 4 is often regarded as a 
qualitative developmental shift with wide-ranging consequences (Perner, 1991; Suddendorf, 1999b; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), but note that there is some controversial evidence for much 
earlier (implicit) false-belief understanding (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; Low & 
Perner, 2012; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 
2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007).  This capacity is necessary to appreciate how minds, 
including one’s own, may change depending on future events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  
When children pass classic false-belief tasks, they also begin to demonstrate a range of other 
abilities useful for future planning, such as an understanding that appearances (like lemon-iced 
cakes) sometimes do not match reality (Gopnik & Astington, 1988), that they have not always 
known facts that they know now (Gopnik & Graf, 1988), and that there is a tight link between 
perception and knowledge (Perner & Ruffman, 1995).  Indeed, a recent study found a positive 
relationship between preschoolers’ performances on a verbal false-belief task and a task that 
required them to learn a rule that had to be applied in the future (Ford, Driscoll, Shum, & Macaulay, 
2012).  More sophisticated theory of mind abilities, such as understanding hidden emotions 
(Wellman, Fang, & Peterson, 2011) and sarcasm (C. C. Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012), 
develop later—and arguably we never quite stop learning about the workings of minds.  Predicting 
one’s own and others’ future mental states is often critical for accurate anticipation of important 
future events.  
5.  The Director 
 After receiving the script from the playwright, the director of a theatre production might try 
out multiple ways of playing out a scene before deciding on the best one.  The future is uncertain 
and so it may often be useful to generate multiple potential scenarios (e.g., is it going to be mustard 
or lemon icing?) and evaluate them in terms of their likelihood and desirability.  We can direct out 
mental scenarios and adjust details of the anticipated event, or even imagine a completely novel 
narrative (e.g., forget the cake and buy some champagne instead).  This ability to generate and 
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select—to choose one path amongst several potentials we are aware of—is crucial for flexible 
foresight.  It gives us an intuitive belief in “free will” (Alexander, 1989). 
  A fundamental problem for such a foresightful system of decision making is how to come to 
an adaptive decision point.  Our open-ended generativity could in principle allow us to keep 
producing new versions of future events and become hamstrung by indecision—as indeed 
sometimes we are.  Consider the following recursive procedure, which includes the option for an 
infinite foresight loop or a termination when necessary: 
1. Imagine a novel future scenario and evaluate its probability and desirability. 
2. Is the future outcome likely enough and desirable enough?   
a. No—repeat step 1 [recursion]. 
b. Yes—pursue the imagined course of action to bring about this outcome. 
The procedure can be looped until an acceptable level of desirability and likelihood has been 
reached.  Research on decision making shows that humans often do not follow optimal, rational 
rules, but instead come to a decision as soon as an acceptability threshold is reached—what Herbert 
Simon (1956) called satisficing.  Such an approach may not be optimal if compared to reason with 
unlimited time and computational resources, but it is immensely practical.  In fact, we argue it is 
crucial for a system that bases decisions on individual mental scenario building.  A satisficing 
termination frees the system to focus on the next task, as soon as possible, rather than endlessly 
trawling all possible versions of future events.  The development of this important ability has, as far 
as we know, not been studied yet. 
   Reasoning about alternative events, however, has been examined.  For instance, as described 
in the stage section, children become able to answer counterfactual questions about past events 
around age 3 (German & Nichols, 2003; Perner, Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004).  When told a story 
about a character who walks on a clean carpet with dirty shoes, 3-year-olds understand the floor 
would have remained clean if the character had taken her shoes off first (Harris, et al., 1996).  Such 
stories, however, merely require the ability to reason about a different event to the one that actually 
occurred.  They do not require the child to represent multiple potential outcomes for the same event 
(Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak, 2010).  In order to differentiate between these abilities, Beck and 
colleagues (2006) gave children a problem in which a toy mouse could emerge at the bottom of one 
of two slides.  When told they could place mats at the bottom of the slides to protect the mouse, 
only 30% of 4-year-olds placed mats at the bottom of both slides, even when prompted with the 
question “could he go anywhere else?” after placing a single mat.  On the other hand, these 4-year-
olds performed near ceiling level when asked a simple counterfactual question after the event: 
“what if next time he goes the other way?”  Only by five did the majority of children place two mats 
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in the undetermined future task, suggesting that they possessed the ability to compare and contrast 
multiple possible versions of a single future event. 
 Often we do not direct very realistic mental scenarios.  We may imagine only what we 
desire and frequently expect that positive events are far more likely to occur than one could 
rationally expect (Weinstein, 1980).  In fact, humans demonstrate various systematic biases when 
predicting the future (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  For example, we tend 
to underestimate the time it will take to complete a goal (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994) and 
overestimate the sadness at not achieving the goal (Wilson & Gilbert, 2005).  These foresight biases 
may be functional adaptations, as they increase a person’s motivation to pursue future goals 
(Buehler, et al., 1994; Suddendorf, 2011).  We do not know of any studies on affective forecasting 
biases in children, though they certainly take immense pleasure in anticipated events, such as an 
upcoming birthday or Christmas.  Lagatutta and Safyan (2011) gave children and adults pictures of 
simple ongoing events and asked them to estimate the likelihood of a specific future outcome—for 
example, how likely it was that a giraffe of a given height would be able to reach a piece of food.  
Understanding of likelihood and uncertainty improved significantly from 4-5 to 6-7, and from 6-7 
to 8-10.  Children spend a lot of time in fantasy play, acting out scenarios and affective reactions.  
These activities, coupled with actual real life experiences, may be essential in enabling better 
assessment of imagined potential future scenarios.  
6.  The Executive Producer 
 A successful theatre production requires an executive producer able to oversee the practical 
and fiscal aspects of the project and, ultimately, put the play into action.  Similarly, to act prudently 
with the future in mind may require some executive function.  In general, executive function covers 
the range of psychological mechanisms that allow organisation of action in relation to competing 
sources of information, as well as the flexible shifting of action choice in response to changes in 
information (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008).  Executive function is implicated in the development 
of basic forms of planning (McCormack & Atance, 2011), such as that required by Tower of 
London tasks (Bull, Espy, & Senn, 2004), but it may be just as important for planning future events 
that are entirely removed from the here-and-now (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  In situations 
where achieving a future goal requires only a single current action, the most important executive 
ability is inhibition.  Specifically, one must be able to implement an action that is more effortful in 
the face of a competing action that is more automatic; and/or to respond to information of less 
salience (e.g., only represented in imagination) in the face of information of greater salience (e.g., 
presented perceptually).  For more complex future goals, one must also be able to flexibly shift 
focus from one aspect of the problem to another when required (P. Anderson, 2002; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007). 
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 Infants begin to show basic forms of inhibition, in which they must withhold an automatic 
response, late during the first year and early during the second year of life (Diamond, 1990; 
Kochanska, Tjebkes, & Fortnan, 1998; Scerif, Cornish, Wilding, Driver, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2004).  
But young children often persevere and fail to executively control their action intelligently.  For 
example, although 24-month olds can use a picture to find a hidden object in a room on their first 
trial, on subsequent trials they tend to simply return to the location of previous success rather than 
to where the object is indicated on the photo (Suddendorf, 2003).  Beyond this age children become 
increasingly competent in their executive control.  The wait-based delay of gratification task, for 
example, requires a child to wait until an absent experimenter returns with a large reward, or ring a 
bell and have the experimenter immediately return with a smaller reward (Mischel, Shoda, & 
Rodriguez, 1989).  Between two and four years of age, there is a gradual improvement in the length 
of time children are able to wait, with the majority of 4-year-olds able to wait at least five minutes 
(Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000; Kochanska, et al., 1998).  The children who demonstrate 
more control have various advantages later in life (Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990).  
 Munakata and colleagues (2012) identify three transitions in control: (i) from perseveration 
to responding based on external signals, (ii) from re-active control to pro-active control and (iii) 
from environmental triggers to autocuing.  By about age 4 children begin to demonstrate some 
capacity to follow a rule even when it contradicts some prepotent response.  Unlike 3-year-olds, for 
example, 4-year-olds can respond appropriately to Stroop-like tasks (Espy, 1997; Gerstadt, Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994), follow rules to do as another says even if it conflicts with what the other does 
(Diamond & Taylor, 1996), select a small over a large reward after repeatedly experiencing that this 
is the more beneficial choice (Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005), and sort multidimensional cards first 
by shape and then by colour (Zelazo, Müller, Frye, & Marcovich, 2003).  However, 4-year-olds’ 
initially successful performances on some of these tasks can deteriorate to chance level over very 
short time periods (Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Gerstadt, et al., 1994), suggesting that young 
children’s executive resources are rather limited.  Indeed, the ability to follow counterintuitive rules 
continues to develop throughout childhood and well into adolescence and young adulthood (V. 
Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; Bedard et al., 2002; Davidson, Amso, 
Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Kalkut, Han, Lansing, Holdnack, & Delis, 2009; Williams, Ponesse, 
Schachar, Logan, & Tannock, 1999).  This late development means children may often struggle to 
implement actions aimed at imagined future goals. 
7.  The Broadcaster 
 Although episodic foresight can be immensely powerful and flexible, it is also a dangerously 
risky way of making decisions.  We are not clairvoyants and our imagined future events may be 
wide off the mark.  A major way in which we improve the accuracy of our future scenarios is by 
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broadcasting them to each other.  People who have been in the situation before can offer the best 
advice about what to expect from the future episode (Gilbert, 2006).  By telling others what we 
think will happen or what we plan to do, we can solicit feedback, comments and advice.  This can 
dramatically reduce error rates.  A friend’s advice to not put mustard on the cheesecake may save 
you, not to mention the target, a lot of grief.  Language may have evolved in part to communicate 
mental scenarios about past and future (Suddendorf, Addis, & Corballis, 2009).  These exchanges 
also allow us to coordinate our actions in novel ways.  Negotiation of shared plans allows members 
of a cooperative group to adopt specific roles within an agreed future event.  Children frequently 
negotiate their roles in play and this may allow them to practice such collaborations for more 
serious circumstances. 
 Future-oriented talk requires specific linguistic markers.  With the correct use of future 
tense, for example, children are able to ensure their audience understands the described event is 
located in the future rather than the past.  Similarly, with the correct use of terms such as ‘before’ 
and ‘after’, children are able to describe sequential relationships between sub-events located within 
the imagined future episode as a whole.  Although some temporal markers appear relatively early in 
language development (Clark, 1971; Veneziano & Sinclair, 1995), it is only between the ages of 
three and seven that significant improvements are seen in the correct use of many indicators of time 
(Busby & Suddendorf, 2011; Harner, 1980; Stevenson & Pollitt, 1987).  
 Perhaps the most important capacity required for the effective communication of future 
event plans is an understanding of narrative structure.  By using this structure, we can provide 
setting information, background information and sequential information about the central future 
event and thus optimise the chance that the audience will construct a matching event within their 
own virtual theatre(s).  Both past and future narratives tend to have important social functions, and 
note that recent research on self-reports suggests that future narratives are more relevant than past 
narratives to one’s life story and identity (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010).  Children first experience 
narratives via conversations about the past and future with their parents, and there is evidence that 
parents who provide more elaborative narratives have children who produce more detailed linguistic 
constructions of the past (Fivush, 2011) and the future (Hudson, 2006)—although note that cultures 
may differ in how much detail people typically provide (Wang, Hou, Tang, & Wiprovnick, 2011).  
Children begin to spontaneously produce their own narratives centred on general event scripts 
between age two to three (Fivush & Slackman, 1986; Hudson, Shapiro, & Sosa, 1995; Nelson & 
Fivush, 2004), and by five their narratives about future events include strategies aimed at preventing 
negative outcomes (Hudson, et al., 1995).  Only by nine, however, do the majority of children 
include setting information, background information, sequential information and a climax in their 
personal narratives (Hudson & Shapiro, 1991).  Without these elements, young children may 
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struggle to elicit a closely matching future event representation in the audience.  Consequently, 
children may not give nor receive the best possible advice about how to approach a future event.  
 
 
 
 
 
Summary 
As summarised in Figure 2, the development of components purportedly involved in 
episodic foresight is diverse, with certain milestones occurring well before others.  While some 
components such as working memory capacity appear to develop gradually throughout childhood, 
others, such as self-recognition, change rapidly around specific time periods.  There may thus be 
qualitative and quantitative transitions with different effects on the development of episodic 
foresight.  Still, it is important to note that many experimental approaches focus on establishing 
competence at certain ages rather than demonstrating absence of capacities.  As failures to perform 
can be due to many reasons other than the one of interest, the evidence may well underestimate 
Figure 2. Approximate representation of developmental changes in the cognitive components 
implicated in episodic foresight (darker shades of grey represent increasing competence). 
32 
 
capacities of younger cohorts.  As it stands, the available evidence suggests that, while some 
components begin to emerge by the second year of life, it is only by the end of the third year that 
developments in all components are documented.  This pattern is consistent with the evidence from 
recent studies attempting to assess the development of episodic foresight more directly.  To those, 
we shall turn next.          
The Development of Foresightful Behaviour 
 Planning is traditionally studied with problems such as the Tower of London (Kaller, Rahm, 
Spreer, Mader, & Unterrainer, 2008) or route-planning games (Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989).  
However, these approaches do not require children to think beyond a single, ongoing, immediate 
context and therefore arguably do not require episodic foresight (Hudson, Mayhew, & Prabhakar, 
2011).  The easiest way to examine children’s access to more removed events is to question them.  
A number of studies have asked children to report specific events that will happen ‘tomorrow’ 
(Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; Suddendorf, 
2010b).  Results indicate that, while 3-year-olds can report some events, 4- and 5- year-olds report 
more total events and more events judged by parents as correct.  Similarly, when asked to describe 
plans for hypothetical future events, older preschoolers tend to provide many more details than 3-
year-olds (Hudson, et al., 1995), consistent with the developments of the episodic foresight 
components reviewed earlier.  Because young children are in the process of learning temporal 
language, however, there are two fundamental problems with this direct approach.  First, they may 
understand something and yet do not have the language to broadcast their capacity.  Second, they 
may use words appropriately and yet not quite understand (Lyon & Flavell, 1994).  Given these 
problems with false negatives and false positives, studies examining future-oriented behaviour are 
desirable (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005). 
 To ensure that children are relying on episodic foresight when engaging in future-oriented 
behaviour, it is important that studies examine novel behaviours (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010).  
When adults place wallets and keys in their pocket in the morning, they frequently do so without 
explicitly considering future situations in which these items will become useful.  Indeed, such 
preparatory behaviour can become automatic with repetition.  Children, too, may engage in habitual 
future-oriented behaviour based on previous learning or parental scaffolding.  To determine that a 
child has used episodic foresight, tests should therefore focus on problems that children have only 
had controlled exposure to.  Of course, there remains the difficult problem of motivation—many 
children may not be sufficiently engaged by a task to demonstrate their foresight competence, and 
so false negatives can be an issue.  By using novel problems, however, studies can at least reduce 
the risk of false positives. 
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Episodic foresight can guide a host of adaptive, novel future-oriented behaviours and so can 
be evident in diverse contexts: for example, selecting objects for future use; delaying gratification to 
increase the size of a reward in the future; acting based on an anticipated desire rather than a current 
one; and learning a rule for future use.  Only some of these contexts, however, have so far received 
significant attention from the developmental literature.  In the following sections we review the 
available evidence, evaluate the methodologies and identify some potential avenues for future 
research.  Throughout the review we relate the evidence, both positive and negative, back to the 
development of the proposed components of episodic foresight discussed in the previous section.    
Selecting objects to be used in a specific future episode 
 Human adults characteristically carry objects such as keys, wallets and other tools that they 
anticipate will be needed in the future (Suddendorf, 2006).  We like to be prepared.  Although 
preschoolers initially have their lunches and jackets packed by adults, they eventually learn to 
choose to carry objects by themselves in anticipation for a future episode when these items will be 
useful.  Suddendorf (1994) proposed a two-rooms experimental design to test children’s developing 
foresight by allowing them to select and transport an object from one room—where it is useless—to 
another where it is useful.  Indeed, Tulving (2005) endorsed such a future-directed approach as a 
behavioural measure of episodic memory.  In a preliminary study, children were first taken to a 
plain room containing only a puzzle board but no puzzle pieces, and then to a second room where, 
after having been distracted for five minutes, they could secure the missing puzzle pieces for a 
return to the first room (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005).  Four- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, 
were more likely to select the puzzle pieces amongst several distracters than in a control condition 
in which they had not been shown the empty puzzle board. 
 Atance and Meltzoff (2005) showed children a picture book containing several scenes (e.g., 
a desert) and told them to pretend they were going to visit each scene.  They were then offered a list 
of three objects and asked which one they would need to bring with them on their visit.  Although 
4-year-olds typically chose the correct object when the distracter items were entirely unrelated to 
the scene, they remained prone to choosing distracters that were semantically related to the scene 
but not actually required for the future episode (e.g., the majority chose to take a fish to a dangerous 
stream instead of taking a band-aid).  The 5-year-olds, however, scored near ceiling even when the 
distracters were semantically related to the scene.  
 In another study, Russell and colleagues (2010) let children first play a form of table football 
against an experimenter.  They were then asked which two items (out of six) they would need to 
play on the other side of the table either ‘right now’ or ‘tomorrow’.  Because the child was too short 
to reach the top of the table on the other side, the correct items were a box to stand on and a straw to 
blow the ball with.  The results showed that 4-year-olds could pass the present task, but they could 
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only pass the tomorrow task if they were asked to imagine what a peer would need to play 
tomorrow.  However, there are some methodological concerns.  First of all, the problem itself was 
evidently very difficult for children, as only 33% of participants in the present condition could solve 
the problem without it having any temporal element whatsoever.  In order to disentangle the basic 
capacity for foresight from later-developing problem-solving capacities, experiments should employ 
problems that can be easily solved in the present context.  Secondly, in the ‘tomorrow’ condition, 
the children were asked to imagine a future event occurring towards an apparatus they were 
currently observing.  Hence, although the children were linguistically invited to step out of the 
present context in their approach to the problem, many of them simply could have solved the task 
using, in the authors’ own words, “purely functional reasoning such as ‘anybody who plays on the 
blue side will need the box’” (p. 59). 
To ascertain that a behaviour is driven by an episodic capacity, Suddendorf and Corballis 
(2010) advocate four criteria that rule out common alternative explanations for apparent future-
directed behaviour: (i) the use of single trials, to avoid repeated exposure to the same stimulus–
reward relationships and to demonstrate memory of a specific event; (ii) the use of novel problems, 
to avoid relevant learning histories and to demonstrate that cognitive processes drive the behaviour; 
(iii) the use of different temporal and spatial contexts for exposure to the problem and the crucial 
future-directed action, to avoid cuing and to demonstrate long-term memory; and (iv) the use of 
problems from different domains, to avoid specific behavioural predispositions and to demonstrate 
flexibility.  A recent developmental study was designed with these criteria in mind (Suddendorf, et 
al., 2011).  Children were introduced to a problem in one room (a box that needed a specially 
shaped key to open it, or a puppet that liked a specific food) before being taken to another room and 
distracted for 15 minutes.  They were then told they would be returning to the first room and were 
allowed to take one of several objects (one of which was the solution to the future problem) with 
them.  Four-year-olds but not 3-year-olds chose the correct item above chance.  In an instant version 
of the task, however, children from both age groups performed near ceiling.  Hence, although the 
problems were conceptually easy, only the 4-year-olds demonstrated a capacity use information 
from a specific past episode and act to prepare for a return to these problems.  A control experiment 
confirmed that temporal rather than spatial displacement was critical to performance.  
 These findings demonstrate that by 48 months of age, at least, human children have a 
capacity for episodic foresight.  They can remember a novel problem sufficiently enough to secure 
its future solution (for similar findings, see Scarf, et al., 2013).  Of course, the future that children 
prepare for in this paradigm is the very next event, albeit one in another room.  In a recent follow-
up study, however, we found that 4-year-olds similarly performed above chance even when 
informed that they would not be returning to the first room until a 5-minute sand-timer had 
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completed its cycle (Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013).  Thus, 48-month-old children can clearly act 
prudently to bring about an anticipated future scenario, consistent with the developments of the 
episodic foresight components reviewed earlier.  Further experimentation varying the time between 
action and implementation, the tasks, the distractors and behavioural options, may help to clarify 
young children’s competencies and limits.  
Choosing to delay gratification to increase the size of a reward in the future 
 To take advantage of future opportunities, we must sometimes forego presently desirable 
activities in favour of intuitively unappealing, but in the longer term more rewarding choices.  Such 
situations have been studied with choice-based delay of gratification tasks, in which a child must 
choose between a larger reward to have in the future or a smaller reward to have in the present 
(Mischel & Metzner, 1962).  Whereas the wait-based task introduced earlier only requires the 
inhibition of a prepotent response, the choice-based task instead focuses on the choices that children 
make when given the opportunity to allocate varying rewards to their present or future self 
(Lemmon & Moore, 2007).  Until around four, children are very much present-oriented in these 
choices (Lemmon & Moore, 2007; Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998).  Yet, even older 
preschoolers’ preferences are influenced by salience of the present reward (Patterson & Carter, 
1979), the size of the future reward (Garon, Longard, Bryson, & Moore, 2012; Lemmon & Moore, 
2007), and the length of time that they have to wait for the future reward (Garon, Johnson, & 
Steeves, 2011).  The executive component of episodic foresight appears to play an important role in 
these patterns, as suggested by associations between performance on choice-based delay of 
gratification tasks and various inhibition tasks (Moore, et al., 1998; Moore & Macgillivray, 2004).  
Improvements on choice-based delay of gratification tasks are seen throughout childhood and 
adolescence (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Mischel & Metzner, 1962). 
 Metcalf and Atance (2011) examined when children can learn from their lack of inhibition 
preventing them from receiving a large reward.  In their experimental set-up, 3- to 5-year-old 
children visited two rooms.  In each room there was a marble run apparatus—a simple one in the 
first and a much more elaborate and interesting one in the second—which allowed the children to 
place a marble at the top and then watch as it made its way through the apparatus to a trap at the 
bottom.  After these had been introduced, the children were given three marbles and told they would 
be able to use them on sequential visits to each room.  After visiting the two rooms, children were 
provided with three more marbles and a second trial of sequential visits to the rooms ensued.  The 
results showed that, while there was some evidence of saving the marbles for the interesting 
apparatus on the first trial, there was a significant increase in saving on the second trial.  Hence, 
after experiencing a failure to deploy executive resources that would have increased the reward, 
preschoolers can learn to show greater inhibition when a second opportunity arises.   
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Acting based on an incongruent future desire 
It is one thing to be able to inhibit an impulsive behaviour in order to increase the size of a 
future reward that is currently desired, and quite another to be able to act based on a future reward 
that is not currently desired.  Indeed, this ability has been proposed to separate humans from other 
extant animals (Bischof-Köhler, 1985; Bischof, 1985; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  And yet, 
even adult humans often struggle to override their current desires when engaging in future-oriented 
behaviour, as exemplified by the finding that people tend to buy more groceries when shopping 
while hungry than when shopping while sated (Nisbett & Kanouse, 1969).  One might therefore 
expect young children to find such behaviour particularly difficult.    
The two-room paradigm discussed in the object choice section was initially proposed to test 
when children can prepare for a state such as thirst while they are currently quenched (Suddendorf, 
1994).  Such a test has proven difficult to implement, although Atance and Meltzoff (2006) have 
come some way.  They gave half of participating preschoolers some thirst-inducing pretzels to eat.  
All children were then offered the choice to have pretzels or water ‘now’ or ‘tomorrow’.  The 
children who had first eaten pretzels preferred to have water, regardless of whether they would be 
receiving it immediately or the next day.  The baseline children who had not eaten pretzels, 
however, preferred to have pretzels in both temporal conditions.  Three, 4- and 5-year olds did not 
differ in their preferences.  These findings suggest that the thirsty children in the ‘tomorrow’ 
condition were unable to act based on their future baseline level of thirst.  By age 5, children can 
consider minds with incongruent states to their own, so why do they struggle here?  Perhaps 
insufficient executive control is the key.  It may require a considerable amount of effort to inhibit 
the impulse to act on such a salient feeling as salt-induced thirst.  Alternatively, perhaps thirsty 5-
year-olds simply do not consider that their level of thirst will have returned to its baseline state by 
the next day.  This failure could arise from both an immature set (as the child underestimates the 
amount of time that will pass between making and receiving the choice) and director (as the child 
fails to recognise and adjust for the initial underestimation).  Only future research with children at 
an age where performance levels are transitional will be able to pinpoint which components are 
responsible. 
Prospective memory 
 Once a future scenario can be conceived, we can not only prepare for or shape the future 
through current action, but also form the intention to perform an action given a particular future 
event or at a specific future point in time.  Once such an intention is formed, a new challenge is to 
remember that intention and act upon it when the time comes.  This memory for an intention is 
known as prospective memory and has been extensively studied (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; 
Kvavilashvili, 1992).  In such studies, an experimenter typically informs participants what they will 
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have to do given either a certain event or time interval (Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & Messer, 2008).  
Kliegel and Jäger (2007), for example, presented 2- to 6-year-olds with picture cards to name, and 
the event-based prospective memory task was to place any pictures of apples within a box.  In the 
‘no memory aid’ condition, the box was behind the children and out of sight; in the ‘memory aid’ 
condition, the box remained in front of the children and visible throughout the task.  In the no 
memory aid condition, the 4-year-olds performed significantly better than the 3-year-olds, who 
performed close to floor level.  However, the 3-year-olds’ performance was significantly increased 
in the ‘memory aid’ condition, suggesting they are sometimes able to succeed on prospective 
memory tasks, as long as there is an external cue to trigger their memory of the rule.  Four-year-
olds, on the other hand, can succeed even without such cues.  Children continue to improve on more 
difficult versions of event-based prospective memory tasks throughout the middle and late 
childhood years (Kvavilashvili, et al., 2008), potentially due to quantitative improvements in 
working memory and complex forms of executive function (Guajardo & Best, 2000).   
 Time-based prospective memory research has typically focused on school-aged children 
(Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Kerns, 2000; Mackinlay, Kliegel, & Mäntylä, 2009), requiring them 
to carry out an action when a clock shows a specific time or when an alternative timing device has 
completed a cycle.  The youngest reported success on a time-based task is by 5-year-olds, who 
performed adequately when they were required to turn a sand-timer over whenever it had completed 
a cycle—while also playing an unrelated game (Kliegel, Brandenberger, & Aberle, 2010).  Still, one 
may question whether these tasks really measure time-based prospective memory in isolation.  One 
can solve the tasks through a time-dependent yet still event-based rule such as: do X when all the 
sand has dropped, or when the clock shows this or that pattern.  Therefore, we are not convinced 
that any current research documents the development of truly time-based prospective memory, and 
recommend such work be conducted.  
 More importantly, we know next to nothing about how children develop the capacity to 
generate their own intentions based on their own episodic foresight.  In prospective memory 
research the experimenter does this important work for the children and instructs them what to do 
and when.  It is possible that children are scaffolded through the instructions adults give them.  
Future research should therefore examine when children have the cognitive resources to instruct 
themselves about what they intend to do in the future.  Such research might wish to measure, for 
example, children’s ability to spontaneously set an alarm that will remind themselves to perform a 
novel future task. 
Future Directions 
 In addition to the specific avenues for future research alluded to in the previous sections, 
there are some more general developmental questions ripe for investigation.  Deliberate practice, for 
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instance, is a fundamentally important behavioural corollary of episodic foresight that has so far 
been neglected by developmental psychology.  We can choose to practice a skill or rehearse 
information in light of what we foresee to be their future utility.  Much of human diversity in 
expertise is a function of the fact that children selectively devote distinct efforts towards learning 
certain knowledge and practicing particular skills.  Children begin to play (Cohen, 2006; Fein & 
Apfel, 1979) and ask questions (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997) from a very young age, incidentally 
learning actions and information that will come in handy throughout their lives.  Surprisingly little, 
however, is known about when children begin to deliberately practice skills or obtain knowledge to 
solve particular future problems.  
 The factors that facilitate or hinder the development of effective episodic foresight also 
deserve more research attention.  We have seen that parents who produce more elaborate past and 
future narratives have children who produce more detailed linguistic descriptions of the past 
(Fivush, 2011) and the future (Hudson, 2006).  However, whether this effect extends to the actual 
capacity, rather than merely its expression, remains to be seen.  There are programs and activities 
that improve children’s executive functions (Diamond, 2012), and this, or similar training, may 
potentially also enhance children’s episodic foresight.  The role that deficits in episodic foresight 
may play in the development of various conditions and psychopathologies also deserves further 
scrutiny.  Children with autism, for example, who struggle to represent the perspectives of other 
people (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), may have similar troubles representing their own 
future perspectives (Lind & Bowler, 2010; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  
 Critically, more research is required on the relationship between brain maturation and the 
development of episodic foresight and its purported components.  The brain regions implicated in 
mental time travel closely map to the ‘default network’ (Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, et al., 
2009), which is highly active during wakeful rest (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; 
Mason et al., 2007) and may be more generally implicated in the construction and maintenance of 
coherent scenes (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009).  By age 2 the default network becomes similar to that 
of adults (Gao et al., 2009).  However, even in 7- to 9-year-old children the nodes are still only 
loosely connected, and only by early adulthood does activity become tightly interlinked and 
temporally correlated (Fair et al., 2008).  Default network activity shifts from the orbital prefrontal 
cortex at age two (Gao, et al., 2009), to more ventral/dorsal prefrontal regions—which have been 
implicated in self-reflective processing (Amodio & Frith, 2006)—from age five onwards (de Bie et 
al., 2011; Gao, et al., 2009).  Between ages 3 and 5 the cortex is expending more energy per unit 
volume than at any other time (Chugani, Phelps, & Mazziotta, 1987), correlating with the 
emergence of many of the episodic foresight components and future-oriented behaviours reviewed 
herein.  As yet, however, there is no published research on the development of the default network 
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during this period.  Interestingly, an infant-like pattern of orbital prefrontal activity is also seen in 
the default network of our closest living animal relative, the chimpanzee (Rilling et al., 2007).  
Future research could examine whether the differences between chimpanzee and adult human 
default networks mirror the developmental refining of the human default network, and so 
potentially link research on the development of episodic foresight with research on the capacities 
and limits of chimpanzees (Mulcahy & Call, 2006; Osvath & Osvath, 2008; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007, 2010; Suddendorf, Corballis, & Collier-Baker, 2009).  
 Neural correlates of the purported components of mental scenario building deserve more 
research attention in their own rights, as well as in the context of enabling foresight.  We saw that 
many relevant components keep developing long after age five, and foresight capacities keep 
improving into young adulthood.  Neural changes, too, continue well beyond early childhood, and 
such changes may correspond to later cognitive developments.  From ages eight to fourteen, for 
instance, the absolute and relative volume of the prefrontal cortex almost doubles (Kanemura, 
Aihara, Aoki, Araki, & Nakazawa, 2003), perhaps increasing the role of this region in the default 
network.  Throughout adolescence cortical grey matter becomes thinner and white matter 
increases—synapses are pruned and axons become increasingly myelinated (Huttenlocher, 1990; 
Paus et al., 1999).  Adolescents gradually improve in their capacity to prudently control behaviour, 
becoming increasingly capable of self-discipline and resistance to temptation.  Indeed, even on 
relatively simple tasks such as “when a light appears on the left of the screen look to the right; when 
it appears on the right look left”, inhibition errors only gradually decrease across adolescence 
(Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004; Luna et al., 2001).  Recent work suggests that 
white matter connectivity continues to mature even later (Asato, Terwilliger, Woo, & Luna, 2010), 
with the uncinate fasciculus, a white matter tract associated with emotional processing linking 
orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala and temporal regions, peaking only in the mid-thirties (Lebel et al., 
2012).  The causal relations between our developing brain and the emergence of our increasingly 
prudent prospective minds remain to be uncovered. 
Conclusion 
 Episodic foresight is arguably a quintessential human faculty that is employed in many 
domains.  There may be some degree of freedom in its development in different individuals, 
depending on the cultures, teachers, models and individual idiosyncrasies.  Little as yet is known 
about such differences and what may foster or inhibit the development of episodic foresight.  The 
basic capacity is a human universal, however, and so the fundamental steps in its development may 
emerge in a predicable fashion.  Our review indicates that children between age 3 and 4 acquire 
many milestones in the components proposed to be involved in episodic foresight.  The pattern of 
development differs between components, suggesting that different aspects of foresight may 
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develop at different times.  More direct measures of future-directed capacities also highlight the 
importance of the preschool years as children demonstrate foresight when asked directly or 
examined with future-directed problems.  So this period appears to represent a watershed, even 
though evidently there are important developments before and after.  
 Only one published study so far has tested associations between multiple future-oriented 
tasks (Atance & Jackson, 2009).  The seven tasks in this study were: a question about what the child 
was going to do ‘tomorrow’, a picture book that required children to select objects to be taken to 
specific future scenes, a wait-based delay of gratification task, two prospective memory tasks, and 
two tasks measuring other aspects of planning (a modified version of the Tower of Hanoi and a 
route-planning task).  After controlling for age and vocabulary, the only two positive correlations 
were between the tomorrow task and the picture book task, and the tomorrow task and one of the 
prospective memory tasks.  If one conceives of episodic foresight as a single encapsulated cognitive 
module, as a unitary ability that children either do or do not have, then a lack of many significant 
correlations would be concerning.  However, the view that episodic foresight depends on the 
maturation and interaction of a range of sophisticated components predicts a far more complicated 
developmental pattern.  Children may begin to solve one kind of task and yet be incapable of 
another, depending on the demands on components involved.  
 Our own foresight indicates that much more research will be conducted to disentangle what 
exactly is involved in each task, and new measures will be developed to isolate specific 
competencies.  We have only very recently begun to investigate the nature and development of this 
important human faculty.  
  
41 
 
References 
Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). Constructive episodic simulation: Temporal distance and 
detail of past and future events modulate hippocampal engagement. Hippocampus, 18(2), 
227-237.  
Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2012). The hippocampus and imagining the future: Where do we 
stand? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5, 173.  
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the 
future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and elaboration. 
Neuropsychologia, 45(7), 1363-1377.  
Alexander, R. D. (1989). Evolution of the human psyche. In P. Mellars & C. Stringer (Eds.), The 
human revolution: Behavioral and biological perspectives on the origins of modern humans 
(pp. 455-513). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Alloway, T. P., Gathercole, S. E., & Pickering, S. J. (2006). Verbal and visuospatial short-term and 
working memory in children: Are they seperable? Child Development, 77(6), 1698-1716.  
Amodio, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2006). Meeting of minds: The medial frontal cortex and social 
cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 7(4), 268-277.  
Amsterdam, B. (1972). Mirror self-image reactions before age two. Developmental Psychobiology, 
5(4), 297-305.  
Andelman, F., Hoofien, D., Goldberg, I., Aizenstein, O., & Neufeld, M. Y. (2010). Bilateral 
hippocampal lesion and a selective impairment of the ability for mental time travel. 
Neurocase, 16(5), 426-435.  
Anderson, P. (2002). Assessment and development of executive function (EF) during childhood. 
Child Neuropsychology, 8(2), 71-82.  
Anderson, V., Anderson, P., Northam, E., Jacobs, R., & Catroppa, C. (2001). Development of 
executive functions through late childhood and adolescence in an Australian sample. 
Developmental Neuropsychology, 20(1), 385-406.  
Asato, M., Terwilliger, R., Woo, J., & Luna, B. (2010). White matter development in adolescence: a 
DTI study. Cerebral Cortex, 20(9), 2122-2131.  
Asendorpf, J. B., & Baudonniere, P. M. (1993). Self-awareness and other-awareness: Mirror self-
recognition and synchronic imitation among unfamiliar peers. Developmental Psychology, 
29(1), 88-95.  
Atance, C. M., & Jackson, L. K. (2009). The development and coherence of future-oriented 
behaviors during the preschool years. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102(4), 
379-391.  
42 
 
Atance, C. M., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2005). My future self: Young children's ability to anticipate and 
explain future states. Cognitive Development, 20(3), 341-361.  
Atance, C. M., & Meltzoff, A. N. (2006). Preschoolers' current desires warp their choices for the 
future. Psychological Science, 17(7), 583-587.  
Baddeley, A. (1992). Working memory. Science, 255(5044), 556-559.  
Baillargeon, R. (2002). The acquisition of physical knowledge in infancy: A summary in eight 
lessons. In U. Goswami (Ed.), Blackwell handbook of childhood cognitive development (pp. 
46-83). Oxford: Blackwell. 
Balter, M. (2010). Did working memory spark creative culture? Science, 328(5975), 160-163.  
Bar, M. (2011). Predictions in the brain: Using our past to generate a future. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? 
Cognition, 21(1), 37-46.  
Barr, R., Dowden, A., & Hayne, H. (1996). Developmental changes in deferred imitation by 6 to 
24-month-old infants. Infant Behaviour and Development, 19(2), 159-171.  
Barr, R., Vieira, A., & Rovee-Collier, C. (2001). Mediated imitation in 6-month-olds: 
Remembering by association. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 79(3), 229-252.  
Bauer, P. J. (2007). Remembering the times of our lives: memory in infancy and beyond. Mahwah, 
NJ: Laurence Erlbaum Associates. 
Bauer, P. J., & Dow, G. A. (1994). Episodic memory in 16-and 20-month-old children: Specifics 
are generalized but not forgotten. Developmental Psychology, 30(3), 403-417.  
Bauer, P. J., & Leventon, J. S. (2013). Memory for one-time experiences in the second year of life: 
Implications for the status of episodic memory. Infancy, 18(5), 755-781.  
Beck, S. R., Riggs, K. J., & Gorniak, S. L. (2009). Relating developments in children's 
counterfactual thinking and executive functions. Thinking & Reasoning, 15(4), 337-354.  
Beck, S. R., Riggs, K. J., & Gorniak, S. L. (2010). The effect of causal chain length on 
counterfactual conditional reasoning. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 28(3), 
505-521.  
Beck, S. R., Robinson, E. J., Carroll, D. J., & Apperly, I. A. (2006). Children's thinking about 
counterfactuals and future hypotheticals as possibilities. Child Development, 77(2), 413-426.  
Bedard, A. C., Nichols, S., Barbosa, J. A., Schachar, R., Logan, G. D., & Tannock, R. (2002). The 
development of selective inhibitory control across the life span. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 21(1), 93-111.  
43 
 
Berntsen, D., & Bohn, A. (2010). Remembering and forecasting: The relation between 
autobiographical memory and episodic future thinking. Memory & Cognition, 38(3), 265-
278.  
Bischof-Köhler, D. (1985). Zur Phylogenese menschlicher Motivation [On the phylogeny of human 
motivation]. In L. H. Eckensberger & E. D. Lantermann (Eds.), Emotion und Reflexivität 
(pp. 3-47). Vienna: Urban & Schwarzenberg. 
Bischof, N. (1985). Das Rätzel Ödipus [The Oedipus riddle]. Munich: Piper. 
Botzung, A., Denkova, E., & Manning, L. (2008). Experiencing past and future personal events: 
Functional neuroimaging evidence on the neural bases of mental time travel. Brain and 
Cognition, 66(2), 202-212.  
Buckner, R. L., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2008). The brain's default network. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124(1), 1-38.  
Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (1994). Exploring the "planning fallacy": Why people 
underestimate their task completion times. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
67(3), 366-381.  
Bull, R., Espy, K. A., & Senn, T. E. (2004). A comparison of performance on the Towers of 
London and Hanoi in young children. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 45(4), 
743-754.  
Busby Grant, J., & Suddendorf, T. (2009). Preschoolers begin to differentiate the times of events 
from throughout the lifespan. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 6(6), 746-
762.  
Busby, J. G., & Suddendorf, T. (2005). Recalling yesterday and predicting tomorrow. Cognitive 
Development, 20(3), 362-372.  
Busby, J. G., & Suddendorf, T. (2011). Production of temporal terms by 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old 
children. Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 26(1), 87-95.  
Butler, D. L., Mattingley, J. B., Cunnington, R., & Suddendorf, T. (2012). Mirror, mirror on the 
wall, how does my brain recognize my image at all? PloS one, 7(2), e31452.  
Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false 
belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112(2), 337-342.  
Carlson, S. M., Davis, A. C., & Leach, J. G. (2005). Less is more: Executive function and symbolic 
representation in preschool children. Psychological Science, 16(8), 609-616.  
Ceci, S. J., & Bronfenbrenner, U. (1985). "Don't forget to take the cupcakes out of the oven": 
Prospective memory, strategic time-monitoring, and context. Child Development, 56(1), 
152-164.  
Chomsky, N. (1966). Language and mind. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
44 
 
Chugani, H. T., Phelps, M. E., & Mazziotta, J. C. (1987). Positron emission tomography study of 
human brain functional development. Annals of Neurology, 22(4), 487-497.  
Clark, E. V. (1971). On the acquisition of the meaning of before and after. Journal of Verbal 
Learning & Verbal Behavior, 10(3), 266-275.  
Claxton, A. F., Pannells, T. C., & Rhoads, P. A. (2005). Developmental trends in the creativity of 
school-age children. Creativity Research Journal, 17(4), 327-335.  
Clayton, N. S., & Russell, J. (2009). Looking for episodic memory in animals and young children: 
Prospects for a new minimalism. Neuropsychologia, 47(11), 2330-2340.  
Cohen, D. (2006). The development of play. New York: Routledge. 
Corballis, M. C. (2011). The recursive mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Corballis, M. C. (2013a). Mental time travel: A case for evolutionary continuity. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 17(1), 5-6.  
Corballis, M. C. (2013b). The wandering rat: Response to Suddendorf. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 17(4), 152.  
D'Argembeau, A., Raffard, S., & Van der Linden, M. (2008). Remembering the past and imagining 
the future in schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 117(1), 247-251.  
Davidson, M. C., Amso, D., Anderson, L. C., & Diamond, A. (2006). Development of cognitive 
control and executive functions from 4 to 13 years: Evidence from manipulations of 
memory, inhibition, and task switching. Neuropsychologia, 44(11), 2037-2078.  
de Bie, H., Boersma, M., Adriaanse, S., Veltman, D. J., Wink, A. M., Roosendaal, S. D., . . . 
Delemarre van de Waal, H. A. (2011). Resting-state networks in awake five-to eight-year 
old children. Human Brain Mapping, 33(5), 1189-1201.  
Dennett, D. C., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992). Time and the observer - the where and when of 
consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15(2), 183-201.  
Diamond, A. (1990). Developmental time course in human infants and infant monkeys, and the 
neural bases of, inhibitory control in reaching. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
608, 637-676.  
Diamond, A. (2012). Activities and programs that improve children’s executive functions. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 21(5), 335-341.  
Diamond, A., & Taylor, C. (1996). Development of an aspect of executive control: Development of 
the abilities to remember what I said and to “Do as I say, not as I do”. Developmental 
Psychobiology, 29(4), 315-334.  
Eacott, M. J., & Easton, A. (2012). Remembering the past and thinking about the future: Is it really 
about time? Learning and Motivation, 43(4), 200-208.  
45 
 
Ellis, J. A., & Kvavilashvili, L. (2000). Prospective memory in 2000: Past, present, and future 
directions. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 14(7), S1-S9.  
Espy, K. A. (1997). The Shape School: Assessing executive function in preschool children. 
Developmental Neuropsychology, 13(4), 495-499.  
Fair, D. A., Cohen, A. L., Dosenbach, N. U. F., Church, J. A., Miezin, F. M., Barch, D. M., . . . 
Schlaggar, B. L. (2008). The maturing architecture of the brain's default network. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105(10), 
4028-4032.  
Fein, G. G. (1981). Pretend play: an integrative review. Cognitive Development, 52, 1095-1118.  
Fein, G. G., & Apfel, N. (1979). The development of play: Style, structure, and situations. Genetic 
Psychology Monographs, 99(2), 231-250.  
Fivush, R. (2011). The development of autobiographical memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 
62, 559-582.  
Fivush, R., & Slackman, E. (1986). The acquisition and development of scripts. In K. E. Nelson 
(Ed.), Event knowledge: Structure and function in development (pp. 71-96). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Ford, R. M., Driscoll, T., Shum, D., & Macaulay, C. E. (2012). Executive and theory-of-mind 
contributions to event-based prospective memory in children: Exploring the self-projection 
hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 111(3), 468-489.  
Friedman, W. J. (1986). The development of children's knowledge of temporal structures. Child 
Development, 57(6), 1386-1400.  
Friedman, W. J. (2003). The development of children's understanding of the past and the future. In 
R. Kail (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol. 31, pp. 229-269). San 
Diego: Academic Press. 
Friedman, W. J. (2005). Developmental and cognitive perspectives on humans' sense of the times of 
past and future events. Learning and Motivation, 36(2), 145-158.  
Friedman, W. J. (2008). Developmental perspectives on the psychology of time. In S. Grondin 
(Ed.), Psychology of time (pp. 345-366). Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Group. 
Friedman, W. J., & Kemp, S. (1998). The effects of elapsed time and retrieval on young children's 
judgments of the temporal distances of past events. Cognitive Development, 13(3), 335-367.  
Gallup, G. G. (1970). Chimpanzees: Self recognition. Science, 167, 86-87.  
Gallup, G. G. (1997). On the rise and fall of self-conception in primates. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 818, 73-84.  
Gao, W., Zhu, H., Giovanello, K. S., Smith, J. K., Shen, D., Gilmore, J. H., & Lin, W. (2009). 
Evidence on the emergence of the brain's default network from 2-week-old to 2-year-old 
46 
 
healthy pediatric subjects. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 106(16), 6790-6795.  
Garon, N., Bryson, S. E., & Smith, I. M. (2008). Executive function in preschoolers: A review using 
an integrative framework. Psychological Bulletin, 134(1), 31-60.  
Garon, N., Johnson, B., & Steeves, A. (2011). Sharing with others and delaying for the future in 
preschoolers. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 383-396.  
Garon, N., Longard, J., Bryson, S. E., & Moore, C. (2012). Making decisions about now and later: 
Development of future-oriented self-control. Cognitive Development, 27(3), 314-322.  
Gathercole, S. E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B., & Wearing, H. (2004). The structure of working 
memory from 4 to 15 years of age. Developmental Psychology, 40(2), 177-190.  
Gauvain, M., & Rogoff, B. (1989). Collaborative problem-solving and children's planning skills. 
Developmental Psychology, 25(1), 139-151.  
German, T. P., & Nichols, S. (2003). Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short 
causal chains. Developmental Science, 6(5), 514-523.  
Gerstadt, C. L., Hong, Y. J., & Diamond, A. (1994). The relationship between cognition and action: 
Performance of children 3½-7 years old on a stroop-like day-night test. Cognition, 53(2), 
129-153.  
Gilbert, D. T. (2006). Stumbling on happiness. New York: A.A. Knopf. 
Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2007). Prospection: Experiencing the future. Science, 317(5843), 
1351-1354.  
Gopnik, A., & Astington, J. W. (1988). Children's understanding of representational change and its 
relation to the understanding of false belief and the appearance-reality distinction. Child 
Development, 59(1), 26-37.  
Gopnik, A., & Graf, P. (1988). Knowing how you know: Young children's ability to identify and 
remember the sources of their beliefs. Child Development, 59(5), 1366-1371.  
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. N. (1997). Words, thoughts, and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT press. 
Green, L., Fry, A. F., & Myerson, J. (1994). Discounting of delayed rewards: A life-span 
comparison. Psychological Science, 5(1), 33-36.  
Guajardo, N. R., & Best, D. L. (2000). Do preschoolers remember what to do? Incentive and 
external cues in prospective memory. Cognitive Development, 15(1), 75-97.  
Halford, G. S., Wilson, W. H., & Phillips, S. (1998). Processing capacity defined by relational 
complextity: Implications for comparative, developmental and cognitive psychology. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21(6), 803-864.  
Harner, L. (1980). Comprehension of past and future reference revisited. Journal of Experimental 
Child Psychology, 29(1), 170-182.  
47 
 
Harris, P. L. (2000). The work of the imagination. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 
Harris, P. L., German, T., & Mills, P. (1996). Children's use of counterfactual thinking in causal 
reasoning. Cognition, 61(3), 233-259.  
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America, 104(5), 1726-1731.  
Hassabis, D., & Maguire, E. A. (2009). The construction system of the brain. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 364(1521), 1263-1271.  
Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, 
and how did it evolve? Science, 298(5598), 1569-1579.  
Hayne, H., Gross, J., McNamee, S., Fitzgibbon, O., & Tustin, K. (2011). Episodic memory and 
episodic foresight in 3-and 5-year-old children. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 343-355.  
Hayne, H., & Rovee-Collier, C. (1995). The organization of reactivated memory in infancy. Child 
Development, 66(3), 893-906.  
Heyes, C. M. (1994). Reflections on self-recognition in primates. Animal Behavior, 47(4), 909-919.  
Horn, J. L., & Cattell, R. B. (1967). Age differences in fluid and crystallized intelligence. Acta 
Psychologica, 26(2), 107-129.  
Hudson, J. A. (2002). "Do you know what we're going to do this summer?": Mothers' talk to 
preschool children about future events. Journal of Cognition and Development, 3(1), 49-71.  
Hudson, J. A. (2006). The development of future time concepts through mother-child conversation. 
Merrill-Palmer Quarterly-Journal of Developmental Psychology, 52(1), 70-95.  
Hudson, J. A., Mayhew, E. M. Y., & Prabhakar, J. (2011). The development of episodic foresight: 
Emerging concepts and methods. Advances in Child Development and Behavior, 40(1), 95-
137.  
Hudson, J. A., & Shapiro, L. R. (1991). From knowing to telling: The development of children’s 
scripts, stories, and personal narratives. In A. McCabe & C. Peterson (Eds.), Developing 
narrative structure (pp. 89-136). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. 
Hudson, J. A., Shapiro, L. R., & Sosa, B. B. (1995). Planning in the real world: Preschool children's 
scripts and plans for familiar events. Child Development, 66(4), 984-998.  
Huttenlocher, P. R. (1990). Morphometric study of human cerebral cortex development. 
Neuropsychologia, 28(6), 517-527.  
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. R., & Piguet, O. (2012a). Considering the role of semantic 
memory in episodic future thinking: evidence from semantic dementia. Brain, 135(7), 2178-
2191.  
48 
 
Irish, M., Addis, D. R., Hodges, J. R., & Piguet, O. (2012b). Exploring the content and quality of 
episodic future simulations in semantic dementia. Neuropsychologia, 50(14), 3488-3495.  
Jones, E. J. H., & Herbert, J. S. (2006). Exploring memory in infancy: Deferred imitation and the 
development of declarative memory. Infant and Child Development, 15(2), 195-205.  
Kalkut, E. L., Han, S. D., Lansing, A. E., Holdnack, J. A., & Delis, D. C. (2009). Development of 
set-shifting ability from late childhood through early adulthood. Archives of Clinical 
Neuropsychology, 24(6), 565-574.  
Kaller, C. P., Rahm, B., Spreer, J., Mader, I., & Unterrainer, J. M. (2008). Thinking around the 
corner: The development of planning abilities. Brain and Cognition, 67(3), 360-370.  
Kanemura, H., Aihara, M., Aoki, S., Araki, T., & Nakazawa, S. (2003). Development of the 
prefrontal lobe in infants and children: A three-dimensional magnetic resonance volumetric 
study. Brain and Development, 25(3), 195-199.  
Kerns, K. A. (2000). The CyberCruiser: An investigation of development of prospective memory in 
children. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 6(1), 62-70.  
Klein, S. B. (2013). The complex act of projecting oneself into the future. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 4(1), 63-79.  
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: The effects of 
episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to remember the past and imagine the 
future. Social Cognition, 20(5), 353-379.  
Kliegel, M., Brandenberger, M., & Aberle, I. (2010). Effect of motivational incentives on 
prospective memory performance in preschoolers. European Journal of Developmental 
Psychology, 7(2), 223-232.  
Kliegel, M., & Jäger, T. (2007). The effects of age and cue-action reminders on event-based 
prospective memory performance in preschoolers. Cognitive Development, 22(1), 33-46.  
Kochanska, G., Murray, K. T., & Harlan, E. T. (2000). Effortful control in early childhood: 
continuity and change, antecedents, and implications for social development. Developmental 
Psychology, 36(2), 220-232.  
Kochanska, G., Tjebkes, J. L., & Fortnan, D. R. (1998). Children's emerging regulation of conduct: 
Restraint, compliance, and internalization from infancy to the second year. Child 
Development, 69(5), 1378-1389.  
Kvavilashvili, L. (1992). Remembering intentions: A critical review of existing experimental 
paradigms. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6(6), 507-524.  
Kvavilashvili, L., Kyle, F. E., & Messer, D. J. (2008). The development of prospective memory in 
children: Methodological issues, empirical findings, and future directions. In M. Kliegel, M. 
49 
 
A. McDaniel & G. O. Einstein (Eds.), Prospective memory: Cognitive, neuroscience, 
developmental, and applied perspectives (pp. 115-140). New York: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Lagattuta, K. H., & Sayfan, L. (2011). Developmental changes in children's understanding of future 
likelihood and uncertainty. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 315-330.  
Lebel, C., Gee, M., Camicioli, R., Wieler, M., Martin, W., & Beaulieu, C. (2012). Diffusion tensor 
imaging of white matter tract evolution over the lifespan. NeuroImage, 60(1), 340-352.  
Lemmon, K., & Moore, C. (2001). Binding the self in time. In C. Moore & K. Lemmon (Eds.), The 
self in time: Developmental perspectives. (pp. 163-179). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers. 
Lemmon, K., & Moore, C. (2007). The development of prudence in the face of varying future 
rewards. Developmental Science, 10(4), 502-511.  
Leslie, A. M., & Keeble, S. (1987). Do six-month-old infants perceive causality? Cognition, 25(3), 
265-288.  
Lewis, M., & Ramsay, D. (2004). Development of self-recognition, personal pronoun use, and 
pretend play during the 2nd year. Child Development, 75(6), 1821-1831.  
Lind, S. E., & Bowler, D. M. (2010). Episodic memory and episodic future thinking in adults with 
autism. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 119(4), 896-905.  
Low, J., & Perner, J. (2012). Implicit and explicit theory of mind: State of the art. British Journal of 
Developmental Psychology, 30(1), 1-13.  
Luna, B., Garver, K. E., Urban, T. A., Lazar, N. A., & Sweeney, J. A. (2004). Maturation of 
cognitive processes from late childhood to adulthood. Child Development, 75(5), 1357-
1372.  
Luna, B., Thulborn, K. R., Munoz, D. P., Merriam, E. P., Garver, K. E., Minshew, N. J., . . . 
Sweeney, J. A. (2001). Maturation of widely distributed brain function subserves cognitive 
development. NeuroImage, 13(5), 786-793.  
Lyon, D. L., & Flavell, J. (1994). Young children's understanding of "remember" and "forget". 
Child Development, 65(5), 1357-1371.  
Mackinlay, R. J., Kliegel, M., & Mäntylä, T. (2009). Predictors of time-based prospective memory 
in children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 102(3), 251-264.  
Mason, M. F., Norton, M. I., Van Horn, J. D., Wegner, D. M., Grafton, S. T., & Macrae, C. N. 
(2007). Wandering minds: The default network and stimulus-independent thought. Science, 
315(5810), 393-395.  
McColgan, K. L., & McCormack, T. (2008). Searching and planning: Young children's reasoning 
about past and future event sequences. Child Development, 79, 1477-1497.  
50 
 
McCormack, T., & Atance, C. M. (2011). Planning in young children: A review and synthesis. 
Developmental Review, 31(1), 1-31.  
McCormack, T., & Hanley, M. (2011). Children's reasoning about the temporal order of past and 
future events. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 299-314.  
McDonough, L., Mandler, J. M., McKee, R. D., & Squire, L. R. (1995). The deferred imitation task 
as a nonverbal measure of declarative memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 92(16), 7580-7584.  
Meltzoff, A. N. (1988). Infant imitation and memory: nine-month-olds in immediate and defferred 
tests. Child Development, 59(1), 217-225.  
Metcalf, J. L., & Atance, C. M. (2011). Do preschoolers save to benefit their future selves? 
Cognitive Development, 26(4), 371-382.  
Mischel, W., & Metzner, R. (1962). Preference for delayed reward as a function of age, 
intelligence, and length of delay interval. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
64(6), 425-431.  
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. I. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science, 
244(4907), 933-938.  
Moore, C., Barresi, J., & Thompson, C. (1998). The cognitive basis of future-oriented prosocial 
behavior. Social Development, 7(2), 198-218.  
Moore, C., & Lemmon, K. (Eds.). (2001). The self in time: Developmental perspectives: Lawrence 
Erlbaum. 
Moore, C., & Macgillivray, S. (2004). Altruism, prudence, and theory of mind in preschoolers. New 
Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 103(1), 51-62.  
Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). Apes save tools for future use. Science, 312(5776), 1038-1040.  
Munakata, Y., Snyder, H. R., & Chatham, C. H. (2012). Developing cognitive control: Three key 
transitions. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 21(2), 71-77.  
Nelson, K., & Fivush, R. (2004). The emergence of autobiographical memory: A social cultural 
developmental theory. Psychological Review, 111(2), 486-511.  
Nielsen, M., & Dissanayake, C. (2001). A longitudinal investigation of the emergence of mirror 
self-recognition, imitation and pretend play in human infants. Infant Behavior and 
Development, 27(3), 342-365.  
Nisbett, R. E., & Kanouse, D. E. (1969). Obesity, food deprivation, and supermarket shopping 
behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12(4), 289-294.  
Okuda, J., Fujii, T., Ohtake, H., Tsukiura, T., Tanji, K., Suzuki, K., . . . Yamadori, A. (2003). 
Thinking of the future and past: The roles of the frontal pole and the medial temporal lobes. 
NeuroImage, 19(4), 1369-1380.  
51 
 
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 
308(5719), 255-258.  
Osvath, M., & Osvath, H. (2008). Chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and orangutan (Pongo abelii) 
forethought: self-control and pre-experience in the face of future tool use. Animal Cognition, 
11(4), 661-674.  
Owens, R. E. (2008). Language development: An introduction. Boston, MA: Pearson Education. 
Patterson, C. J., & Carter, D. B. (1979). Attentional determinants of children's self-control in 
waiting and working situations. Child Development, 50(1), 272-275.  
Paus, T., Zijdenbos, A., Worsley, K., Collins, D. L., Blumenthal, J., Giedd, J. N., . . . Evans, A. C. 
(1999). Structural maturation of neural pathways in children and adolescents: in vivo study. 
Science, 283(5409), 1908-1911.  
Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Perner, J., & Ruffman, T. (1995). Episodic Memory and Autonoetic Conciousness: Developmental 
Evidence and a Theory of Childhood Amnesia. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
59(3), 516-548.  
Perner, J., & Ruffman, T. (2005). Infants' insight into the mind: How deep? Science, 308(5719), 
214-216.  
Perner, J., Sprung, M., & Steinkogler, B. (2004). Counterfactual conditionals and false belief: A 
developmental dissociation. Cognitive Development, 19(2), 179-201.  
Peterson, C. C., Wellman, H. M., & Slaughter, V. (2012). The mind behind the message: 
Advancing theory-of-mind scales for typically developing children, and those with deafness, 
autism, or Asperger syndrome. Child Development, 83(2), 469-485.  
Peterson, D. M., & Riggs, K. J. (1999). Adaptive modelling and mindreading. Mind & Language, 
14(1), 80-112.  
Povinelli, D. J., Landau, K. R., & Perilloux, H. K. (1996). Self-recognition in young children using 
delayed versus live feedback: Evidence of a developmental asynchrony. Child Development, 
67(4), 1540-1554.  
Povinelli, D. J., & Simon, B. B. (1998). Young children's understanding of briefly versus extremely 
delayed images of self: Emergence of the autobiographical stance. Developmental 
Psychology, 34(1), 188-194.  
Rafetseder, E., Cristi-Vargas, R., & Perner, J. (2010). Counterfactual reasoning: Developing a sense 
of "nearest possible world". Child Development, 81(1), 376-389.  
Rafetseder, E., & Perner, J. (2010). Is reasoning from counterfactual antecedents evidence for 
counterfactual reasoning? Thinking & Reasoning, 16(2), 131-155.  
52 
 
Read, D. W. (2008). Working memory: A cognitive limit to non-human primate recursive thinking 
prior to hominid evolution. Evolutionary Psychology, 6(4), 676-714.  
Redshaw, J., & Suddendorf, T. (2013). Foresight beyond the very next event: Four-year-olds can 
link past and deferred future episodes. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 404.  
Rilling, J. K., Barks, S. K., Parr, L. A., Preuss, T. M., Faber, T. L., Pagnoni, G., . . . Votaw, J. R. 
(2007). A comparison of resting-state brain activity in humans and chimpanzees. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(43), 17146-17151.  
Rosenbaum, R. S., Gilboa, A., Levine, B., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (2009). Amnesia as an 
impairment of detail generation and binding: Evidence from personal, fictional, and 
semantic narratives in K.C. Neuropsychologia, 47(11), 2181-2187.  
Russell, J., Alexis, D., & Clayton, N. (2010). Episodic future thinking in 3- to 5-year-old children: 
The ability to think of what will be needed from a different point of view. Cognition, 114(1), 
56-71.  
Scarf, D., Gross, J., Colombo, M., & Hayne, H. (2013). To have and to hold: Episodic memory in 
3-and 4-year-old children. Developmental Psychobiology, 55(2), 125-132.  
Scerif, G., Cornish, K., Wilding, J., Driver, J., & Karmiloff-Smith, A. (2004). Visual search in 
typically developing toddlers and toddlers with Fragile X or Williams syndrome. 
Developmental Science, 7(1), 116-130.  
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., & Buckner, R. L. (2008). Episodic simulation of future events - 
Concepts, data, and applications. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 39-60.  
Schacter, D. L., Addis, D. R., Hassabis, D., Martin, V. C., Spreng, R. N., & Szpunar, K. K. (2012). 
The future of memory: Remembering, imagining, and the brain. Neuron, 76(4), 677-694.  
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Peake, P. K. (1990). Predicting adolescent cognitive and self-regulatory 
competences from preschool delay of gratification. Developmental Psychology, 26(6), 978-
986.  
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review, 
63(2), 129-138.  
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief 
by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18(7), 587-592.  
Spelke, E. S., Phillips, A., & Woodward, A. L. (1995). Infants' knowledge of object motion and 
human action. In D. Sperber, D. Premack & A. J. Premack (Eds.), Causal cognition: A 
multidisciplinary debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Spreng, R. N., & Grady, C. L. (2010). Patterns of brain activity supporting autobiographical 
memory, prospection, and theory of mind, and their relationship to the default mode 
network. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(6), 1112-1123.  
53 
 
Spreng, R. N., Mar, R. A., & Kim, A. S. N. (2009). The common neural basis of autobiographical 
memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind, and the default mode: A quantitative 
meta-analysis. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(3), 489-510.  
Squire, L. R. (1992). Memory and the hippocampus: A synthesis from findings with rats, monkeys 
and humans. Psychological Review, 99(2), 195-231.  
Stevenson, R. J., & Pollitt, C. (1987). The acquisition of temporal terms. Journal of Child 
Language, 14(3), 533-545.  
Suddendorf, T. (1994). Discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution.  
Masters thesis, University of Waikato, Hamilton. Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/729/   
Suddendorf, T. (1999a). Children's understanding of the relation between delayed video 
representation and current reality: A test for self-awareness? Journal of Experimental Child 
Psychology, 72(3), 157-176.  
Suddendorf, T. (1999b). The rise of the metamind. In M. C. Corballis & C. S. Lea (Eds.), The 
descent of mind: Evolutionary perspectives on hominin evolution (pp. 218-260). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Suddendorf, T. (2003). Early representational insight: Twenty-four-month-olds can use a photo to 
find an object in the world. Child Development, 74(3), 896-904.  
Suddendorf, T. (2006). Foresight and evolution of the human mind. Science, 312(5776), 1006.  
Suddendorf, T. (2010a). Episodic memory versus episodic foresight: Similarities and differences. 
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1(1), 99-107.  
Suddendorf, T. (2010b). Linking yesterday and tomorrow: Preschoolers' ability to report temporally 
displaced events. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 28(2), 491-498.  
Suddendorf, T. (2011). Evolution, lies and foresight biases. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(1), 
38-39.  
Suddendorf, T. (2013). Mental time travel: Continuities and discontinuities. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 17(4), 151-152.  
Suddendorf, T., Addis, D. R., & Corballis, M. C. (2009). Mental time travel and the shaping of the 
human mind. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 
364(1521), 1317-1324.  
Suddendorf, T., & Busby, J. G. (2003). Mental time travel in animals? Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7, 391-396.  
Suddendorf, T., & Busby, J. G. (2005). Making decisions with the future in mind: Developmental 
and comparative identification of mental time travel. Learning and Motivation, 36(2), 110-
125.  
54 
 
Suddendorf, T., & Butler, D. L. (2013). The nature of visual self-recognition. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 17(3), 121-127.  
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (1997). Mental time travel and the evolution of the human mind. 
Genetic Social and General Psychology Monographs, 123(2), 133-167.  
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel 
and is it unique to humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(3), 299-313.  
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2010). Behavioural evidence for mental time travel in 
nonhuman animals. Behavioural Brain Research, 215(2), 292-298.  
Suddendorf, T., Corballis, M. C., & Collier-Baker, E. (2009). How great is great ape foresight? 
Animal Cognition, 12(5), 751-754.  
Suddendorf, T., & Fletcher-Flinn, C. M. (1999). Children's divergent thinking improves when they 
understand false beliefs. Creativity Research Journal, 12(2), 115-128.  
Suddendorf, T., & Moore, C. (2011). Introduction to the special issue: The development of episodic 
foresight. Cognitive Development, 26(4), 295-298.  
Suddendorf, T., Nielsen, M., & von Gehlen, R. (2011). Children’s capacity to remember a novel 
problem and to secure its future solution. Developmental Science, 14(1), 26-33.  
Suddendorf, T., Simcock, G., & Nielsen, M. (2007). Visual self-recognition in mirrors and live 
videos: evidence for a developmental asynchrony. Cognitive Development, 22(2), 185-196.  
Suddendorf, T., & Whiten, A. (2001). Mental evolution and development: Evidence for secondary 
representation in children, great apes, and other animals. Psychological Bulletin, 127(5), 
629-650.  
Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. 
Psychological Science, 18(7), 580-586.  
Szpunar, K. K., Watson, J. M., & McDermott, K. B. (2007). Neural substrates of envisioning the 
future. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
104(2), 642-647.  
Tulving, E. (2005). Episodic memory and autonoesis: Uniquely human? In H. S. Terrace & J. 
Metcalfe (Eds.), The missing link in cognition (pp. 3-56). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty - Heuristics and biases. Science, 
185(4157), 1124-1131.  
Urban, K. K. (1991). On the development of creativity in children. Creativity Research Journal, 
4(2), 177-191.  
Veneziano, E., & Sinclair, H. (1995). Functional changes in early child language: The appearance 
of references to the past and of explanations. Journal of Child Language, 22(3), 557-581.  
55 
 
Wang, Q., Hou, Y. B., Tang, H. Z., & Wiprovnick, A. (2011). Travelling backwards and forwards 
in time: Culture and gender in the episodic specificity of past and future events. Memory, 
19(1), 103-109.  
Weiler, J., Suchan, B., Koch, B., Schwarz, M., & Daum, I. (2011). Differential impairment of 
remembering the past and imagining novel events after thalamic lesions. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(10), 3037-3051.  
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 39(5), 806-820.  
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-ofmind development: The 
truth about false belief. Child Development, 72(3), 655-684.  
Wellman, H. M., Fang, F., & Peterson, C. C. (2011). Sequential progressions in a theory-of-mind 
scale: Longitudinal perspectives. Child Development, 82(3), 780-792.  
Wells, G. (1985). Language development in the pre-school years. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Williams, B. R., Ponesse, J. S., Schachar, R. J., Logan, G. D., & Tannock, R. (1999). Development 
of inhibitory control across the life span. Developmental Psychology, 35(1), 205-213.  
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2005). Affective forecasting: Knowing what to want. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 14(3), 131-134.  
Zelazo, P., Müller, U., Frye, D., & Marcovich, S. (2003). The development of executive function in 
early childhood. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 68(3), 1-
137.  
Zelazo, P., Sommerville, J. A., & Nichols, S. (1999). Age-related changes in children's use of 
external representations. Developmental Psychology, 35(4), 1059-1071.  
 
 
  
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
Foresight Beyond the Very Next Event:   
Four-year-olds can Link Past and 
Deferred Future Episodes 
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Preface 
 Chapter 2’s review revealed that crucial developments in episodic foresight are achieved 
throughout childhood and beyond.  It also revealed, however, that many future-oriented behaviours 
remain entirely unexamined in children.  I now move onto the empirical section of my thesis, in 
which I examine the development of several novel future-oriented behaviours.  This section mainly 
focuses on children aged between three and five years because, as the review has shown, this period 
appears to be particularly critical in the development of the identified episodic foresight 
components and often marks the first appearance of various future-oriented behaviours.  If my 
research can establish the typical age of initial evidence for novel future-oriented behaviours, then it 
will enable future studies to identify the particular cognitive maturations that may be driving change 
at the behavioural level. 
To begin with, the following chapter assesses 4-year-old children’s capacity to recall a 
problem from the past and act in the present to solve that problem for a deferred future episode.  
This study uses an adaptation of the two-room paradigm first introduced by Suddendorf and Busby 
(2005), and later refined by Suddendorf, Nielsen, and von Gehlen (2011).   
 The published version of this chapter1 was mentioned in Chapter 2, and this chapter likewise 
references the published version of Chapter 2.  The reason for this cross-referencing is that both 
chapters were published at roughly the same time, in mid-2013.  Because this chapter is an adapted 
version of a published article, many of the concepts and findings mentioned in the previous two 
chapters are briefly reiterated. 
 
1Redshaw, J., & Suddendorf, T. (2013). Foresight beyond the very next event: Four-year-olds can 
link past and deferred future episodes. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 404. 
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Abstract 
Previous experiments have demonstrated that by four years of age children can use information 
from a past episode to solve a problem for the very next future episode.  However, it remained 
unclear whether four-year-olds can similarly use such information to solve a problem for a more 
removed future episode that is not of immediate concern.  In the current study, we introduced four-
year-olds to problems in one room before taking them to another room and distracting them for 15 
minutes.  The children were then offered a choice of items to place into a bucket that was to be 
taken back to the first room when a five-minute sand-timer had completed a cycle.  Across two 
conceptually distinct domains, the children placed the item that could solve the deferred future 
problem above chance level.  This result demonstrates that by 48 months many children can recall a 
problem from the past and act in the present to solve that problem for a deferred future episode.  We 
discuss implications for theories about the nature of episodic foresight.  
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Much of human cognition involves mental time travel to past and future episodes (Buckner 
& Carroll, 2007; Smallwood et al., 2011), a capacity that allows effective preparation for and active 
shaping of future events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  At their core, both episodic memory and 
episodic foresight require self-projection into a non-current perspective (e.g., Buckner & Carroll, 
2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), and  one might therefore expect these abilities to draw on 
similar neurocognitive resources and develop at a similar age.  Supporting the case of neurological 
similarity, both abilities engage similar brain networks (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Okuda et 
al., 2003; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009); both show similar declines in old 
age (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008); and both are selectively impaired in hippocampus-lesioned 
amnesiacs (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; 
Rosenbaum, Gilboa, Levine, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2009; Tulving, 1985). And indeed, children 
who can accurately report events from yesterday are more likely to accurately report events that will 
happen tomorrow (Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Hayne, Gross, McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 
2011; Suddendorf, 2010).  These commonalities support the view of episodic memory as a crucial 
design feature of the episodic foresight system (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005).  Episodic memories 
provide a rich database of information that can be mentally recombined into similar and even 
entirely novel future episodes to guide prudent behaviour (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007).  Only recently, however, have studies begun to examine when and how this 
capacity to link past, present and future develops in children. 
The ability to use information from a past episode to prepare in the present for a future 
episode is a useful test of mental time travel in both non-verbal animals and children whose verbal 
responses may belie their true cognitive abilities (Hampton & Schwartz, 2004; Scarf, Gross, 
Colombo, & Hayne, 2013; Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008; Tulving, 
2005).  Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) distil four criteria that studies of this capacity must meet in 
order to rule out alternative explanations: (i) use of single trials, to avoid conditioning and 
demonstrate memory for a specific event; (ii) use of novel problems, to engage cognitive processes 
and eliminate learning history explanations; (iii) use of separate spatial/temporal contexts for the 
crucial future-directed action and the future problem, to avoid cuing to the answer and demonstrate 
long-term memory; and (iv) use of multiple problems from distinct domains, to demonstrate the 
domain-general nature of the capacity.  Compelling positive evidence meeting these criteria has not 
yet been obtained for animals (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010), and some studies of children also 
fail to meet them.  In a recent study by Russell and colleagues (2010), for example, the future 
problem was visible to the children during the future-directed action (violating criterion iii), such 
that the successful children did not necessarily have to base their solution on a spatially and 
temporally removed mental construction.   
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Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) designed a series of experiments that did meet the four 
criteria outlined above.  In one of these, 3- and 4- year-olds were introduced to one of two 
conceptually distinct problems in an initial testing room.  The ‘box task’ involved a box with a 
triangle-shaped keyhole and the ‘food task’ involved a puppet that wanted to eat a banana.  In the 
instant condition, the child was led to the other side of the room immediately after being presented 
with the problem, and was allowed to choose a solution from a selection of three items without 
being allowed to look back at the problem.  In the delay condition, the child was taken to a second 
room and distracted for 15 minutes. They were then offered the same choice of items for an 
immediate return to the first room.  Importantly, the experimenter did not refer to the problem in 
either condition, only its location.  In the instant condition, both 3- and 4-year-olds selected the item 
that could solve the problem at levels close to ceiling.  In the delay condition, however, only the 4-
year-olds selected the item that secured the future solution significantly above chance level.   
These results clearly demonstrate the effect of a delay between the relevant past event and 
the future-oriented action on children’s ability to link past and future episodes.  Only 4-year-olds 
demonstrated a capacity to import a past event from long-term memory into working memory and 
act for the future.  Still, the very next event following item selection was a return to the problem, 
and so, while the future problem had to be imagined, in some sense it may have been part of the 
child’s psychological present.  Even 2-year-old children (Bauer, Schwade, Wewerka, & Delaney, 
1999) and non-human great apes (Döhl, 1968; Koehler, 1927) show some ability to mentally 
simulate and act for the ‘future’, when that future is part of a single ongoing event and long-term 
memory is not required.  This ability likely relies on working memory in much the same way as the 
ability to recall and manipulate information that has been encountered in the very recent past.  As 
adults, however, we frequently prepare for more remote future events, and we rely on our long-term 
memory for what was required in similar past episodes to guide our future-oriented actions.  It is 
possible that imagining and acting for a deferred future episode requires more executive resources 
than for a future episode that has become of immediate concern, such as the episode in Suddendorf 
and colleagues’ (2011) task.  Would 4-year-olds be capable of solving this task if a series of 
irrelevant events was inserted between the future-directed action and the return to the original 
problem?  Can they link past and future episodes that are both temporally removed from the 
immediate?   
Attempts to test for episodic foresight beyond the very next event must overcome the 
difficult problem of how to inform a child participant just when in the future their present behaviour 
will have an effect (Suddendorf, et al., 2011).  Young children, especially those aged four and 
under, have considerable trouble understanding and correctly using specific future-oriented terms 
(Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2010, 2011; Harner, 1975, 1980).  Therefore, informing them that 
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their choice of an item will have an effect when they go to another room in ‘five minutes’ or play a 
game ‘tomorrow’ (e.g., Russell, et al., 2010) would be futile for a large proportion of young 
children.  However, as children generally understand concrete instantiations of concepts earlier than 
they understand symbolic representations (Uttal, Scudder, & DeLoache, 1997), it may be more 
effective to convey the delay with a sand-timer.  A previous study revealed that most 4-year-olds 
understand that a half empty sand-timer will complete its cycle before a full one (Bischof-Köhler, 
2000), suggesting they correctly recognise something about how the amount of sand in the 
compartments changes over time.   
The current experiment built on Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) methodology to test 
whether 4-year-olds could remember a problematic past episode from 15 minutes ago and prepare 
for a deferred future episode marked by the completion of a sand-timer’s cycle.  Rather than 
choosing an item to immediately take into the problem room, the children instead had to place the 
item into a bucket, which they were previously told would be taken to the problem room only when 
the timer had completed its cycle.  The inclusion of the bucket crucially required the children to 
physically separate themselves from their chosen item, thus reinforcing the idea that the item was to 
be ‘saved’ for a deferred future episode rather than used in the immediate future.  An instant 
condition with no delay in either temporal direction was included to confirm that the problems 
themselves were conceptually easy. 
Method 
Participants 
 Twenty-four 4-year-olds (M = 48 months 17 days, SD = 14 days) were included in the study.  
This group consisted of 10 boys and 14 girls, who each participated individually with a parent or 
caregiver present.  Each child completed both the box task and the food task, one in the instant 
condition and one in the delayed condition.  The orders of the tasks and conditions were 
counterbalanced. 
Materials 
 The experimental materials for the box task and the food task were identical to those used in 
experiment two of Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) study, with the exception that more 
distracting objects were included to lower the level of chance performance and thus increase 
experimental power. 
 Box task.  Two wooden boxes (14 x 21 x 21 cm) were used in this task, each featuring a 
large keyhole (either square- or triangle-shaped) on the front panel.  Sliding an appropriately-shaped 
key into these keyholes activated a mechanism that revealed a previously hidden platform within 
the box, allowing objects to be retrieved from the platform.  Seven different keys were used in the 
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task, each consisting of a wooden shape connected to a 19 cm rod.  The seven shapes were: square, 
triangle, circle, star, heart, teardrop, and an irregular zigzag shape. 
 Food task.  Two commercially available hand puppets (a tiger and an elephant) were used, 
along with seven plastic foods: strawberry, banana, apple, pear, orange, grapes, and carrot.   
 Sand-timer and bucket.  One commercially available cylindrical sand-timer (height 16 cm, 
diameter 8 cm) with blue sand grains was used to communicate the delay to the child.  The time of a 
complete cycle was approximately five minutes.  A black bucket was also used, in which the child 
was to place their selected item in the delayed condition. 
Procedure 
 Prior to the main sequence of the experiment, the child was taken to a warm-up room where 
they were introduced to the time-keeping nature of the sand-timer.  The sand-timer was turned over 
and the child was asked to examine the sand falling from the top to the bottom compartment.  The 
child was informed that they would receive a sticker once all of the sand had reached the bottom. 
 After this introduction, the child was taken to Room A, referred to as “Charlie the chicken’s 
room” owing to a large poster of a chicken on the wall.  In this room they were presented with the 
box task and the food task while seated at a child-friendly table. 
 Box task.  The experimenter introduced the child to the box with the square-shaped hole, 
and demonstrated how to use the square-shaped key to activate the mechanism and reveal a hidden 
toy.  The child was allowed to perform this action themselves, before the demonstration was 
repeated and the child was allowed to have a second attempt.  This box was then removed and the 
box with the triangle-shaped hole was introduced.  The experimenter demonstrated to the child that 
the square-shaped key did not work on this box, and the child was allowed to confirm this for 
themselves. 
 In the instant condition, the child was then led to the other side of the room, where the 
triangle-shaped key and five distracter keys were located.  Without being able to look back at the 
test table, the child was asked to pick one of these items to take back. 
 In the delayed condition, the child was told that they would go to another room (Room B) to 
play some games, and the box with triangle-shaped keyhole was left on the table.  After 15 minutes 
of unrelated activity in Room B, the child was reintroduced to the sand-timer and shown the bucket.  
They were informed that (i) they would be going back to Charlie the chicken’s room after the sand-
timer had completed a cycle, and (ii) they would be taking the bucket with them when they went.  
The child was asked to independently generate these facts consecutively to ensure that they 
understood exactly what would be happening and when.  Finally, the experimenter revealed a 
previously hidden tray containing the triangle-shaped key and the five distracter keys, and invited 
the child to place one of these items only into the bucket.  After they had made their choice, the 
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child was asked to explain the reason for their selection.  Upon completion of the sand-timer’s 
cycle, the child was invited to bring the bucket with them to Room A where they could solve the 
problem (the experimenter brought the correct item if the child had not selected it). 
 Food task.  The experimenter introduced the child to the tiger puppet.  The child was told 
that ‘Terry the tiger’ liked to eat strawberries and the child was allowed to ‘feed’ the puppet using 
the visible plastic strawberry on the table.  This procedure was repeated, before the child was 
introduced to the elephant puppet and told that ‘Ellie the elephant’ liked to eat bananas.  The 
experimenter then pointed out that there were no bananas to feed Ellie.   
 The instant and delayed conditions mirrored those of the box task, except that the items 
available to choose were the plastic banana and the five plastic food distracters. 
Results 
 A 2 x 2 ANOVA (Task x Condition) revealed a main effect of Condition, with the children 
selecting the correct item significantly more often in the instant condition than the delayed 
condition, F (1, 22) = 12.79, p = .002.  There were no significant effects involving Task, suggesting 
that the box and food tasks did not vary in difficulty in either condition.  There were also no 
significant condition order effects, suggesting that the presentation order of the instant and delayed 
conditions did not affect the children’s performance.  We have therefore collapsed across these 
variables in the subsequent analyses. 
 As seen in Figure 1, the large majority of children selected the appropriate item (91.7%) in 
the instant condition, a performance that was well above chance level (16. 7%), χ2 (1) = 97.20, p < 
.001.  This finding confirmed that the problems themselves were conceptually easy when the 
temporal element was absent.  Although performance was decreased in the delayed condition, the 
children still selected the appropriate item (50%) well above chance level, χ2 (1) = 19.20, p < .001.   
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Figure 1.  Proportion of 4-year-olds who made the correct item choice in the instant and delayed 
conditions (collapsed across the box and food tasks). 
 
 The conclusion that the children displayed some foresight when selecting the item in the 
delayed condition is supported by their verbal responses.  Across tasks, 25% of children made 
reference to the future utility of the item when explaining their choice.  All of these children had 
selected the correct item, a performance that was well above chance level, χ2 (1) = 30.00, p < .001.  
Of the 75% of children that did not make future reference when explaining their choice, one third of 
them had still selected the correct item.  Nevertheless, the rate of correct item selection among this 
sub-sample was not significantly above chance level, χ2 (1) = 3.60, p = .058. 
Discussion 
 The current study examined whether 4-year-olds could remember a problem from a specific 
past episode and act in the present to obtain a novel solution for a return to the problem in a 
deferred future episode.  In the delayed condition, the children had to independently confirm their 
understanding that they would be returning to Room A with the bucket after the familiar sand-timer 
had completed its cycle.  This process ensured that the children understood the item they 
subsequently placed into the bucket was not to be used in the immediate future, but rather saved for 
the deferred future episode in Room A.  And, although they did not perform at the same level as in 
the instant condition, they still selected the correct item well above chance level.  The current study 
therefore demonstrates, for the first time, that many 4-year-olds can use information from past 
episodes to prepare for deferred future episodes, just as they can for otherwise identical future 
episodes of immediate concern (Suddendorf, et al., 2011).  
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 The findings of the current study add to the growing developmental literature that has 
emerged following recent widespread recognition of the importance of human episodic foresight 
and its links to episodic memory (Science, 2007).  Developmental milestones appear to be achieved 
over the preschool years (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  During this 
period, children begin to show competence on tasks requiring them to delay gratification for the 
future (Garon, Longard, Bryson, & Moore, 2012; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Moore, 
Barresi, & Thompson, 1998), save resources for the future (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Metcalf & 
Atance, 2011), place multiple future episodes in time relative to each other (Busby Grant & 
Suddendorf, 2009; Friedman, 2000; Hayne, et al., 2011; Hudson & Mayhew, 2011), learn a rule to 
be applied in the future (Kliegel & Jäger, 2007), plan an intervention that will help a character in the 
future (McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hanley, 2011), and evaluate the likelihood 
of future events (Lagattuta & Sayfan, 2011).  The current study documents the development of 
another key future-oriented capacity: adaptively linking past and deferred future episodes.   
Potential implications for the nature of episodic foresight 
 The performance of the 4-year-olds in the delayed condition (50% success, with a chance 
level of 16.7%) closely matches that of the 4-year-olds in Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) 
second experiment, in which the future episode immediately followed the crucial future-oriented 
action (58.3% success, with a chance level of 33.3%).  Perhaps then, as long as the relevant past 
episode can be imported into working memory, we can use the same cognitive mechanism to 
prepare for a similar future episode whether that future episode is the very next event or several 
minutes removed.  So, as long as we can remember the shampoo bottle running out last night, we 
can use the same mechanism to replace it with a full one whether we are going to shower 
immediately or in preparation for a shower in five minutes time.  This observation raises the 
possibility that the same mechanism can even be used to prepare for more distant future episodes, 
such as next summer’s holiday, again as long as the relevant past episode is recalled.1  Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the strong neurological links between episodic memory and 
episodic foresight described in the introduction, and with the idea that episodic memory may have 
evolved as a crucial design feature of the episodic foresight system.   
 If imagining immediate and deferred future episodes can be achieved with the same basic 
mechanism, then it may follow that children (and adults) will tend to use this mechanism as a 
heuristic when preparing for any deferred future episode—even when additional mechanisms are 
required.  Consistent with Read and Loewenstein’s (1995) time contraction hypothesis, we may 
                                               
1 This is not to say we are equally motivated to prepare for immediate and distant future events, as a large body of 
temporal discounting literature disproves (e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Green & Myerson, 2004).  Future events 
are increasingly uncertain as they move further away, and so our lack of enthusiasm for preparing for distant episodes is 
sometimes justified.  Still, the current study may indeed suggest that linking past events with deferred future events is 
not more cognitively demanding in principle than for immediate future events.   
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typically imagine and prepare for any future episode as if it were occurring in the immediate future; 
as if the current self were placed into that episode with a time machine.  Nevertheless, our current 
motivation, emotion, and knowledge states are not always the same as our future states, and so we 
must sometimes prepare for a deferred future episode containing a self that differs from the current 
self on some important dimension (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  Both children (Atance & 
Meltzoff, 2006) and adults (Nisbett & Kanouse, 1969) often fail to take this difference into account 
when required, despite the fact children begin to demonstrate a capacity to imagine minds with 
distinct states to their own around age four (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  These specific 
theory-of-future-mind failings may be explained by the routine use of a generally successful 
heuristic that places the current self into the future episode. 
Future directions and conclusions 
 The current study was designed only to answer the specific question of whether 4-year-olds 
could prepare for a deferred future event just as they can for the very next future event, and we 
found that indeed they could.  Future studies may want to vary the temporal delay between the item 
selection and the future event.  It is possible that the same basic mechanism can be used to prepare 
for an immediate future event and one that is happening in five minutes, but additional mechanisms 
are required to prepare for an event happening next year.  Such a finding would provide evidence 
against the heuristic view we have presented above, which theoretically should apply to any non-
immediate future event.  Other studies may want to vary the temporal period in which an item 
becomes useful, such that the item that is useful immediately is not the same one that is useful in 
five minutes or in ten minutes.  Selecting only the time-appropriate item may require complex 
inhibition skills, which 4-year-olds are still in the process of learning (Diamond & Taylor, 1998; 
Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994). 
 In conclusion, the current study has demonstrated, for the first time, that 4-year-olds can 
remember a problem from a specific past episode and act to solve that problem for a deferred future 
episode, just as they can for the very next future episode.  Future-oriented action may be achievable 
with the same episodic foresight mechanism whether or not intermediate events are located between 
that action and the relevant future episode. 
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Preface 
 Chapter 3’s study used the two-room paradigm (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Suddendorf, 
Nielsen & von Gehlen, 2011) to show that many 4-year-olds could recall a problem from the past 
and act to solve that problem for a deferred future episode, which was marked by a 5-minute sand-
timer.  The usefulness of the two-room paradigm, however, is not limited to studies of children’s 
future-oriented object selection.  Rather, it can also be used to assess the development of other 
future-oriented behaviours where control over contextual cuing is desired.  
 The following chapter uses the two-room paradigm (in Study 1) to assess 4- and 5-year-old 
children’s capacity to seek information that will only be useful in a specific future episode, which is 
a crucial aspect of human learning.  I do not, however, include a five minute delay between the 
future-oriented action and the return to the problem, because (i) Chapter 3’s results suggest that this 
manipulation has no effect on children’s ability to act for the future, and (ii) sand-timers were used 
for other purposes with the same participants (e.g., in Study 2). 
 This chapter has been submitted for publication1 and at the time of writing it is under peer 
review.  Therefore, many of the concepts and findings mentioned in the general introduction 
(Chapter 1) and review (Chapter 2) are briefly reiterated.  
 
1Redshaw, J., & Suddendorf, T. (submitted). The development of future-oriented information 
seeking and encoding. 
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Abstract 
Despite a wealth of recent research examining children’s future-oriented cognition, there remains 
little known about the development of information seeking behaviour aimed at achieving specific 
future goals.  Here we present the first experiments directly tracking the emergence of this 
behaviour in older preschool children.  Study 1 consisted of two experiments requiring children to 
recall a problem from the past and seek information relevant to solving that problem in the future.  
Across both experiments, we found that 5-year-olds selectively sought the information that would 
help them solve the future problem.  Four-year-olds did not perform above chance level when low-
level associative explanations were controlled for, though it remained unclear what caused their 
poor performance.  In Study 2, we reduced demands on memory as children were given an 
opportunity to study information for a future test.  Again, we found that 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-
olds, were more likely than chance to use future-directed information seeking strategies, with the 
use of such strategies predicting superior performance on the test questions.  We conclude that 
many children can selectively seek information for specific future episodes by at least the fifth year 
of life, and discuss why this skill may emerge relatively late in development. 
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 Humans are prolific information seekers (Biederman & Vessel, 2006; Wilson, 2000).  We 
ask questions of each other, we exchange news and gossip, and we learn facts and theories, 
providing us with the knowledge to help navigate the physical and social world (Suddendorf, 2013; 
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).  Often, we seek information without any 
specific purpose in mind.  Consider, for example, the tendency of humans and other animals to 
automatically orient towards changes in the environment (Sechenov, 1863/1965).  Information 
gained in such fashion frequently proves useful, for example by allowing rapid detection of 
potential prey or predators, thus conferring an adaptive benefit to the behaviour.  Still, in humans at 
least, an additional feature of information search is the ability to preference information for a 
particular purpose.  If you wish to make dinner, for instance, you may check the contents of your 
fridge and pantry while deciding what to cook.  Importantly, however, the goal of purposeful 
information search does not necessarily have to exist in the here-and-now—we can also selectively 
search for information that will only be useful in an anticipated future scenario (Bruce, 2005).  
Many of us study in school, for example, not because of any inherent preference for the specific 
facts learned, nor to achieve any immediate goal, but rather because these facts are likely to become 
valuable during a particular future test or during other future episodes in the wider world.  Yet, 
despite broad implications for schooling and other applied domains, to our knowledge no study has 
directly examined the emergence of children’s ability to selectively seek and encode information 
that will be useful in the future.   
 Young children, like adults, regularly seek unknown information.  Even newborn infants 
look longer at novel visual displays than familiar displays (Friedman, 1972; Slater, Morison, & 
Rose, 1984), suggesting they possess an innate preference for new sensory material.  Not long after 
they start speaking, children begin to habitually question others about the world using signature 
phrases such as “what’s that?” (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  This questioning allows them to acquire 
information that will assist them, at times, for the rest of their lives, even if they did not seek it with 
any awareness of such long-term functions.  And by the time they are 30 months old, many children 
will selectively seek out critical information with a purpose in mind, for instance when they are 
uncertain about the location of a reward (Call & Carpenter, 2001).  It appears then, that even in the 
earliest years of life children possess a natural curiosity that leads to adaptive information seeking, 
and at least by their third year they can seek out information to help achieve a current goal.  In order 
to harness this ability to achieve more distant goals, however, children must first be able to imagine 
future episodes to assess what information will likely be useful. 
 Envisioning specific future events, or “episodic foresight”, is the future-directed counterpart 
of episodic memory (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011) and is potentially unique to humans (Suddendorf 
& Corballis, 1997; Tulving, 2005).  It should not be thought of as a single encapsulated cognitive 
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module, but rather as a multifaceted process involving the engagement of several distinct but 
interconnected components (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  Such components may include: the 
working memory capacity to construct a mental scenario removed from the here-and-now, 
populating that scenario with objects and mentally-endowed actors, placing the scenario in time 
relative to current reality, judging the scenario on dimensions such as likelihood and desirability 
and altering it accordingly, and inhibiting immediate impulses so that the anticipated scenario can 
be envisioned and actualised.  Together, these components allow us to imagine virtually any future 
scenario and to act with specific future episodes in mind (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  The 
components of episodic foresight emerge along varying trajectories, but developments in all of them 
are seen between ages three and five (Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  And indeed, during this 
period children also begin to show evidence of flexible future-directed behaviour.  Several recent 
studies have demonstrated that preschoolers can pass many tasks requiring them to act with the 
future in mind (for reviews, see Hudson, Mayhew, & Prabhakar, 2010; McCormack & Atance, 
2011; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013). 
 Despite the consistent pattern of development during the preschool years, however, there is 
inconsistency regarding the more specific ages that various future-oriented capacities develop.  For 
example, some future-oriented object selection tasks appear to be within the capacity of 3-year-olds 
(Scarf, Gross, Colombo, & Hayne, 2013), whereas others appear to remain out of reach until four 
(Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & Von Gehlen, 2011) or five (Atance & 
Meltzoff, 2005) years of age.  Some temporal reasoning tasks can be passed by 3- and 4-year-olds, 
whereas others are passed only by five (Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2009; Hayne, Gross, 
McNamee, Fitzgibbon, & Tustin, 2011; McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & Hanley, 
2011).  And some tasks requiring the inhibition of current desires in favour of future desires can be 
passed by 3- or 4-year-olds (Imuta, Hayne, & Scarf, 2013; Metcalf & Atance, 2011; Moore, Barresi, 
& Thompson, 1998; Thompson, Barresi, & Moore, 1997), whereas others cannot even be passed by 
5- or 7-year-olds (Atance & Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014).  Moreover, 
preschoolers’ performances across multiple future-oriented tasks are only weakly correlated when 
age is controlled for (Atance & Jackson, 2009).  Such patterns make sense when episodic foresight 
is considered as a multidimensional capacity dependent on specific task demands (Suddendorf & 
Redshaw, 2013), but they also make it difficult to predict the age of competence on novel future-
oriented tasks.  Considering that future-oriented information seeking is particularly important 
during the formal schooling years, however, it would be interesting to examine whether children 
who are about to begin school can solve problems requiring this capacity.   
 An essential purpose of schooling is for children to obtain the information that will allow 
them to eventually become productive members of society.  Yet, this need not entail that first-
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graders themselves envision the critical long-term future significance of basic arithmetic knowledge 
or of learning the letters of the alphabet.  Instead, much of children’s early learning is imposed and 
scaffolded by parents and teachers.  Nonetheless, children who do understand the relationship 
between information seeking and improved future outcomes may be more likely to seek appropriate 
information independently and encode it more efficiently.  Initially, at least, this may be primarily 
driven by understanding the relatively short-term future relevance of information seeking, which in 
turn will have additional (and perhaps unintentional) long-term future benefits.  For instance, if 
children understand that studying two-times tables on Thursday will help them achieve greater 
performance on Friday’s test, then they may be more motivated to study this information than 
children who do not understand the contingency.   
 In the current studies, 4- and 5-year-old preschoolers were given tasks requiring them to 
selectively seek out certain information that would benefit them in a short-term future situation, in 
preference to structurally similar but non-useful information.  The first set of experiments required 
them to recall problems encountered 15 minutes earlier in a separate room and preferentially seek 
out information that would allow the problems to be solved in the future.  The second study relaxed 
the memory requirement and instead gave children the opportunity to preferentially study 
information that would appear on a future test.  Children’s performance levels on all tasks were 
compared between age groups and also to the levels expected by chance.  These exploratory studies 
provide the first attempt to chart the development of an aspect of future-oriented behaviour that is 
fundamentally important to human learning.  Indeed, our own information search here is driven by 
the anticipation that a clearer understanding of this development will eventually lead to 
opportunities to inform the design of novel interventions and enhance early schooling performance.   
Study 1 
 Several authors have identified criteria that studies of episodic foresight should ideally meet 
in order to rule out simpler alternative explanations for results (e.g., Hampton & Schwartz, 2004; 
Suddendorf & Busby, 2003, 2005; Tulving, 2005).  Suddendorf and Corballis (2010) propose four 
such criteria: (i) the use of single trials, to avoid multiple exposures to the same stimulus-response 
relationships and demonstrate the representation of a specific future event; (ii) the use of novel 
problems, to engage cognitive processes and rule out learning history explanations; (iii) the use of 
separate temporal and spatial contexts for the future-oriented action and the problem that it solves, 
to avoid contextual cuing and engage long-term memory; and (iv) the use of problems from 
different domains, to avoid specific behavioural predispositions and demonstrate flexibility in 
applying the capacity. 
 With these criteria in mind, Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) developed a paradigm to 
assess episodic foresight in preschoolers.  In the critical condition of their second experiment, 
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children were exposed to a novel problem in one room before being taken to a second room and 
distracted for 15 minutes.  They were then offered a choice out of three items (one of which could 
solve the problem) to take back to the first room.  Four-year-olds were able to choose the correct 
item above chance level.  In our first study we report on two experiments, inspired by this two-room 
paradigm, intended to answer the question of when children begin to seek out information with a 
specific future episode in mind.  Experiment 1A involves a task in which children are given the 
opportunity to preferentially seek out relevant novel information (about a specific familiar puppet) 
instead of irrelevant novel information (about other familiar puppets) to solve a future problem in 
another room.  Experiment 1B varies the context of the future problem to address some alternative 
explanations for the results of the first experiment.  In both experiments, we compare the capacities 
of 4- and 5-year-olds to examine early competence in future-oriented information seeking. 
Experiment 1A 
Method 
Participants.  Twenty 4-year-olds (M age = 48 months 12 days, SD = 20 days) and twenty 5-year-
olds (M age = 59 months 21 days, SD = 26 days) comprised the sample of the first experiment.  Ten 
of the 4-year-olds and seven of the 5-year-olds were boys.  Each child participated individually with 
a parent or caregiver present. 
Materials.  Four commercially available puppets (giraffe, elephant, tiger, snail) were used as the 
protagonists of the task.  The other critical item was a specially constructed, landscape-oriented A4 
booklet.  A practice page showed three animal characters – a cat, a dog, and a rabbit.  These 
characters appeared on flaps that could be lifted up to reveal pictures of their favourite shapes.  The 
next three test pages all featured three photographs of the same three animal puppets – the elephant, 
the tiger and the snail.  On each page the characters appeared on flaps that could be lifted up to 
reveal pictures of their favourite foods (test page 1), favourite colours (test page 2), or favourite toys 
(test page 3).  See Figure 1 for a representation of test page 1. 
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Figure 1. Representation of test page 1 in the booklet used in Experiments 1A and 1B.  The children 
were instructed to lift up the one of the animal pictures to reveal their favourite food.  Test pages 2 
and 3 (used only in Experiment 1A) were identical, except for the fact that the children were asked 
whose favourite colour/toy they would like to know. 
 
Procedure.  The general procedure involved the children having to guess information about the 
puppets in return for rewards if their guesses were correct.  The first time the children encountered 
the puppets, they had no previous experience with the relevant information and so their guesses 
were inevitably incorrect.  Later on, in another room, they were given the opportunity to seek the 
information that would enable them to receive the rewards when they encountered the puppets again 
in the future. 
 Participants were first led into Room A, identified as “Charlie the Chicken’s room” because 
of a large poster of a chicken on the wall.  The children were sat at a table and the experimenter 
introduced them to the giraffe puppet “Jamie”.  The children were told that Jamie had a favourite 
drink, and if they could guess what it was then they would receive a sticker from a sticker sheet on 
the table.  Whatever answer they gave, they were told that this was correct and were rewarded with 
a sticker to enhance their engagement in the main task.  The experimenter then introduced the 
children to “Sammy” the snail, “Ellie” the elephant, and “Terry” the tiger (the order of exposure 
was counterbalanced across children).  The children were invited to guess the snail’s favourite food 
(strawberries), the elephant’s favourite colour (black), and the tiger’s favourite toy (a puzzle) in 
return for stickers.  The experimenter referred to each favourite thing three times with the following 
instructions: “This is [name] the [animal], and [name] has a favourite [food/colour/toy].  If you can 
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guess what [name]’s favourite [food/colour/toy] is then I will give you one of these stickers.  So, 
what do you think [name]’s favourite [food/colour/toy] is?”  Following each of these guesses, the 
children were told that their answers were a good guess but incorrect. 
 After the questioning procedure, the children were told that they would be going to another 
room now but would be returning to Charlie the chicken’s room later to talk to the puppets again.  
The snail, elephant, and tiger puppets were left on the table and the children were taken to Room B.  
After 15 minutes of unrelated activities, the children were told that very soon they would be 
returning to Charlie the chicken’s room, and the experimenter invited the children to repeat this 
fact.  The children were then introduced to the booklet.  The experimenter showed the children the 
practice page and demonstrated how to lift up the flaps to reveal the favourite shapes of the cat, the 
dog, and the rabbit.  The children were then told that they could have a turn on the next page, but 
they would only be able to lift up one picture.  The children were asked to confirm how many 
pictures they would be able to lift up on the next page.  The experimenter then opened up the three 
test pages, and asked the children whose favourite food, toy, and colour they would like to know (of 
the elephant, tiger, and snail).  After the children lifted up the flaps they were encouraged to say the 
names of the items they revealed.  Finally, the children were asked three control questions requiring 
them to identify which character had a favourite food, colour, and toy.  
 After this process the children were taken back to Room A.  In the same sequence as before, 
they were invited to guess the favourite things of the snail, elephant, and tiger puppets for stickers.  
The experimenter scored the children on the correctness of their answers. 
Results and Discussion 
 As there were three test pages, each with one correct response and two incorrect responses, 
the level of chance performance was set at one correct answer out of three.  As seen in Figure 2 (left 
panel), both the four- (M = 2.00, SD = 1.17) and five-year-olds (M = 1.90, SD = 1.25), performed 
well above chance level on these test questions, t (39) = 5.02, p < .001, with no significant 
difference between age groups, t (38) = .26, p = .796.  Exactly half of the children (10 four-year-
olds and 10 five-year-olds) answered all three of the test questions correctly, which is much higher 
than the proportion who would be expected to do so by chance alone (1/27 = 3.7%), p < .001.  The 
children answered 87 total control questions correctly, and of the corresponding test questions they 
answered 76 correctly (87.4%).  On the other hand, they answered 33 total control questions 
incorrectly, and of the corresponding test questions they answered just 2 correctly (6.1%).  This 
suggests that the children were typically using their knowledge about which puppet had which 
favourite thing when answering the test questions.  There were no significant effects involving the 
order of exposure to the puppets on either the test or control questions, both F < 1.60, p > .05. 
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Figure 2. Mean test question performance (left panel) and mean difference between test and guess 
scores (right panel) across age groups in Experiment 1A.   
 
 For each child, we calculated a difference score between the number of correct flaps lifted 
during the test questions and the number of correct answers given upon return to the other room.  
More negative difference scores indicated greater failure to name the critical, previously seen 
information at the appropriate occasion.  As seen in Figure 2 (right panel), a t-test indicated that 4-
year-olds showed significantly more negative difference scores (mean = -.50, SD = .69) than 5-year-
olds (mean = -.05, SD = .22), t (38) = 2.78, p = .008.  Of the subset of 20 children who answered all 
three test questions correctly, five out of ten 4-year-olds failed to name at least one piece of 
information in the other room, which was significantly more than the number of 5-year-olds (zero 
out of ten) who failed to name at least one piece of information, Pearson’s χ2 (1, N = 20) = 6.67, p = 
.010.  These results suggest that 5-year-olds may be better than 4-year-olds at encoding, storing, 
and/or retrieving future relevant information; or at linking past and present experiences.  
Although it is tempting to conclude from the above-chance test question performance that 
the children solved the task using episodic foresight, strategically selecting the information relevant 
to the anticipated future problem, there remain alternative interpretations.  The current procedure 
met three of Suddendorf and Corballis’ (2010) four behavioural criteria for assessing episodic 
foresight (it did not meet criterion [iv], because only one type of problem was included), yet there 
were additional concerns owing to domain-specific features of information seeking.  Specifically, 
the children may have been able to succeed on the test questions using associative memory alone, 
rather than foresight.  They could have done this by encoding the puppet-category pairings of snail-
food, elephant-colour, and tiger-toy, and simply using these associations when asked whose 
favourite food/colour/toy they would like to know—without thinking about the future episode of 
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revisiting the puppets.  Indeed, this may explain why the 4-year-olds often failed to take advantage 
of the information upon return to the problem.   
Experiment 1B modified the paradigm to address the possibility of a simpler associative 
explanation.  This time, each of the three puppets had only a favourite food, such that the puppet-
category association was irrelevant if used as a low-level guide to answer the subsequent test 
question.  However, each puppet was also located in a unique spatial context (a coloured box).  
After initial exposure to the puppets, two of the boxes were removed from the scene and the 
children were informed that only the one remaining puppet would be spoken to in the future.  In this 
way, the children were encouraged to envision the critical future context at the point of problem 
exposure.  And, later on in the other room, the lifting of the correct flap could not be the result of 
any puppet-category pairing, but rather required consideration of this specific context—which 
importantly was not directly referred to when the children were asked which flap they would like to 
lift.   
Experiment 1B 
Method 
Participants.  Eighteen 4-year-olds (M = 48 months 24 days, SD = 20 days) and eighteen 5-year-
olds (M = 60 months 10 days, SD = 31 days) comprised the sample of the second experiment.  Nine 
of the 4-year-olds and twelve of the 5-year-olds were boys.  Each child participated individually 
with a parent or caregiver present. 
Materials.  The same puppets used in the previous experiment were also used in Experiment 1B.  
The A4 booklet was also used again, except this time the only pages shown to the child were the 
practice page and test page 1.  The new materials were three large cardboard boxes, each with 
dimensions of 465mm (width) x 360mm (depth) x 600mm (height).  One box was painted red, one 
blue, and one yellow.  The front and back of the boxes were cut in such a way that flaps could be 
opened to reveal and manipulate the contents inside.  The red box contained the snail puppet, the 
blue box the elephant, and the yellow box the tiger.  Another small box containing stickers was used 
as a potential reward to motivate the children. 
Procedure.  The children were led into Room A, again identified as “Charlie the chicken’s room”.  
They were shown the three coloured boxes, spread out and arranged in an arc, with the order of the 
boxes counterbalanced across participants.  The children were asked to identify the colour of each 
box and all children did so correctly.  They were then asked to sit in front of the first box (on their 
left).  The experimenter reached into the box from behind and showed the children which puppet 
was inside.  As in Experiment 1A, the children were introduced to the puppet and told that it had a 
favourite food, and if they could guess that food then they would receive a sticker from the sticker 
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box.  When the children answered, the experimenter told them that it was a good guess but not 
correct.  This procedure was then repeated for the other two boxes and puppets. 
 After the questioning procedure, the experimenter picked up two of the boxes and placed 
them out of sight behind a curtain.  As he removed each box he informed the children that they 
would not be playing with that one again.  After the two boxes were removed, the experimenter 
informed the children that he would leave the remaining box (colour counterbalanced across 
participants) in its place.  He informed the children that they would be going to another room now 
and returning to Charlie the chicken’s room later, but next time they would only sit in front of the 
remaining box and talk to the puppet inside (the puppet remained visible to the children at this stage 
as the flaps of the box were left open).   
 After 15 minutes of unrelated activities in Room B, the children were introduced to the A4 
booklet and shown the practice page.  Immediately after going through the practice page, the 
children were informed that (i) very soon they would be going back to Charlie the chicken’s room 
(no reference was made to the remaining box or the puppet), and (ii) they could lift up only one 
picture on the next page of the booklet.  The experimenter repeated these facts and asked the 
children to independently generate them to ensure that they understood the task.  Finally, the 
experimenter opened up test page 1 and asked the children whose favourite food they would like to 
know (the elephant, tiger, or snail).  After the children lifted up a picture they were encouraged to 
say the name of the food.  The children were then asked three control questions about which puppet 
lived in the red box, the blue box, and the yellow box. 
 The children were then taken back to Room A and asked to sit in front of the remaining box.  
The experimenter reintroduced the children to the puppet within the box and again invited the 
children to guess that puppet’s favourite food.  If the children had selected the appropriate flap in 
the other room, they were scored on the correctness of their answer.   
Results and Discussion 
 As seen in Figure 3 (left panel), five-year-olds (55.6%) chose the appropriate character on 
the test question more often than 4-year-olds (27.8%), with the difference significant under a one-
tailed test, Pearson’s χ2 (1, N = 36) = 2.86, p = .046.  More importantly, binomial tests indicated that 
5-year-olds were significantly more likely than chance (33.3%) to select the appropriate character, p 
= .043, whereas 4-year-olds did not perform significantly different from chance level, p = .769.  
There was no significant effect of the critical puppet (elephant vs. tiger vs. snail) on children’s test 
question performance, F (2, 33) = 1.00, p = .379, suggesting that performance was not influenced 
by any inherent biases towards selecting certain puppets over others.  Of the children who answered 
the test question correctly, nine out of ten 5-year-olds and four out of five 4-year-olds recalled the 
critical information upon re-visiting the other room, with the difference between age groups not 
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significant, Pearson’s χ2 (1, N = 15) = .29, p = .591.  (It should be noted that information recall was 
less demanding in this experiment than in Experiment 1A, given that the children only had to 
encode, store and recall one favourite thing, not three). 
 
                
Figure 3. Mean test question performance (left panel) and critical control question performance 
(right panel) across age groups in Experiment 1B.  
 
 Importantly, performance on the critical control question (i.e., about which character lived in 
the box remaining in the other room) matched test question performance.  As seen in Figure 3 (right 
panel), 5-year-olds (88.9%) performed significantly better than 4-year-olds (38.9%) on this control 
question, Pearson’s χ2 (1, N = 36) = 9.75, p = .002.  Binomial tests revealed that 5-year-olds 
performed significantly above chance level, p < .001, whereas 4-year-olds did not, p = .391.  Of the 
subset of children who answered the critical control question correctly, 5-year-olds performed 
significantly better than chance on the test question (9 out of 16), p = .049, whereas 4-year-olds (3 
out of 7) did not, p = .429.   
 Experiment 1B attempted to overcome a potential limitation of the previous experiment by 
varying the context of the future problem and making the puppet-category association irrelevant.  
The 5-year-olds performed above chance level on the test question, replicating the results of 
Experiment 1A and hence substantiating the conclusion that by this age some children are able to 
select information for a specific future episode.  Even though the 4-year-olds did not perform above 
chance level, however, we cannot rule out the capacity in this younger group, especially considering 
that their performance on the critical control question also failed to surpass chance levels.  If these 
children could not even recall the box that the appropriate character lived in, then they certainly 
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could not be expected to choose the appropriate flap for the future episode, regardless of whether 
they possessed a capacity for future-directed information seeking.   
In Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) structurally similar two-room task described in the 
introduction, 4-year-olds were not only able to recall a concrete problem from 15 minutes earlier, 
but also select an appropriate novel tool that could solve the problem in the future (Suddendorf, et 
al., 2011).  Thus, the difficulty experienced by the 4-year-olds in the Experiment 1B task may have 
derived from the fact that they had to select from three options (puppets) that they had previously 
seen, with the memories interfering with each other when they had to recall the critical problem 
context.  And without the puppet-category association to fall back on, they may have simply 
guessed the answer, even if they potentially possessed the capacity for future-directed information 
seeking in other contexts.  Supporting this case, a recent study from Atance and Somerville (2014) 
suggests that children’s performance in two-room tasks can be largely explained by their capacity to 
recall the critical problem. 
 Alternatively, the performance difference between 4- and 5-year-olds on the test question 
(and the critical control question) could have arisen due to differences in the use of episodic 
foresight at the point of problem exposure.  As demonstrated by the difference scores in Experiment 
1A, 5-year-olds may be better than 4-year-olds at encoding and rehearsing information that will be 
useful in the future.  Thus, in Experiment 1B, the 5-year-olds may have been more likely to 
recognise the significance of the remaining box and puppet during their initial visit to the room, 
when they were told that they would return to this context and talk to that puppet again in the future.  
And in turn, they may have devoted more cognitive resources towards encoding and rehearsing this 
crucial information, which would have facilitated their later performance on the test question.  
Nevertheless, the results do not permit this explanation to be disentangled from the simple memory 
interference explanation presented above, nor from any number of other potential reasons for the 4-
year-olds’ failure.   
 The main conclusion to take away from the Study 1 experiments is that we have 
demonstrated 5-year-olds’ capacity to engage in future-oriented information seeking in a paradigm 
that controls for low-level alternative explanations.  The ambiguous performance of the 4-year-olds, 
however, highlights the question of how to disentangle the role of memory from the role of 
foresight in the behaviour.  Study 2 goes some way towards an answer. 
Study 2 
 Episodic memory shares much in common with episodic foresight (Suddendorf, 2010), and 
yet failures of memory do not necessarily rule out a capacity for foresight.  Indeed, it has been 
proposed that episodic memory is often inaccurate (Schacter, 1999) simply as a side effect of our 
extremely flexible episodic foresight system that can imagine whatever, wherever, whenever 
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(Suddendorf & Busby, 2003).  If we follow Suddendorf & Corballis’ (2010) criterion (iii) for 
behavioural episodic foresight studies, however, then participants first need to correctly recall a 
problem from another spatial and temporal context before they can apply their capacity for foresight 
(as the children were required to do in both experiments of Study 1).  In Study 2 we drop this 
criterion and let children perform the future-oriented behaviour in the same spatial context as the 
future problem.  This has the necessary caveat of introducing a low-level cue for the appropriate 
behaviour, but it also minimises memory demands and so allows us to disentangle some of the 
causes of success.   
 In devising a novel test of future-oriented information seeking with relaxed memory 
demands, we drew on Miller and colleagues’ ‘selective attention’ task, which was originally 
developed as a general measure of attention allocation (P. H. Miller, Haynes, DeMarie-Dreblow, & 
Woody-Ramsey, 1986; P. H. Miller, Seier, Probert, & Aloise, 1991; P. H. Miller & Weiss, 1981; 
Woody-Ramsey & Miller, 1988).  In this task, children are presented with 12 openable boxes – six 
with a drawing of a cage on the front door and six with a drawing of a house.  Underneath the doors 
with a cage are drawings of familiar animals, and underneath the doors with a house are drawings of 
familiar household objects.  Half of the children are told that their task is to remember which boxes 
contain which animals, and the other half are told that their task is to remember which boxes 
contain which household objects.  Thus, half of the boxes contain information that will be relevant 
in the future and half of the boxes contain irrelevant information.  The children are then given 25 
seconds to open any doors they wish before they are asked to identify the box that contains one 
specific animal or household object.  These studies have uncovered improvements in selective 
attention (that is, opening doors that will be relevant in the future) over the early schooling years. 
 In addition to some structural changes (see the method section), we modified this paradigm 
conceptually to produce a more specific and preschooler-appropriate measure of future-directed 
information seeking with minimal memory demands.  Firstly, in accordance with Suddendorf and 
Corballis’ (2010) criterion (i), we used only one trial per participant in order to rule out simple 
learning explanations for the future-oriented behaviour.  Authors using Miller and colleagues’ 
paradigm typically collapse over a number of trials, which may have the effect of grouping children 
who truly understand the future-directed requirements of the task with others who simply learn to 
allocate their attention appropriately over the course of the trials.   
 Secondly, we included a sand-timer that allowed the children to visibly track the amount of 
time that they had to study before the future test.  We reasoned that, if the children knew how much 
time they had left (and were constantly reminded that this time was decreasing), then they might be 
more motivated to study the appropriate information and avoid wasting time on irrelevant 
information.  Preschoolers have difficulty understanding temporal terms such as ‘minute’ or 
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‘second’ (Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2011), but they find it much easier to comprehend physical 
instantiations of time such as sand-timers (Bischof-Köhler, 2000; Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013).   
 Thirdly, we reduced memory demands further by physically marking the material that would 
be relevant in the future.  Although Miller and colleagues’ task involves few memory demands 
compared to the two-room task, it still requires the children to remember the instruction about 
which information is critical.  Preschoolers may struggle to maintain this instruction in their limited 
working memory space (Alloway, Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006) while also engaging in 
information seeking behaviour. 
 Finally, our post-studying recall measure tested children on their ability to name all six of 
the relevant pieces of information, without confining their answers to a set number of options.  
When children are tested after the studying period in Miller and colleagues’ task, they are typically 
given the name of one of the relevant pieces of information before being asked to point out its 
spatial location.  Thus, they have an a priori 1/6 chance of simply guessing the correct location 
without truly knowing it, and an even greater chance if they can rule out locations that they know 
are definitely incorrect.  Our free answer, multi-item recall measure should allow a finer-grained 
analysis of potential age-based performance differences and the factors related to success. 
 The aim of Study 2 was to examine preschoolers’ future-directed information seeking skills 
with minimal memory demands.  We administered our modified version of Miller and colleagues’ 
paradigm to 4- and 5-year-olds.  The children were shown two sets of six cards, one set containing 
information relevant to a future test (on the cards’ opposite sides) and the other set containing 
irrelevant information.  The relevant cards were marked with a puppet to further reduce memory 
demands, and a one-minute sand timer indicated to the children the time they had to turn over and 
look at whatever cards they wished.  Afterwards, they were tested on their ability to freely name all 
six pieces of the relevant information.   
Method 
 Participants.  The participants in Study 2 were the same 36 children (18 four-year-olds; 18 
five-year-olds) that completed Experiment 1B.  They completed Study 2 immediately after 
Experiment 1B.  Using these participants had the added bonus of allowing us to check for 
correlations across tasks. 
 Materials.  The main experimental materials were 12 plastic-coated cards, six with a red 
border and six with a blue border.  The two sets of cards each contained pictures of the same six 
animals on the front (bird, cat, dog, kangaroo, lion, and lizard).  On the back of each red card was a 
picture of a toy (respectively: teddy bear, dinosaur, ball, doll, car, and puzzle), and on the back of 
each blue card was a picture of a food (respectively: carrot, orange, banana, apple, strawberry, 
watermelon).  A one-minute sand-timer, used to convey the length of the studying period, was 16cm 
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high with a diameter of 8cm and filled with green sand particles.  The giraffe puppet from 
Experiment 1A was used to mark the relevant cards. 
 Procedure.  The experimenter sat at a table directly across from the children before turning 
the sand-timer over and instructing them to watch the sand go from one end to the other.  In this 
way the children received pre-experimental experience of the length of the timer’s cycle.  
Afterwards, the experimenter revealed the cards and placed them in front of the children on a sheet 
on the table (this made the cards easy to pick up).  One group of cards (red or blue, counterbalanced 
across participants) was placed animal-side up on the left of the sheet in two rows of three, 
according to the alphabetical order of the animals.  The other group of cards was placed to the right 
of the sheet in the same formation.  A standing piece of cardboard was placed between the red and 
blue cards to emphasise that they belonged to different categories.  See Figure 4 for a picture of the 
experimental set-up from the children’s perspective.  The task itself occurred in three phases: task 
exposure, studying, and test. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Depiction of the Study 2 experimental set-up from the children’s perspective.  The red 
and blue cards were placed on opposite sides of the cardboard barrier with their animal sides facing 
up.  The green sand-timer marked how long the children had to turn over the cards and study the 
items depicted on the other side.  The giraffe puppet marked the cards that the children would be 
playing with once the sand-timer had completed its cycle. 
 
 Task exposure phase.  The experimenter placed the giraffe puppet behind either the red or 
blue cards (counterbalanced across participants), and informed the children that this meant they 
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would be playing with this group of cards.  The experimenter told the children that on the back of 
the red/blue cards were pictures of the animals’ favourite toys/foods, and their task was to guess 
these in return for stickers.  After the children guessed each toy/food (incorrectly), the experimenter 
turned the card over to reveal the correct answer and to ensure that the children knew the name of 
each toy/food.  Afterwards, the experimenter moved the giraffe puppet to the other group of cards 
and the children also performed the guessing task with these cards.  The exposure phase was 
included so that the children could experience the fact that they did not originally possess the 
knowledge required to gain the stickers. 
 Studying phase.  Immediately after the exposure phase, the experimenter placed the giraffe 
puppet behind either the red or blue cards (counterbalanced across participants).  He told the 
children that, this time, he would turn the sand-timer over, and when its cycle had completed they 
would play the same game as before with the cards marked by the giraffe.  He reminded the 
children that they could win stickers if they could guess the favourite toys/foods underneath the 
appropriate cards.  He emphasised that they would not play the game again with the cards that were 
not marked by the giraffe.  The experimenter then told the children that, while the sand was falling, 
they could turn over and look at whatever cards they liked, and they could keep looking until all of 
the sand had finished.  He emphasised this fact by lifting up and turning one of the red cards and 
one of the blue cards, before replacing them in their original position.  These instructions were then 
repeated, and the children were asked to confirm which cards they would be playing the game with 
when the timer had completed its cycle.  The experimenter once again reminded the children that 
they could look at whatever cards they liked, before turning the timer over to signal the beginning 
of the one-minute studying period. 
 The children were video-taped during the task, and these videos helped to score the data.  
We measured how many times children picked up and turned over each card during the studying 
period (this included instances where they replaced the card in the original animal-side up position, 
and instances where they replaced it toy/food-side up), the colour of the first card they turned over, 
and how much time they spent looking at cards of each colour.  The time spent looking at the cards 
was collapsed according to colour, because the children often had multiple overturned cards within 
their visual field and it was not possible to tell which one they were focusing on.  Because of the 
cardboard barrier between the red and blue cards, however, it was possible to tell which colour 
cards they were focusing on.   
 Test phase.  Immediately after the studying phase, the children were invited to play the 
guessing game again with the cards that were marked by the giraffe puppet.  Each correct answer 
was rewarded with a sticker, and the children were scored for which individual answers they got 
correct as well as their total number of correct answers. 
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Results and Discussion 
 The data were analysed in two main ways.  Firstly, the individual variables were checked for 
age differences, and for whether 4- and 5-year-olds performed above chance level.  Secondly, the 
variables were entered into a multiple regression with the total number of correct answers in the test 
phase as the dependent variable, in order to identify which factors were making unique 
contributions to the children’s test performance. 
 Analyses of individual variables. 
 First card preference.  Thirteen of the 4-year-olds (72.2%) and fourteen of the 5-year-olds 
(77.8%) chose a correct card the first time they turned a card over, with separate sign tests revealing 
that both of these age groups performed above chance level (50%), both p < .048.  There are at least 
two ways to interpret this result.  It may indicate that, at the beginning of the trial at least, children 
from both age groups had a preference for the information that they knew would be useful in the 
future.  On the other hand, it may simply indicate that the children were cued into choosing a 
correct card on the first turn by the experimenter’s instructions or the presence of the giraffe puppet 
(with this cue effect potentially wearing off over time).  Nevertheless, despite this interpretational 
uncertainty, the first card preference variable can still be checked for its independent contribution to 
the children’s performance on the later test questions (see the multiple regression analysis). 
 Number of card turns per colour.  The number of times that children turned over correct 
and incorrect cards were entered into a 2 x 2 (Age x Correctness) mixed ANOVA.  As seen in 
Figure 5 (left panel), this ANOVA revealed a main effect of Age, F (1, 34) = 7.53, p = .010, ηp2 = 
.181, such that 5-year-olds turned over significantly more total cards (M = 15.44, SD = 5.28) than 4-
year-olds (M = 10.39, SD = 5.15).  There was also a main effect of Correctness, F (1, 34) = 9.47, p 
= .004, ηp2 = .281, such that children turned over correct cards (M = 8.56, SD = 5.76) significantly 
more times than incorrect cards (M = 4.53, SD = 4.23).  These main effects were qualified by an 
Age x Correctness interaction, F (1, 34) = 5.96, p = .020, ηp2 = .149.  Follow-up testing indicated 
that the 4-year-olds (M = 4.94, SD = 4.96) and 5-year-olds (M = 4.11, SD = 3.43) did not differ in 
the number of times that they turned over incorrect cards, F (1, 34) = .343, p = .562.  However, 5-
year-olds turned over correct cards (M = 11.33, SD = 6.46) significantly more times than 4-year-
olds (M = 5.78, SD = 3.19), F (1, 34) = 10.70, p = .002.  Five-year-olds turned over correct cards 
significantly more often than incorrect cards, F (1, 34) = 15.22, p < .001, whereas 4-year-olds did 
not, F (1, 34) = .203, p = .655.  These results suggest that the average 5-year-old had a preference 
for turning over the correct cards during the studying period, whereas the data from the 4-year-olds 
did not demonstrate such a preference.  
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Figure 5. Mean number of card turns (left panel) and time spent looking at cards (right panel) 
across age groups and card correctness in Study 2.   
 
 Looking time per colour.  The amounts of time that children spent looking at correct and 
incorrect cards were entered into a 2 x 2 (Age x Correctness) mixed ANOVA (data from one 5-
year-old were missing).  As seen in Figure 5 (right panel), this test revealed a main effect of Age, F 
(1, 33) = 6.72, p = .014, ηp2 = .169, such that 5-year-olds spent significantly more time looking at 
the cards (M = 44.65s, SD = 11.55s) than 4-year-olds (M = 33.28s, SD = 14.08s).  There was also a 
main effect of Correctness, F (1, 33) = 9.27, p = .006, ηp2 = .219, such that children spent 
significantly more time looking at correct cards (M = 26.14s, SD = 16.55s) than incorrect cards (M 
= 12.63s, SD = 14.34s).  The Age x Correctness interaction did not reach statistical significance, F 
(1, 33) = 3.43, p = .073, ηp2 = .094, although post-hoc testing did uncover some revealing effects.  
Four-year-olds (M = 13.94s, SD = 16.54s) and 5-year-olds (M = 11.24s, SD = 11.93s) did not differ 
in the time they spent looking at the incorrect cards, F (1, 33) = .306, p = .584.  However, 5-year-
olds spent significantly more seconds looking at the correct cards (M = 33.35s, SD = 17.63s) than 4-
year-olds (M = 19.33s, SD = 12.42s), F (1, 33) = 7.46, p = .010.  Five-year-olds spent significantly 
more time looking at correct cards than incorrect cards, F (1, 33) = 11.65, p = .002, whereas 4-year-
olds did not, F (1, 33) =.73, p = .398. 
 The results from this measure provide valuable insight into how the children were allocating 
their limited studying time before the future test.  The first thing to note is the relatively large 
amount of time wasted by the younger children during the studying period.  On average, 4-year-olds 
spent 44.5% of this period not focusing any cards, whereas 5-year-olds did not focus on the cards 
only 25.6% of the time.  Inspection of the testing videos revealed that many of the 4-year-olds 
looked at the cards for only a brief period, before switching their focus to the falling sand in the 
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timer and simply waiting for it to complete its cycle.  This behaviour, coupled with the lack of a 
preference for correct cards when they did look at the cards, may suggest either a fundamental lack 
of understanding of the usefulness of studying relevant information for the future, or a lack of 
motivation to focus on such information.  The 5-year-olds, however, used their time more 
effectively and also showed a preference for looking at the correct cards, indicating they may have 
some understanding of the future-oriented usefulness of studying. 
 Test phase answers.  An independent samples t-test (one-tailed) revealed that 5-year-olds 
answered significantly more questions correctly during the test phase (M = 3.06 out of 6, SD = 1.63) 
than 4-year-olds (M = 2.11 out of 6, SD = 1.45), t (35) = 1.84, p = .038 (a one-tailed test is justified 
here because one would expect performance to improve with age).  Despite the age effect, however, 
this test does not tell us why the 5-year-olds outperformed the 4-year-olds on the test questions.  In 
an attempt to answer this question, we entered age and other potentially important variables into a 
multiple regression.  
 Multiple regression analysis.  The dependent variable of the multiple regression was the 
total number of correct answers during the test phase.  The independent variables, entered into the 
regression simultaneously, included: exact age, the number of times correct cards were turned over, 
the amount of time spent looking at correct cards in seconds, and whether the child chose a correct 
card the first time they turned a card over (no = 0, yes = 1).  These four predictors significantly 
explained 51.9% of the variance in children’s performance, R2 = .519, F (4, 30) = 8.09, p < .001.  
The contributions of the individual variables to the model are summarised in Table 1.  Only two of 
the four independent variables added significant unique variance.   
 
Table 1 
Standardised Regression Coefficients for Predictors of Children’s Test Question Performance in 
Study 2 
Variable β t p 
Exact age .16 1.10 .279 
Number of correct card turns -.31 -1.22 .232 
Time looking at correct cards .61 2.40 .023* 
Correct first card preference .42 2.89 .007** 
 
 The variable that significantly contributed the most unique variance to the children’s test 
performance was the amount of time that they spent looking at the correct cards.  This suggests that 
the children may have been actively encoding and rehearsing the information over the time they 
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were looking at the cards.  As described earlier, older children spent more time than younger 
children looking at the correct cards, which may suggest that their use of this strategy contributed to 
their higher performance on the test questions.  Supporting this view, the significant zero-order 
relationship (one-tailed) between exact age and total number of correct answers, r = .29, p = .045, 
was fully mediated by the time spent looking at the correct cards, Z = 2.12, p = .034 (Sobel test), 
such that the direct relationship between exact age and correct answers was not significant, t (34) = 
.30, p = .383.   
 In contrast to the time spent looking at the correct cards, the number of times that children 
turned over these cards did not contribute significant unique variance to the regression model.  This 
may reflect the fact that some children rapidly turned the cards over many times without actually 
encoding the information required for the future test.  A more effective strategy was to turn the 
cards over at a moderate pace, with more time spent encoding the future-relevant information. 
 One final interesting finding was the significant and positive unique contribution of the 
correct first card preference variable to test question performance.  Given that many of the children 
would have undoubtedly turned over an appropriate first card by chance alone, the strength of this 
relationship is particularly noteworthy.  One interpretation is that the children who turned over an 
appropriate card first were more likely to understand the future relevance of the studying period 
than the children who did not, and thus were more likely to be in a future-oriented mindset when 
looking at the correct cards.  In turn, this mindset could have had an effect on memory encoding 
over and above the effect provided by the sheer amount of time spent looking at the correct cards.  
A leaner alternative interpretation, however, is that the children were more likely to recall the 
information they looked at first simply because of a primacy effect (see Murdock Jr, 1962). 
 Comparisons with Experiment 1B task performance.  Because the participants in Study 2 
were the same as those from Experiment 1B, we were able to check for relationships between the 
tasks.  Age-partialled binary logistic regressions, however, revealed that outcomes on the variables 
of interest in Experiment 1B’s puppet task (test question performance and critical control question 
performance) could not be predicted by scores on the variables of interest in Study 2’s task (first 
card preference, number of correct card turns, time spent looking at correct cards, and number of 
correct answers), all Wald χ2 < 1.95, p > .16.  The lack of significant relationships may have been 
due to potential power issues, and/or the relative insensitivity of the nominal Experiment 1B 
measures. 
 In Experiment 1B, there were 11 children who selected the correct puppet flap, answered the 
critical control question correctly, and used the information appropriately to obtain the future 
reward.  In Study 2, these 11 children looked at the correct cards (M = 26.45s, SD = 16.50s) for 
longer than the incorrect cards (M = 11.82s, SD = 13.78), although this difference was not 
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significant, t (10) = 1.86, p = .093.  The difference did become significant, however, when one 
outlier who only looked at the incorrect cards was removed from the analysis, t (9) = 3.43, p = .008.  
This result provides tentative support for the idea that the children who showed the strongest 
evidence of future-oriented information seeking behaviour in Experiment 1B also showed the 
behaviour in another context.   
General Discussion 
 The current studies provide the first targeted investigation of children’s future-oriented 
information seeking abilities.  The two experiments in Study 1 were based on a modified version of 
the two-room paradigm previously used by Suddendorf and colleagues (2011) and required children 
to preferentially seek out specific information that would solve a future problem in a spatially 
removed context.  In Experiment 1A, we found that both 4- and 5-year-olds were more likely than 
chance to seek information that would be useful in the future.  Nevertheless, there was some 
concern that children could have based their selections on associative memory alone, rather than 
episodic foresight, which may have explained why the younger children were particularly 
susceptible to failing to use the information to obtain the future reward.  Thus, in Experiment 1B we 
modified the two-room paradigm to ensure that the correct answer depended on a specific future 
context.  In this experiment, 5-year-olds but not 4-year-olds were more likely than chance to seek 
the correct information.  This result substantiates the claim that many 5-year-olds are truly able to 
seek information with a specific future episode in mind.  Yet, this is not to say that younger children 
definitely lack this ability, as there may have been many reasons for failure.  A common issue in 
this and other attempts to measure foresight is that problems with foreseeing the future cannot be 
disentangled from problems with remembering the critical information.  Our final study aimed to 
address this issue by minimising memory demands and allowing children to seek information in the 
same spatial context in which it would become useful in the future.  
 Study 2 gave children the opportunity to study relevant information (and irrelevant 
information) for a future test, using a modified version of Miller and Weiss’ (1981) selective 
attention paradigm.  Five-year-olds as a group demonstrated some level of competence, further 
substantiating the case that many of them can strategically search for information with a future goal 
in mind.  Four-year-olds, on the other hand, again performed at chance levels, seemingly unaided 
by the reduction in memory demands.  Because this task involved an identical spatial context for the 
future-directed behaviour and the future problem, there was a chance that the children could have 
been cued into the appropriate behaviour without necessarily understanding its future relevance (see 
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010).  And yet, even with this potential cue, the 4-year-olds as a group 
still did not demonstrate compelling future-oriented studying behaviour, which appeared to explain 
their poorer performance on the subsequent test questions than the 5-year-olds.   
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 Overall, the main novel contribution of the current studies is the consistent finding that 
children begin to demonstrate future-oriented information seeking skills by at least the fifth year of 
life.  This developmental pattern falls within the range of other future-oriented behaviours that 
emerge during the preschool years (Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013), albeit towards the latter end of 
this period.  As described in the introduction, for example, object selection tasks can be passed by 
4-year-olds (Suddendorf, et al., 2011) and perhaps even 3-year-olds (Scarf, et al., 2013), and so 
future-oriented information seeking may be more cognitively demanding than acting to solve future 
concrete problems.  Indeed, although the 5-year-olds performed above chance levels across all of 
our tasks, they certainly did not perform at ceiling levels, even in Study 2 when memory demands 
were relaxed.  Future research may wish to examine the reason for this potentially late 
development, and one possibility concerns the particular type of mental time travel involved. 
Does future-oriented information seeking involve doubly embedded mental time travel? 
Presumably, future-oriented information seeking may emerge later than some other future-
oriented behaviours, such as object selection, because of differences in the underlying cognitive 
processes.  In an object selection task, the child must envision themselves encountering the problem 
in the future before they are able to choose the item that can solve it.  In this way, the child is 
recursively embedding their own future mental perspective within their present experience and 
using this embedding to guide their behaviour (Corballis, 2011).  In a future-directed information 
seeking task, the child must similarly envision themselves encountering the future problem, and 
simply doing so may bias them towards preferring the correct information.  If they want to perform 
optimally in the future episode, however, they must also deduce the fact that they will have to rely 
on their memory to solve the future problem, and hence the information must be encoded, stored, 
and potentially rehearsed.  Under these circumstances, the child is not only embedding a future 
mental perspective within their present experience, but also embedding a (relative) past mental 
perspective within the embedded future perspective.  This form of mental time travel can be 
described as doubly embedded.  The salient differences between 4- and 5-year-olds on each task of 
the current studies—in the difference scores in Experiment 1A, the test and control question scores 
in Experiment 1B, and the time spent looking at the correct cards in Study 2—could all potentially 
be explained by the increased propensity of 5-year-olds to engage in such doubly embedded mental 
time travel. 
 Doubly embedded mental time travel may also be involved in prospective memory tasks, in 
which a person must remember to carry out a certain action given a specific future event or at a 
specific future time (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & Messer, 2008).  Such 
action can be triggered automatically by an external cue (e.g., seeing a shop may trigger your latent 
intention to buy milk), but performance is nevertheless greatly enhanced by internal rehearsal of the 
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prospective intention before it must be carried out (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  A propensity to 
engage in such rehearsal may rely on the doubly embedded understanding that, in the future, one 
will benefit from the (relative) past mental rehearsal of the intention.  Recent evidence suggests that 
children begin to internally rehearse prospective intentions around age five (Mahy & Moses, 2011), 
consistent with the developmental pattern seen in the current studies.  More broadly, doubly 
embedded cognition may also begin to emerge around age five in the theory of mind domain (S. A. 
Miller, 2009; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994), about one to two years later than singly 
embedded cognition (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). 
Implications, future directions and conclusion 
 Regardless of the underlying mechanisms supporting the development of future-oriented 
information seeking behaviour, the results of the current studies have important applied 
implications.  In the early school years, for instance, we cannot expect children to perform well if 
they do not understand the future relevance of tasks such as studying and homework—at least when 
using their own strategies.  Although the results suggest that many 5-year-olds do possess some 
future-oriented understanding of information seeking, the fact that this group did not perform even 
close to ceiling levels suggests there is much room for improvement.  Indeed, many young children 
may exist in a ‘zone of proximal development’ (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1984) in regards to this 
skill, and so parents and teachers may wish to pay particular attention towards scaffolding their 
information seeking behaviour with future outcomes in mind.  Concurrently, parents and teachers 
may wish to improve children’s independent skills by explicitly discussing with them the future 
importance of their information seeking behaviour.  Future research may seek to identify the factors 
relating to individual developmental delays, with the potential long-term goal of producing training 
programs aimed at improving the skill. 
 The current studies were the first to directly investigate the development of basic future-
oriented information seeking behaviour.  Across two structurally distinct domains, 5-year-olds but 
not 4-year-olds demonstrated an ability to seek and retain information that would be useful in a 
specific future episode, although even the older children did not perform exceptionally well.  This 
suggests that many, but perhaps not all children will understand the future relevance of tasks such 
as studying and homework as they are about to begin formal schooling.  The mechanisms 
underlying the emergence of future-oriented information seeking remain unclear, but one prospect 
is a general ability to engage in doubly embedded mental time travel.  Future research could explore 
this and other possibilities more directly, as a greater understanding of the mechanisms could 
eventually inform the identification and treatment of children at risk of developmental delays.  
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Preface 
 Chapter 4’s study found that many 5-year-old children were able to solve tasks requiring 
them to seek information for a specific future episode, whereas 4-year-olds struggled on the same 
tasks when low-level associative explanations were controlled for.  One potential reason that I gave 
for the difference between these age groups was an increased propensity of 5-year-olds to engage in 
doubly embedded mental time travel—in which they reflect on how their memory will be useful in 
the future.  I suggested that doubly embedded mental time travel may also be involved in 
prospective memory tasks, in particular when children internally rehearse prospective intentions in 
order to improve their future memory to perform a particular action.   
 The following chapter examines 3-, 4-, and 5-year-old children’s capacities on a prospective 
memory task in which a cue to carry out an intended future action is either present or absent.  One 
might expect doubly embedded mental time travel to be especially important without the cue, 
because children have to rely more heavily on internal processes to enhance their future memory to 
carry out the action.  Considering the pattern of results in the previous chapter then, one might 
expect 5-year-olds to perform much better than younger children when the cue is absent.  
 This chapter has been submitted for publication1 and at the time of writing it is under peer 
review.  Therefore, many of the concepts and findings mentioned in the general introduction 
(Chapter 1) and review (Chapter 2) are briefly reiterated.  I do not, however, discuss doubly 
embedded mental time travel, as the data from the previous chapter remain unpublished and I wrote 
the paper under the framework of the broader prospective memory literature.  Instead, I return to the 
issue of doubly embedded mental time travel in the general discussion (Chapter 8). 
 
1Redshaw, J., & Suddendorf, T., & Henry, J.D. (submitted). The development of time-based 
prospective memory in the presence and absence of event-based cues. 
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Abstract 
Previous time-based prospective memory research, both with children and other groups, has 
measured the ability to perform an action with the arrival of a time-dependent, yet still event-based 
cue (e.g., the occurrence of a specific clock pattern), while also engaged in an ongoing activity.  
Here we introduce a novel means of operationalising time-based prospective memory and assess 
children’s growing capacities when the availability of an event-based cue is varied.  Preschoolers 
aged three, four, or five years (N = 72) were required to ring a bell when a familiar one-minute 
sand-timer had completed a cycle under four conditions.  In a 2x2 within-subjects design, the timer 
was either visible or hidden, and either presented as a single task or embedded within a dual picture-
naming task.  Children were more likely to ring the bell before two minutes had elapsed in the 
visible-timer and single-task conditions, with performance improving with age across all conditions.  
Executive function measures independently predicted performance and accuracy in the hidden-timer 
conditions but not the visible-timer conditions.  These results suggest a divergence in the 
development of time-based prospective memory in the presence and absence of event-based cues, 
potentially because the latter relies more on executive resources.  Our paradigm allows for the 
assessment of time-based prospective memory in much younger children than previous measures, 
and it could also be adapted for use with other populations. 
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 Researchers typically distinguish between event-based prospective memory (EBPM), 
whereby people must act on an intention when prompted by a future external cue (e.g., ‘buy milk 
next time you are at the shop’); and time-based prospective memory (TBPM), whereby people must 
act on an intention at a particular future point in time (e.g., ‘get the washing out of the machine in 
two hours’).  Nevertheless, the latter can also be conceived of as an event-based form of memory, as 
long as there is an external means of tracking time (e.g., ‘get the washing out of the machine when 
the clock shows 10am’).  Indeed, empirical TBPM studies almost universally require participants to 
perform an action when a clock shows a specific pattern or when an alternative timing device has 
completed a cycle (for reviews, see Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & Messer, 2008; McDaniel & Einstein, 
2007).  In the real world, however, TBPM tasks often involve intended actions that need to be 
carried out at a future time for which no event-based cues are available.  You may know that you 
have to get the washing out of the machine after two hours, for example, but perhaps you did not 
glance at your watch when turning the machine on.  In this case there is no time-dependent event-
based reminder to retrieve the washing, and instead you must exclusively rely on your own internal 
sense of the passage of time and your ability to self-initiate the intended action.   
            TBPM studies do often include safeguards to ensure that participants are not automatically 
cued into implementing the intention by the event-based reminder.  Many tasks, for instance, 
require participants to turn their head (e.g., Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, & Cunfer, 
1995) or press a button (e.g., Park, Hertzog, Kidder, Morrell, & Mayhorn, 1997) in order to look at 
the timing device.  Nevertheless, such paradigms are still conceptually distinct from real-world 
tasks in which there are no time-dependent event-based cues at all, as in the above example.  And 
so it remains unclear to what degree performance in TBPM tasks is driven by the internal tracking 
of time and self-initiated implementation of the intention, and to what degree it is driven by the 
availability of event-based reminders.  Furthermore, almost nothing is known about the 
development of TBPM in the absence of event-based cues in children.  Here we provide the first 
paradigm of TBPM that varies the availability of an event-based cue and is simple enough to be 
used with very young children (among other populations). 
The Development of Event-based and Time-based Prospective Memory 
 EBPM develops during the preschool years, with even 3-year-olds able to succeed at certain 
tasks (for a review, see Kvavilashvili, et al., 2008).  TBPM research, on the other hand, has 
typically focused on older, school-aged samples (e.g., Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Kerns, 2000; 
Mackinlay, Kliegel, & Mäntylä, 2009).  The earliest reported success on a TBPM task is by 5-year-
olds, who could sometimes remember to turn a sand-timer over whenever it had completed a cycle, 
while also playing an unrelated card game (Aberle & Kliegel, 2010).  Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that in this paradigm the visible passage of sand through the timer could act as an event-based 
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reminder to perform the task.  As for other populations, TBPM studies with children do sometimes 
require the participants to act purposefully in order to see the timing device (Aberle & Kliegel, 
2010; Mackinlay, et al., 2009).  Interestingly, however, the level of self-initiation required to see the 
device appears to have no effect on children’s ability to carry out the intended action (Voigt, 
Aberle, Schönfeld, & Kliegel, 2011).  Perhaps this is because, even when the timer requires effort to 
see, the children can still off-load the need to internally track the passage of time and implement the 
intention to an external, event-based source.  The development of TBPM in the complete absence of 
time-dependent event-based cues remains almost entirely unexamined. 
 The only study to assess this ability in children used a school-aged sample of 7- to 12-year-
olds, but the authors did not describe their task as a prospective memory task nor did they report 
whether there was a developmental pattern (Mackinlay, et al., 2009).  The children had to tell an 
experimenter when they thought two minutes had elapsed, while also engaged in an ongoing task 
that required them to trace tangled lines on a sheet of paper.  Although useful for older child 
participants, however, such tasks would not be appropriate for preschoolers, given their limited 
understanding of temporal terms such as ‘second’ or ‘minute’ (Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2011).  
The very use of such cultural time instantiations also carries the risk that participants will internally 
count to the crucial time when deciding when to act, rather than relying on their biological clock per 
se (as was self-reported by many adult participants in a similar task; Waldum & Sahakyan, 2013).  
A physical instantiation of time, such as a sand-timer, might provide a more child-friendly and 
controlled means of conveying a specific temporal period (see, e.g., Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2013).  
Furthermore, because the ongoing tracing task in Mackinlay and colleagues’ study was fully 
directed by the child, there may have been individual and age-based differences in the degree to 
which the participants were engaged by the activity (and potentially distracted from carrying out the 
prospective intention).  An experimenter-directed ongoing task, such as picture-naming (see, e.g., 
Kliegel & Jäger, 2007; Kvavilashvili, Messer, & Ebdon, 2001), would reduce this problem by 
controlling the rate at which the child performed the activity. 
 Notably, there exists a large literature assessing the development of ‘time perception’ 
(Droit-Volet, Delgado, & Rattat, 2006), and some tasks measuring this construct require children to 
perform an action when they believe a certain amount of time has elapsed.  One example is the 
temporal reproduction task (e.g., Szelag, Kowalska, Rymarczyk, & Pöppel, 2002), in which 
participants are exposed to a continuous visual or auditory stimulus for a certain period of time, 
before they are again exposed to the stimulus and asked to press a button when they believe it has 
appeared for the same amount of time as before.  Typically, however, such tasks are administered 
on their own, rather than with an additional ongoing activity, and so they do not meet the standard 
definition of a prospective memory task (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).  
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Furthermore, the reproduced time period is typically less than 10 seconds, meaning that the original 
temporal stimulus may be represented in working memory rather than by a long-term internal clock.  
Finally, because the visual or auditory stimulus is typically available while its temporal length is 
being reproduced, the children are continuously reminded that they have to match the new stimulus 
with their internal representation of the original stimulus.  It is probably for these reasons that 
children very rarely fail to press the button in such tasks (unlike in prospective memory tasks where 
failure is relatively common). 
The Current Study  
 The aim of the current study was to produce a measure that could examine the early 
development of TBPM in the presence and absence of time-dependent event-based cues.  As 
described earlier, these cues are often unavailable in real-world TBPM situations, and so such a 
measure could make a valuable novel contribution to the broader prospective memory literature.  
Our paradigm was designed to be usable with preschool children, while also avoiding issues with 
previous relevant work, including a reliance on cultural time instantiations and the use of fully 
child-directed ongoing tasks (or no ongoing tasks at all).   
 Our basic task required children to ring a bell when a familiar one-minute sand-timer had 
completed a cycle (or at least before the end of a two-minute trial).  We manipulated two variables 
in a 2x2 within-subjects design.  In the visible-timer conditions, the children could rely on the 
finishing passage of sand as an event-based reminder when deciding when to act.  In half of the 
conditions, however, the timer was covered and the children were required to ring the bell when 
they thought the sand had finished.  In these hidden-timer conditions there was no event-based 
reminder to perform the action at the appropriate time, nor was there any sensory access to the 
temporal stimulus (as there is in temporal reproduction tasks).   
 Besides timer visibility, the other within-subjects variable was task load.  In half of the 
conditions (single-visible and single-hidden) the timer was presented alone and the only task was to 
ring the bell.  These conditions were included to (i) measure task comprehension, and (ii) in the 
single-hidden condition, provide a measure of time perception that was not embedded within an 
ongoing task.  Because prospective memory requires one to carry out the intended action while 
engaged in another activity (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), however, we 
also included a second task in half of our conditions.  In these prospective memory conditions (PM-
visible and PM-hidden), the experimenter moved the timer (visible or covered) around a sheet 
containing 25 pictures, with the children having to name each picture as it was marked by the timer; 
all the while still remembering to ring the bell at the end of the timer’s cycle.  Thus the timer task 
was embedded within the picture-naming task in much the same way that event-based tasks are 
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embedded within dual tasks throughout the prospective memory literature (e.g., Kerns, 2000; 
Kliegel & Jäger, 2007; Rendell & Craik, 2000). 
 According to conventional models of prospective memory, the appearance of a focal event-
based cue (such as that provided by the finishing passage of sand) might be expected to trigger 
either an automatic retrieval of the prospective intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) or a retrieval 
requiring only limited executive resources (Smith & Bayen, 2004).  Consequently, we hypothesised 
that children’s performance in the PM-visible condition would be superior to that in the PM-hidden 
condition.  Without the event-based reminder, the PM-hidden condition should impose greater 
demands upon strategic retrieval processes.  McDaniel and Einstein (2000) defined strategic 
retrieval in terms of recruiting executive resources to monitor the environment for an event-based 
cue, but this definition could be broadened to include other executive processes, such as internal 
rehearsal of the future intention, active monitoring of the passage of time, and inhibition of 
immediate distractions.  Executive function shows important developments during the preschool 
years (Anderson, 2002), particularly between ages three and five (Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008), 
and there is recent evidence for the role of executive function in children’s prospective memory 
performance (Ford, Driscoll, Shum, & Macaulay, 2012; Mahy & Moses, 2011; Mahy, Moses, & 
Kliegel, in press).  We therefore chose 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds for our sample, and we included two 
measures of executive function to examine the predictive value of this construct over the various 
conditions of the timer task.   
Method 
Participants 
 The sample included 72 preschoolers aged within one month of their third, fourth, or fifth 
birthday (24 from each age group).  Fifteen of the 3-year-olds (mean age = 36.31 months, SD = 
.34), twelve of the 4-year-olds (mean age = 48.34 months, SD = .44), and twelve of the 5-year-olds 
(mean age = 59.83 months, SD = .45) were boys.  All children participated individually with a 
parent or caregiver present.  All children completed all conditions of the timer task, but four did not 
complete the recognition task or both executive function tasks due to restlessness and were thus 
excluded from these specific analyses. 
Materials 
 Timer, bell and sock.  The sand-timer was 16cm high with a diameter of 8cm and was 
filled with green sand particles.  The length of one cycle was 60 seconds.  Other materials included 
a commercially available call bell and a black sock that could be placed over the timer to conceal 
the passage of sand.   
 Dual task picture sheets.  The two picture sheets were each in A1 dimensions (84.1cm x 
59.4cm) and printed on white satin cloth.  Each sheet was divided by gridlines into 25 equally-sized 
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rectangles in a 5x5 configuration.  Each rectangle contained a picture representing an easily 
identifiable word in the bottom right corner and an empty circle in the top left corner that marked 
where the timer could be placed (see Figure 1).  All 50 images were purchased from the website 
www.clipart.com to be used royalty free.  Each child saw both sheets, one in the PM-visible 
condition and one in the PM-hidden condition. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Representation of one of the picture sheets used for the prospective memory dual task.  
Every five seconds the timer (visible or covered by the sock) was placed on top of a new circle and 
the child had to name the corresponding picture.  The second sheet contained 25 different pictures. 
 
 Procedure 
 Timer task.  The experimenter sat at a table directly across from the child before turning the 
timer over and instructing the child to watch the sand go from one end to the other.  In this way the 
child received pre-experimental experience of the length of the timer’s cycle.  Immediately 
afterwards the child was introduced to the bell and asked to practice ringing it, before completing 
the four timer task conditions consecutively (see below).  The single-visible and single-hidden 
conditions were always administered first and second, ensuring that the child had experience with 
the basic versions of the prospective task prior to exposure to the dual task.  The order of the two 
prospective memory conditions was counterbalanced across participants.  In all conditions the task 
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was not administered until the child could generate a correct verbal or physical answer to the 
question of what they were required to do when (they thought that) the sand had completed a cycle 
(i.e. ring the bell).  The experimenter scored (i) if the child rang the bell at any time before the two-
minute trial had ended, and if yes, (ii) how long it took the child to ring the bell after the timer was 
turned.  At the end of each trial, any child who had failed to ring the bell was asked what they were 
supposed to do when all of the sand had finished, and was scored for whether they gave a correct 
verbal or physical answer.   
 A blind coder scored a randomly selected 25% of the responses from all four conditions to 
check inter-rater reliability.  This coder agreed perfectly with the experimenter’s coding of the 
performance data, Kappa = 1.00, p < .001, and almost perfectly with the experimenter’s coding of 
the accuracy data, Pearson’s r (34) = .995, p < .001. 
 Single-visible condition.  The experimenter told the child that he would turn the timer over 
and that their task was to ring the bell when all of the sand had reached the other end.   
 Single-hidden condition.  The experimenter revealed the sock and demonstrated that this 
time he would place the sock over the timer before it was turned.  The child was told that they were 
not allowed to peek under the sock and that their task was to ring the bell when they thought that all 
of the sand had reached the other end.   
 PM-visible condition.  The experimenter revealed one of the picture sheets and told the 
child that he would place the timer next to the pictures and the child had to name each picture as it 
was marked by the timer.  After some practice at this, the experimenter then told the child that he 
would turn the timer as the task began, and the child had to ring the bell (placed to the left of the 
sheet) when the sand had reached the other end.  The starting picture was either in the top left or 
bottom right corner of the picture sheet (as seen by the child), counterbalanced across the PM-
visible and PM-hidden conditions.  The experimenter started a digital stopwatch (not visible to the 
child) as the task began, and every five seconds moved the timer to a new picture by skipping two 
pictures in a horizontal-first direction, such that all 25 pictures were marked by two minutes.  If the 
child did not name a picture then the experimenter pointed at the picture to remind them of the dual 
task, but continued to move the timer every five seconds even if the child still did not name the 
picture or if the child had already rung the bell.  All children named the large majority of pictures. 
 PM-hidden condition.  The experimenter revealed the other picture sheet and explained the 
dual task to the child.  As in the single-hidden condition, the experimenter demonstrated that he 
would place the sock over the timer before it was turned, and the child was told that their task was 
to ring the bell when they thought that all of the sand had reached the other end.   
 Recognition task.  After completing the final condition of the timer task, the child was 
shown 20 cards (half depicting pictures that appeared on the dual task in the prospective memory 
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conditions; half depicting new pictures) in a pseudo-random order and asked to identify whether 
they had seen each picture previously. 
 Executive function tasks. 
 Day/night task.  In line with Gerstadt, Hong, and Diamond (1994), the child had to say the 
word ‘day’ when shown a card depicting the moon and stars, and the word ‘night’ when shown a 
card depicting the sun.  The cards were shown eight times each in a pseudo-random order and the 
child was scored on the number of correct responses out of 16.  
 Backwards word span.  This task was modelled on those used by Carlson, Moses and 
Breton (2002) and Ford and colleagues (2012).  The experimenter listed a sequence of one-syllable 
words and the child’s task was to repeat the words in reverse order.  The task included three 
sequences each of two words, three words, and four words (nine sequences in total), and it 
concluded when the child failed three consecutive trials.  The child was scored for the maximum 
number of words they could repeat backwards, but if they could not repeat two words backwards 
they received a score of one.    
Results 
Timer Task Performance (Did the Child Ring the Bell at All?) 
 A graphical summary of the children’s performance in all conditions of the timer task can be 
seen in Figure 2.  Because the dependent variable was nominal (did ring bell vs. did not ring bell) 
and the experimental design contained a mixture of between-subjects (age) and within-subjects 
(timer visibility, task load) variables, we entered the data into a Generalised Estimating Equations 
analysis (Hardin, 2005) for binary responses.  There was a significant main effect of Age, 
Generalised-Score (GS) χ2 (2) = 9.70, p = .008, such that, across all conditions, 5-year-olds were 
more likely to ring the bell at any time than 4-year-olds, Wald χ2 (1) = 21.85, p < .001, who in turn 
were more likely to ring the bell than 3-year-olds, Wald χ2 (1) = 40.68, p < .001.  Consistent with 
predictions, there was also a significant main effect of Visibility, GS χ2 (1) = 14.57, p < .001, and a 
significant main effect of Task Load, GS χ2 (1) = 5.11, p = .024, such that the children were more 
likely to ring the bell in the visible-timer and single-task conditions than the hidden-timer and 
prospective memory conditions respectively.  There were no significant interactions, although 
inspection of Figure 2 suggests that this may have been partly due to a combination of floor effects 
for 3-year-olds in the PM-hidden condition (0% success) and ceiling effects for 4- and 5-year-olds 
in the single-visible condition (97.9% success). 
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Figure 2.  Percentage of children from each age group who rang the bell at any time across levels of 
timer visibility and task load. 
 
 Across all participants and all four conditions, there were 130 occasions (out of 288 total 
trials) when a child did not ring the bell at all.  Only 15 times (across nine participants), however, 
did children not remember the intention when prompted by the experimenter after the trial (all of 
these participants were 3-year-olds).  This suggests that not ringing the bell was typically due to 
prospective memory failure rather than retrospective memory failure (see Einstein & McDaniel, 
1990), especially among children older than three. 
Timer Task Accuracy 
 Because not all children rang the bell in every condition, the accuracy of the children who 
did ring the bell was analysed separately for each condition.  The means and standard deviations of 
responses in the single-visible condition (M = 63.40s, SD = 9.70s), single-hidden condition (M = 
62.33s, SD = 27.79s), PM-visible condition (M = 70.46s, SD = 13.97s), and PM-hidden condition 
(M = 51.45s, SD = 14.40s) suggested that the children who did respond tended to be roughly 
accurate (albeit with more variance in the single-hidden condition).  In line with previous research 
(Rendell & Craik, 2000; Rendell, Mazur, & Henry, 2009), the children’s accuracy in each condition 
was classified as either ‘no response’ (did not ring the bell), ‘very early response’ (0-29s), 
‘somewhat early response’ (30-49s), ‘on time response’ (50-70s), ‘somewhat late response’ (71-
90s), or ‘very late response’ (91-120s).  Figure 3 depicts the cumulative percentage of children in 
each accuracy classification group across each age and condition.   
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Figure 3.  Cumulative percentage of children from each age group in each accuracy classification 
group across all four conditions. 
 
 The children who did ring the bell were also scored on absolute error; that is, the number of 
seconds from 60 that they rang the bell.  The age groups significantly differed in absolute error only 
in the single-visible condition, F (2,65) = 3.65, p = .034, with 4- and 5-year-olds significantly more 
accurate than 3-year-olds, t (65) = 2.66, p = .010.  Potential age effects in the prospective memory 
conditions may have been hidden due to the relatively small numbers of participants from younger 
age groups who rang the bell at all. 
Recognition Task 
 A one-way ANOVA indicated that performance on the recognition task differed across age 
groups, F (2,67) = 16.71, p < .001.  Follow-up testing revealed that 4- and 5-year-olds (M = 18.48 
out of 20, SD = 2.50) performed better than 3-year-olds (M = 13.82 out of 20, SD = 4.19), t (67) = 
5.78, p < .001.  Both 4- and 5-year-olds and 3-year-olds performed better than chance (10 out of 
20), both t > 4.27, p < .001, however, indicating that children from all age groups were paying 
attention to the dual task as it was administered.   
Age-partialled Relationships between Timer Task Data and Executive Function 
 The two executive function measures (backwards word span and day/night task) were 
checked for a significant positive age-partialled correlation, and this was confirmed, r (67) = .21, p 
= .037, one-tailed.  An executive function composite score was then created for each child by 
summing their Z-scores for the two measures.  The individual and composite executive function 
scores were subsequently checked for age-partialled relationships with the timer task data (using 
binary logistic regressions for the nominal performance scores and partial correlations for the 
continuous accuracy scores).  These partial relationships are summarised in Table 1.  In the single-
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hidden condition, performance and accuracy were each significantly predicted by one individual 
executive function measure and the composite measure.  In the PM-hidden condition, accuracy was 
significantly predicted by backwards word span and the composite measure.  Thus, in the single-
hidden condition at least, the children who rang the bell tended to have higher executive function 
scores than the children who did not; and of the children who did ring the bell, those who were 
more accurate tended to have higher executive function scores.  No age-partialled relationships 
involving the data from the visible conditions were significant. 
 
Table 1 
Age-partialled Relationships between Timer Task Data and Executive Function Scores across All 
Four Conditions 
Timer Task Measure Condition BWS D/N EF comp. 
Performance 
(Wald χ2 for binary 
logistic regression) 
Single-visible .00 .37 .04 
Single-hidden 5.15* 2.53 6.03* 
PM-visible 1.93 .30 .27 
PM-hidden 2.78 .84 2.69 
Accuracya 
(partial r) 
Single-visible (n = 68) -.02 .12 .06 
Single-hidden (n = 42) .25 .59** .53** 
PM-visible (n =37) .18 .02 .13 
PM-hidden (n = 11) .89** .21 .77** 
Note.  BWS = Backwards Word Span; D/N = Day/night task; EF comp. = Executive Function composite 
a. Accuracy was operationalised as the absolute error (from 60s) multiplied by -1.  Only children who rang the bell at 
any time during the trial were considered in the accuracy analyses. 
* p < .05           ** p < .01 
 
 In an additional analysis, we considered whether pure time estimation (as measured by 
accuracy in the single-hidden condition) would predict performance in the PM-hidden condition 
over and above the contribution of age.  A significant partial relationship might suggest that some 
children failed to ring the bell in the PM-hidden condition simply because they did not think the 
timer had completed its one-minute cycle by the end of the two-minute trial, rather than because 
they genuinely lost attention to the future intention.  A binary logistic regression, however, did not 
find a significant effect, Wald χ2 (1) = .25, p = .618. 
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Discussion 
The results of the current study reveal, for the first time, the early developmental pattern of 
TBPM in the presence and absence of time-dependent event-based cues.  In the single-visible 
condition, when the passage of sand was observable and there was no ongoing dual task, the 
majority of the 3-year-olds were able to carry out the future intention accurately, suggesting they 
understood the basic requirements of the prospective task.  When the timer was hidden and/or 
embedded in the picture-naming task, however, most 3-year-olds failed to ring the bell at all and 
improvements were seen across both of the older age groups.  Given that the children who did not 
ring the bell were typically still able to recall the intention when prompted by the experimenter after 
the trial, the increase in performance between ages three and five appears to have been driven by 
prospective memory improvements rather than retrospective memory improvements (see Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1990).   This finding is consistent with other recent results indicating an increase in 
prospective memory abilities throughout the preschool years (e.g., Causey & Bjorklund, in press; 
Mahy, et al., in press; Walsh, Martin, & Courage, in press). 
Of more general interest, however, was the novel main effect of timer visibility.  In the PM-
visible condition, over half of the 4-year-olds and nearly all of the 5-year-olds remembered to ring 
the bell, extending previous work showing that TBPM tasks can be passed by 5-year-olds when 
event-based cues are available (Aberle & Kliegel, 2010).  In the PM-hidden condition, on the other 
hand, even 5-year-olds struggled, with less than half remembering to ring the bell.  Overall, these 
results suggest that TBPM develops during the preschool years, with performance lagging when 
event-based cues are unavailable.  This finding stands in contrast to previous results showing no 
performance lag when event-based cues merely require more effort to see (Voigt, et al., 2011). 
One potential reason for the visibility effect is that, in both of the hidden conditions, many 
children were intending to ring the bell at some stage, but simply did not think the timer had 
completed its one-minute cycle prior to the end of the two-minute trial.  This explanation seems 
unlikely, however, given that the children who did respond formed roughly normal accuracy 
distributions centred close to 60 seconds, just as they did in the visible conditions.  Furthermore, the 
children’s accuracy in the single-hidden condition (as a proxy for pure time estimation ability) did 
not predict their performance in the PM-hidden condition.  Therefore, it appears more likely that the 
children who did not ring the bell in the PM-hidden condition genuinely lost attention to the 
prospective intention, despite clearly demonstrating their competence at the basic task in the single-
visible condition.   
Perhaps the most reasonable explanation for the children’s poorer performance in the hidden 
conditions is that time-based tasks rely more heavily on the strategic component of prospective 
memory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) when there are no event-based cues available.  Without the 
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sand reminding them that they needed to ring the bell, the hidden conditions may have required the 
children to recruit additional executive resources to drive internal maintenance of the future 
intention, monitoring of the time until the future action was required, and inhibition of immediate 
distractions.  Supporting this view, the children’s performance on executive function tasks predicted 
their performance and/or accuracy in the hidden conditions but not the visible conditions.  Indeed, 
the lack of any executive function effects in the PM-visible condition, in contrast to the strong 
effects in the single-hidden condition, may suggest that the dual task itself was not as demanding of 
executive resources as the requirement to cognitively maintain the future intention and monitor the 
time left until the future action was required.  The current study may therefore complement recent 
work showing that future-oriented cognition (e.g., Atance & O’Neill, 2005; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & 
Von Gehlen, 2011) and cognitive monitoring (Mahy & Moses, 2011) emerge during the preschool 
years, and it may also highlight the importance of executive function in the mental representation of 
and preparation for future events (see Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 
2013).  Nevertheless, because of the ceiling and floor effects evident in the data, we do make these 
suggestions with caution. 
Regardless of its causes, the visibility effect clearly suggests that TBPM is more difficult in 
the absence of time-dependent event-based cues.  Thus, on other TBPM measures, which nearly all 
contain event-based cues, performance may be partly driven by EBPM.  Many real-world TBPM 
tasks do not include event-based cues, and so our paradigm, or adapted versions of it, may prove 
useful for future studies that wish to examine TBPM in isolation.  Such work could concentrate on 
children or other populations among whom TBPM is thought to be impaired (see, e.g., Altgassen, 
Williams, Bölte, & Kliegel, 2009; Costa, Peppe, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2008; Henry, MacLeod, 
Phillips, & Crawford, 2004; Henry, Rendell, Kliegel, & Altgassen, 2007; Kliegel, Ropeter, & 
Mackinlay, 2006; Rendell, Mazur, et al., 2009).  Given that picture-naming may be too simple as a 
dual task for adult participants, these studies could instead use other items on the board, such as 
basic arithmetic problems.  Another potential task modification could be the inclusion of a delay 
between the delivery of the prospective instructions and the beginning of the dual task, thus 
increasing the difficulty of maintaining and retrieving the prospective intention.   Many studies with 
young children do not include such a delay (e.g., Aberle & Kliegel, 2010; Ford, et al., 2012; 
Mäntylä, Carelli, & Forman, 2007; Rendell, Vella, Kliegel, & Terrett, 2009), although it is standard 
practice with older populations (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000).   
In conclusion, our paradigm provides the first measure of TBPM that varies the presence of 
a time-dependent event-based cue and can be administered to very young children.  The results 
suggest a divergence in the development of TBPM in the presence and absence of event-based cues, 
potentially because the latter relies more on the strategic, executive component of prospective 
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memory.  Tasks such as ours may be used to compare TBPM and EBPM under various conditions 
and with various populations. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
When can Children Spontaneously 
Prepare for Alternative Future         
Event Outcomes? 
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Preface 
 The previous three chapters involved studies assessing children’s capacity to engage in 
novel future-oriented behaviours.  In each of these studies children had to consider a single future 
event and engage in behaviour that would help them to perform optimally when that event arrived.  
The studies uncovered developments at various times throughout the preschool years, as children 
become increasingly competent in their episodic foresight capacities. 
 The following chapter’s study gives 2-4 year-old children the opportunity to not only 
prepare for a single future event, but also consider and prepare for multiple possible outcomes of 
that event.  I develop a minimalist paradigm to assess this capacity, with negligible language 
demands and no complex intermediate steps between the behavioural preparation and the future 
outcome.  Because of its simplicity, this paradigm can also be administered to non-human primates, 
and so I additionally include a preliminary test of three adult chimpanzees.  
 This chapter has been prepared for eventual submission for publication1.  Therefore, many 
of the concepts and findings mentioned in the general introduction (Chapter 1) and review (Chapter 
2) are briefly reiterated.  Because the experimental paradigm and results may be of broad interest 
beyond the developmental psychology literature, I have followed the preferred format of many 
general science journals by placing the materials and methods section at the end of the main article. 
 
1Redshaw, J., & Suddendorf, T. (to be submitted). When can preschool children spontaneously 
prepare for alternative future event outcomes? 
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Abstract 
Humans possess the remarkably flexible ability to prepare for multiple, mutually exclusive versions 
of single future events.  When this capacity develops in children, however, remains largely 
unknown.  We tested preschool children (N = 90) on a minimalist behavioural paradigm in which 
they were given the opportunity to catch a ball that was dropped into a forked tube with one 
opening at the top but two openings at the bottom.  Few 2-year-olds, many 3-year-olds and most 4-
year-olds spontaneously covered both bottom openings of the tube the first time they prepared to 
catch the ball, with performance improving over subsequent trials across age groups.  This pattern 
of results suggests that many children aged three years and older can insightfully prepare for 
alternative versions of immediate future events, whereas the success of some younger children on 
later trials may simply reflect trial-and-error learning.  We also administered a preliminary test of 
our paradigm to three adult chimpanzees, with none of them spontaneously covering both bottom 
openings but one learning to reliably do so after many trials.  Spontaneously passing our task may 
typically require a capacity to form metarepresentations, which enables agents to reflect on their 
representation of a single version of a future event and to understand that this representation could 
be incorrect.   
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 Much of humanity’s success on this planet can be attributed to our ability to envision, 
prepare for, and actively shape specific future events (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007).  Yet, 
this is not to say the human mind contains some sort of crystal ball that can precisely foretell how 
the future will unfold.  Many future events are difficult to predict with any degree of certainty.  We 
often believe we are better at predicting events than we actually are (Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 
1990), even though our histories are littered with examples in which we failed to correctly 
anticipate the future and thus failed to avoid problems or take advantage of opportunities.  One 
powerful way in which humans can prudently deal with uncertainty about the future is to ‘hedge our 
bets’ and prepare for multiple (even mutually exclusive) versions of upcoming events.  We may 
prepare for a picnic in the sun, for example, but we may also pack an umbrella in case the weather 
changes.  Other people’s future behaviour is particularly difficult to predict, and so we may often 
devise a Plan B (and C) for social situations.  We may even prepare for relatively ambiguous 
alternative futures, for instance when we buy insurance to protect against misfortunes.  Despite the 
importance of the capacity to consider and prepare for alternative future events, however, little is 
known about when and how it develops in children. 
 Here we show that even preschool children have an ability to insightfully act for mutually 
exclusive versions of the future.  To examine the early development of this capacity, we created a 
very simple task that allowed children to spontaneously prepare for two potential outcomes of a 
single undetermined future event.  We constructed a novel forked tube apparatus that had one 
opening at the top but two openings at the bottom (see Figure 1).  The experimenter could drop a 
ball into the top of the tube and surreptitiously control which bottom opening it would fall from (in 
a pseudorandom order).  After six observation trials, the children were invited to catch the ball for 
twelve trials, and if they failed to do so it fell on a ramp and rolled out of reach.  We were interested 
in whether the children (n = 90; 18 each from age groups 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, and 4 years) would cover 
one or two bottom openings (with two hands) when preparing to catch the ball (see Figure 1, left 
panel).  See the Materials and Methods section for more detailed procedural information. 
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Figure 1.  Depiction of the experimental task given to children (left panel) and chimpanzees (right 
panel).  Participants had the opportunity to cover one or both bottom openings of the forked tube 
when preparing to catch a ball/grape that would be dropped into the top opening.  The child is 
covering both bottom openings, whereas the chimpanzee is only covering one. 
 
 Our task involves an immediate future event in which the behavioural preparation and future 
outcome occur in the same context.  This has the advantage of not conflating the central capacity of 
interest—preparing for alternative future outcomes—with other capacities like imagining an 
appropriate spatial and temporal context for the alternative outcomes (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007; Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013), which may be difficult to control.  The task also takes 
advantage of a natural behavioural response, given that even 2-year-olds are adept at using both 
hands to collect appealing objects.  And interestingly, because our paradigm has minimal language 
demands, it can also be adapted for use with non-human primates—which may eventually provide 
some insight into the evolution of the capacity.  Indeed, any primate with two functional hands and 
a motivation to obtain food can be tested relatively straightforwardly.  We therefore conducted an 
additional preliminary test in which three adult chimpanzees were given the opportunity to catch 
grapes dropped into the tube (see Figure 1, right panel). 
 We were particularly interested in whether the participants would spontaneously cover both 
bottom openings of the forked tube on the first trial in which they were given the opportunity to do 
so.  Success on the first trial indicates insight into the particular contingencies of the task, whereas 
success on later trials might also be explained through simple trial-and-error conditioning.  
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Specifically, each time the item was not caught with the one-hand strategy, the participants might 
be more motivated to try a different behaviour, and the partial reinforcement of each hand may 
ultimately lead to the optimal two-hand strategy emerging.  We included additional trials to 
determine whether the two-hand response would be learned eventually, and also to show that the 
physical coordination required for such a response was within the capacity of the participants. 
 Figure 2 shows the cumulative number of children who covered both bottom openings of the 
tube for the first time over all twelve trials.  None of the 2-year-olds, few 2.5-year-olds, many 3- 
and 3.5-year-olds, and most 4-year-olds used this strategy on the first trial.  A significant Cochran-
Armitage χ2 test revealed that the children’s use of the two-hand strategy on the first trial increased 
linearly with age, χ2 (1) = 25.74, p < .001.  Follow-up Pearson’s χ2 tests revealed that the 4-year-
olds were significantly more likely to use the two-hand strategy on the first trial than the 3- and 3.5-
year-olds, χ2 (1) = 4.58, p = .032, who in turn were significantly more likely to use this strategy on 
the first trial than the 2- and 2.5-year-olds, χ2 (1) = 13.57, p < .001.  This pattern of first-trial results 
suggests that the ability to insightfully prepare for multiple potential outcomes of a single future 
event emerges during the third and fourth years. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The cumulative number of children from each age group who covered both bottom 
openings of the pipe for the first time across all twelve trials.   
 
 Despite their poor spontaneous performance on the first trial, however, Figure 2 shows that 
many 2- and 2.5-year-olds adopted the two-hand strategy at least once over the later trials.  And 
nearly all 3-, 3.5-, and 4-year-olds had used the two-hand response at least once by the end of the 
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experiment.  Because the dependent variable was nominal (one-hand strategy vs. two-hand strategy) 
and the experimental design contained a mixture of between-subjects (age) and within-subjects 
(trial) variables, we entered the trial-by-trial data into a Generalised Estimating Equations analysis 
(Hardin, 2005) for binary responses.  This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Age Group, 
Generalised-Score (GS) χ2 (4) = 33.45, p < .001, with a linear contrast showing that, across all 
trials, children were more likely to use the two-hand response with increasing age, Wald χ2 (1) = 
143.27, p < .001.  The analysis also revealed a main effect of Trial, GS χ2 (11) = 24.85, p = .010, 
with a linear contrast showing that children became more likely to use the optimal two-hand 
response over time, Wald χ2 (1) = 132.55, p < .001.  There was also a significant Age Group x Trial 
interaction, GS χ2 (44) = 69.30, p = .009, suggesting that the effect of age changed over trial (as one 
might expect with 3-, 3.5-, and 4-year-olds approaching ceiling level before the end of the 
experiment).   The later-trial success of many 2- and 2.5-year-olds demonstrates that the two-hand 
response was within their behavioural repertoire, although the general lack of initial success 
suggests that this strategy was typically not insightful but rather conditioned in these groups. 
 Interestingly, not all of the children who adopted the two-hand strategy maintained it across 
later trials.  Figure 3 shows that many 2- to 3.5-year-olds (but no 4-year-olds) regressed to the less 
efficient one-hand strategy on at least one later trial.  Of the children who used the two-hand 
strategy at least once (n = 67), regressing to the one-hand strategy was significantly less likely 
among 4-year-olds (0 out of 17) than among the younger children combined (19 out of 50), 
Pearson’s χ2 (1) = 9.02, p = .003, even though 4-year-olds tended to adopt the two-hand strategy 
much earlier than younger children.  This pattern of results substantiates the claim that most 4-year-
olds and some 3-year-olds were solving the problem insightfully, whereas many of the younger 
children were weakly conditioned into using the optimal response through trial-and error learning 
and thus remained susceptible to using the one-hand strategy on some trials. 
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Figure 3.  Grouping of children from each age group according to when and how they used the two-
hand strategy across trials. 
 
Unlike the older children, none of the three chimpanzees used the optimal two-hand strategy 
on their first trial.  Indeed, only one (Holly) used it at all on any of the first twelve trials.  She used 
the two-hand response on trials 9 and 11, but regressed to using the one-hand response on trials 10 
and 12, much like many of the younger children.  Because of the chimpanzees’ poor performance 
over the initial trials, we were interested in whether they could eventually learn to consistently 
employ the two-hand strategy over several extra trial blocks.   
The performance of all three chimpanzees across all trials is summarised in Figure 4.  All 
subjects were given at least 24 extra trials (blocks 2 and 3) in which the grape fell from both sides 
of the tube in the regular pseudorandom order.  Two of the chimpanzees (Holly and Cassie) showed 
no evidence of using the two-hand response during these extra trials, although the other subject 
(Samantha) used the response once in both blocks (on trials 15 and 36).  Because of this, we 
continued to administer the trials in the regular pseudorandom order to Samantha, and by the end of 
the first day of testing (trial block 5) she was using the optimal two-hand response on every trial.  
When we tested her the following morning (trial block 6), however, she regressed to using the one-
hand strategy, although by that afternoon (trial block 7) she was again using the two-hand strategy 
on all trials.  Such a response pattern—an initial appearance of the target behaviour after many 
unsuccessful trials, followed by brief regression, spontaneous recovery and eventual maintenance—
is consistent with simple operant conditioning principles (Staddon & Cerutti, 2003) rather than 
insightful behaviour.  Nonetheless, Samantha’s results do show that chimpanzees can learn to 
reliably use the two-hand response.  Holly and Cassie did not learn to reliably use this response, 
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even when we removed all reinforcement of the one-hand response by forcing the grape to come out 
of the uncovered opening (see Figure 4, and Materials and Methods for supplementary results). 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Chimpanzees’ use of the one-hand and two-hand strategies across multiple blocks of 
twelve trials.  In the “opposite” trials, the experimenter forced the grape to come out of the 
uncovered hole if the chimpanzee used the one-hand response, rather than using the regular 
pseudorandom order.  The two trials marked with an “X” indicate where Holly refused to attempt to 
catch the grape after repeated unrewarded one-hand responses. 
 
 Contrary to the responses of Samantha and the 2-year-olds, many children aged three years 
and older spontaneously prepared for both potential outcomes of the event on the first trial.  
Furthermore, most 3-year-olds and all 4-year-olds from this sub-sample maintained that response 
over every subsequent trial.  This pattern of results suggests that, among these children, the two-
hand response was underscored by insight into the particular contingencies of the problem.  In other 
words, they understood that the future location of the ball was uncertain and were able to prudently 
prepare for two mutually exclusive possibilities.  
 The results of the current study contrast with two previous studies of children’s ability to 
prepare for alternative future event outcomes, which found strong positive evidence for the 
behaviour only during the fifth year (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Robinson, Rowley, 
Beck, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006).  Unlike our minimalist task, however, the tasks used in these 
studies relied heavily on language comprehension and included complex intermediate steps between 
the preparatory behaviour and the future outcome.  Our results more comfortably place the capacity 
to insightfully prepare for alternative futures on a similar developmental trajectory to other future-
oriented behaviours (McCormack & Atance, 2011; Suddendorf & Moore, 2011; Suddendorf & 
Redshaw, 2013), such as the abilities to delay gratification  (Garon, Longard, Bryson, & Moore, 
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2012; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Moore, Barresi, & Thompson, 1998), to select an 
appropriate object to solve a future problem (Russell, Alexis, & Clayton, 2010; Scarf, Gross, 
Colombo, & Hayne, 2013; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011), to save resources for the 
future (Metcalf & Atance, 2011), and to learn rules that must be applied in the future (Ford, 
Driscoll, Shum, & Macaulay, 2012; Kliegel & Jäger, 2007; Mahy & Moses, 2011). 
 The improvements on our task with increasing age may have been driven by developments 
in various cognitive components of foresight that typically occur around the third and fourth years 
(Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  One fundamental component is the capacity to form 
metarepresentations, which allows an agent to reflect on the relationship between their 
representation of a given event and the event itself (Perner, 1991; Pylyshyn, 1978).  An effective 
way to solve our task, for instance, would be to reflect on a representation of the ball coming out of 
one bottom opening of the tube, recognise that this representation of the event could be incorrect 
(metarepresentational insight), and simultaneously prepare for the alternative version of the same 
event.  The capacity to form metarepresentations is also involved in passing explicit false-belief 
tasks (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), in which a child must recognise and act on the fact that another 
agent can represent the world incorrectly.  Children typically begin to pass such tasks around four 
years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), although many pass aged three when language and 
working memory demands are simplified as much as possible (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013).  
This pattern of results is consistent with the pattern seen in the current study, supporting the 
possibility that both tasks typically rely on a capacity for forming metarepresentations.  It must be 
noted, however, that our task should not be considered an acid test of metarepresentational insight, 
because it remains possible that a child could spontaneously pass through simpler means (Perner, 
2012; Perner, Rendl, & Garnham, 2007).   Nonetheless, the overall pattern of results does suggest 
that a fundamental shift in the representational mind occurs typically during the middle preschool 
years (Perner, 1991; Suddendorf, 1999). 
 An exciting secondary finding was the failure of three adult chimpanzees to spontaneously 
use the two-hand response, with only one subject eventually passing reliably in a manner consistent 
with simple trial-and-error learning.  Given the small sample and the difficulties associated with 
identifying reasons for failure, interpretation ought to remain cautious.  Nevertheless, the results do 
raise the intriguing possibility that humans’ closest extant relatives cannot insightfully prepare for 
alternative futures, which would suggest that this ability evolved after the split of the human and 
chimpanzee lineages approximately 6-8 million years ago (Langergraber et al., 2012; Prado-
Martinez et al., 2013).  If spontaneous success on our task does typically rest on a capacity for 
forming metarepresentations, then a general inability of chimpanzees to pass in this manner would 
be consistent with their failure to pass behavioural false-belief tasks (Call & Tomasello, 1999; 
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Krachun, Call, & Tomasello, 2010; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009), and with the 
proposal that metarepresentations may be uniquely human (Redshaw, in press; Suddendorf, 1999).   
 In conclusion, we have shown that many 3-year-olds and most 4-year-olds are able to 
spontaneously prepare for two mutually exclusive versions of a single undetermined future event.  
We obtained very limited evidence for this capacity in younger children and no evidence in a small 
sample of chimpanzees.  Future research may seek to narrow down the cognitive components 
required to pass our task.  Whatever its cognitive underpinnings, however, spontaneous passing of 
our task is a simple and straightforward demonstration that an individual can take two potential 
versions of the future into account to prudently prepare for what cannot be known for certain.  
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Materials and Methods 
Methodology for children 
 Participants.  Ninety preschool children participated in the experiment at the University of 
Queensland in Brisbane, Australia, between August 2013 and February 2014.  The children were 
recruited from a database of parents and caregivers who had previously expressed an interest in 
participating in early childhood psychology experiments.  All children participated individually, 
with a caregiver present in the experimental room at all times.  There were five age groups (2-year-
olds, 2.5-year-olds, 3-year-olds, 3.5-year-olds, and 4-year-olds), each consisting of 18 children aged 
within two months of the respective group label.  The descriptive statistics for each age group can 
be seen in Table S1 below. 
 
Table S1 
Gender Split, Mean Age and Standard Deviation of Age for Each Group of Children that 
Participated in the Experiment 
 
Age group Gender split (M/F) Mean age (months) SD age (months) 
2-year-olds 10/8 24.30 .85 
2.5-year-olds 10/8 30.38 .77 
3-year-olds 10/8 36.63 .77 
3.5-year-olds 8/10 41.97 .33 
4-year-olds 9/9 48.78 .65 
 
 
 Apparatus.  The main “forked tube” apparatus (see Figure S1, left and middle panels) 
consisted of a number of PVC pipe fittings connected in such a way that the apparatus had one 
opening at the top but two openings at the bottom.  The top arm of the tube was cylindrical, 
approximately 50cm long, and approximately 9cm in diameter.  Inside the top opening was a funnel 
fastened with tape, such that a ball (or grape) dropped into the tube would fall in approximately the 
same place inside the tube every time.  Approximately 3cm underneath the funnel, on the inside of 
the tube, was a wooden platform approximately 8cm long x 3cm wide, fastened to the inside of the 
tube with a wingnut screw accessible on the outside.  Underneath the wooden platform was a fixed 
piece of cardboard the same width as the inner diameter of the tube and running the rest of the 
length of top arm.  The wingnut screw could be turned to rotate the wooden platform in such a way 
that a dropped item would be forced to run down one side of the cardboard, on either the left or 
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right side of the tube.  The bottom of the top arm of the tube connected to an inverse T-section, with 
each side of the T attached to a 90° curved pipe fitting.  At the bottom of each curved fitting was a 
narrowing fitting that allowed children to entirely cover each bottom opening of the apparatus with 
their hands.  Once constructed, the apparatus allowed the experimenter to drop a ball into the top 
opening with full control over which bottom opening the ball would fall from. 
 
     
 
Figure S1.  Depictions of the forked and straight tubes used in the experiment.  The left panel shows 
the forked tube as it appeared from the children’s perspective.  The middle panel shows the same 
forked tube as it appeared from the experimenter’s perspective, revealing the wingnut screw, 
wooden platform and funnel that allowed control over which bottom opening the balls would fall 
from.  The right panel shows the straight tube as it appeared from the children’s perspective (this 
tube was used only in the practice phase of the experiment). 
 
 Another, more basic pipe apparatus used only in the practice phase of the experiment was 
the “straight tube”.  This apparatus consisted of a single cylindrical pipe, approximately 50cm long 
with a diameter of approximately 9cm, with the bottom opening connected to a narrowing fitting 
that allowed children to entirely cover the opening with their hands (see Figure S1, right panel).  
The balls dropped into the straight and forked tubes were spherical polybutadiene “bouncy balls” 
approximately 3cm in diameter.  The “ramp” that the balls rolled down was a piece of plywood 
approximately 90cm long and 60cm across.  This ramp was leaned against the top of a small 
wooden chair approximately 45cm high, such that an uncaught ball would land on the ramp and roll 
away from a child standing behind the chair. 
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 Procedure.   
 Practice phase.  The children were asked to stand behind the wooden chair, while their 
caregivers were asked to sit on the other side of the room.  The experimenter introduced the 
children to the straight tube and the bouncy balls, before asking the children to place their hands 
behind their back.  The experimenter then stood directly above the ramp and dropped three balls 
into the straight tube one at a time, such that each ball fell onto the ramp and rolled away from the 
children.  The children were then invited to catch the next ball, with the experimenter demonstrating 
how to completely cover the narrow opening at the bottom of the straight tube with a single hand.  
The experimenter continued dropping balls into the straight tube until the children had caught three 
consecutively, which they were encouraged to place into a small bucket at their feet. 
 The experimenter then introduced the children to the forked tube, and again asked them to 
place their hands behind their back and observe.  The experimenter again stood directly above the 
ramp and dropped six balls into the tube such that they fell onto the ramp and rolled away from the 
children.  During this procedure, the experimenter surreptitiously turned the wingnut screw (not 
visible from the children’s perspective) such that the ball came out of the bottom openings of the 
tube in the following pseudorandom order: right, left, left, right, left, right (from the experimenter’s 
perspective).  The experimenter touched the screw between each trial, whether he turned it or not, 
such that the children had no obvious external cue as to which side of the tube the ball would fall 
from on any given trial. 
 Test phase.  After the six observation trials with the forked tube, the experimenter told the 
children that they could try to catch the balls again.  He told them that they could do whatever they 
wanted when trying to catch the balls (without explicitly mentioning the opportunity to use two 
hands), and that if they caught lots of balls they would receive stickers in return.  The experimenter 
then stood above the ramp and dropped balls into the forked tube for 12 trials, forcing them to come 
out of the bottom openings of the tube in the following pseudorandom order: right, left, left, right, 
left, right, right, left, right, left, left, right (from the experimenter’s perspective).  Again, the 
experimenter touched the wingnut screw between each trial, whether or not he turned it to change 
the bottom opening that the ball would fall from.  Individual trials immediately followed each other, 
as long as the children were still interested in participating.  Children were encouraged to place 
caught balls into the bucket at their feet, and all children were rewarded with stickers at the end of 
the experiment.  All sessions were videotaped, and for each trial the children were scored for 
whether they covered one or two bottom openings in their preparation to catch the ball. 
Methodology for chimpanzees 
 Participants.  Three captive born and raised adult chimpanzees (one male, two female) 
participated in the experiment at Rockhampton Zoo in Rockhampton, Australia, between 4 and 6 
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February, 2014.  “Cassie” is a male aged 42 years at the time of testing, who had previously 
participated in experiments on object permanence understanding (Collier-Baker, Davis, Nielsen, & 
Suddendorf, 2006; Collier-Baker & Suddendorf, 2006), inferential reasoning (Nielsen, Collier-
Baker, Davis, & Suddendorf, 2005), imitation recognition (Nielsen, et al., 2005), and mirror and 
video self-recognition (unpublished).  “Holly” is a female aged 25 years at the time of testing, who 
had previously participated in experiments on object permanence understanding and video self-
recognition (unpublished).  “Samantha” is a female aged 30 years, who had not previously 
participated in experiments.  The chimpanzees are unrelated and live together in a large zoo 
enclosure with separate living and sleeping quarters.  They are provided with food, medical care 
and enrichment activities at various times throughout the day by zookeepers.  Water was available 
to the chimpanzees at all times throughout the experiment. 
 Apparatus.  The materials used with the chimpanzees were identical to those used with the 
children, with a few exceptions.  Instead of bouncy balls, the items dropped into the tubes were 
grapes.  The grapes tended to be smaller in diameter than the bouncy balls, and so the narrowing 
fittings of the forked tube openings were changed from “stepped” to “smooth” to prevent the grapes 
from getting caught in the inner steps of the tube (see Figure 1 in the main text).  The plywood ramp 
was used when testing Holly and Samantha, but not Cassie, because of the different settings in 
which they were tested (see below for more information). 
 Experimental setting. 
 Holly and Samantha.  The experimental setting for Holly and Samantha is depicted in 
Figure 1 of the main text.  The plywood ramp was placed on the experimenter’s side of a meshed 
wall, with one end sitting on top of a metal bar such that it was raised approximately 20cm from the 
ground.  Approximately 30cm above the ramp were two large holes in the mesh that each allowed 
the chimpanzees to comfortably put one hand through to the side containing the ramp.  These holes 
were horizontally separated by approximately the same distance that separated the two bottom 
openings of the forked tube, such that during the experiment the chimpanzees were easily able to 
cover both bottom openings (with two hands) if they wished.  The ramp was raised high enough 
such that any uncaught grape would roll away from the chimpanzees before they had a chance to 
grab it.  While each chimpanzee was being tested individually, the other two chimpanzees were 
distracted with attention from research assistants in other areas of the enclosure. 
 Cassie.  The experimental setting had to be altered for Cassie because he refused to sit in the 
area where Holly and Samantha were tested (apparently for fear of attack).  To reduce his 
apprehension, we locked Cassie away from the other chimpanzees in the sleeping area of the 
enclosure.  This area contained a meshed wall with a gap at the bottom of approximately 10cm, 
such that Cassie was able to comfortably place both of his hands through the gap.  On the outside of 
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this wall was a drop to the ground of approximately 120cm, such that a researcher could stand and 
hold the tube in front of Cassie during the experiment (see Figure S2).  The plywood ramp was 
unnecessary in this setting, as any uncaught grapes simply fell to the ground on the researcher’s side 
of the wall before Cassie could grab them.   
 
 
 
Figure S2.  Experimental setting for Cassie.  He covered a single bottom opening with his right 
hand on every forked tube trial. 
 
 Procedure.  The procedure was broadly similar to that used with the children.  Like the 
children, the chimpanzees first each received three observation trials and three successful practice 
trials with the straight tube.  They then each received six observation trials and twelve (initial) test 
trials with the forked tube, with the grape falling out of the bottom openings in the same 
pseudorandom orders that were used with the children.  During the observation trials, the tube was 
held far enough from the meshed wall that the chimpanzees could not reach through and catch the 
grape.  On test trials, however, the tube was held against the meshed wall such that the chimpanzees 
could easily cover both bottom openings if they wished.  As for the child participants, the 
experimenter touched/turned the wingnut screw (not visible to the chimpanzees) after every trial, 
such that there were no obvious external cues as to the bottom opening that the grape would fall 
from.  On a few test trials, the grape bounced off a chimpanzee’s hand and fell out of reach even 
after they had covered the correct bottom opening of the tube.  On these trials the chimpanzee was 
given the grape so as to not punish them for a response that would have been otherwise rewarded.  
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Individual trials immediately followed each other, as long as the chimpanzees were willing to 
continue participating. 
 As described in the main text, the chimpanzees also received at least 36 extra test trials (in 
blocks of twelve trials) with the forked tube.  Each block of twelve trials followed the same 
pseudorandom order as for the initial twelve trials, with the exception of the special “opposite” 
trials (given to Holly and Cassie only).  These trials involved the experimenter waiting for the 
chimpanzee to place one hand underneath one of the bottom openings of the forked tube, before 
turning/touching the wingnut screw and forcing the grape to come out of the uncovered opening.   
 Mistrials.  Because the grapes were relatively small compared to the bouncy balls used with 
children, the wingnut screw and wooden platform were not 100% effective at forcing the grapes to 
come out of the intended bottom opening of the forked tube.  Thus, there were a few mistrials in 
which a grape came out of the unintended opening.  Mistrials that occurred during the regular 
pseudorandom order trials (no more than five times per subject) were corrected for on later trials, 
such that the grapes still came out of each bottom opening approximately 50% of the time.  Only 
three mistrials occurred during the opposite trials, all while testing Cassie (trials 37, 44 and 47).  
They were not considered strongly problematic for interpreting the results, however, given that 
Cassie did not use the two-hand response on any of his 48 total trials, and given that we had already 
demonstrated it was possible to condition the two-hand response over many trials (with Samantha). 
 Supplementary results.   
 The response pattern of the most successful chimpanzee (Samantha) is summarised in the 
main text.  Of the other subjects, Holly showed some evidence of the two-hand response in block 1 
and the first block of opposite trials (block 4), so we continued testing her with blocks of 
pseudorandom and opposite trials.  Even though she had used the two-hand response on four total 
trials (out of 94), however, she eventually refused to attempt the task when her one-hand response 
went continually unrewarded in the final block of opposite trials (block 8)—seemingly because she 
was frustrated with the apparent lack of a solution.  Because Cassie showed no evidence of the two-
hand response in either the regular pseudorandom trials or the first block of opposite trials, we 
decided to abandon testing him after trial block 4.  His unambiguous failure of our task contrasts 
with his previous successes on many other cognitive tests (Collier-Baker, et al., 2006; Collier-Baker 
& Suddendorf, 2006; Hill, Collier-Baker, & Suddendorf, 2011; Nielsen, et al., 2005). 
 A more detailed summary of all three chimpanzees’ results is provided in Figure S3.  This 
figure shows the same information as in Figure 4 of the main text, while also differentiating 
between trials in which the one-hand response was rewarded (i.e., when the chimpanzee guessed the 
correct bottom opening and caught the grape) and unrewarded.  Across all regular pseudorandom 
order trials in which the one-hand response was used, Samantha covered the correct bottom opening 
136 
 
20 out of 50 times (40%), Holly covered it 26 out of 57 times (45.6%), and Cassie covered it 17 out 
of 36 times (47.2%).  None of these percentages significantly differed from chance level (50%), all 
p > .20, suggesting that the chimpanzees were not using any hypothetical external cue when 
deciding which hole to cover with their one-hand responses during these pseudorandom order trials.   
 
 
 
Figure S3.  Detailed summary of chimpanzees’ performance across all blocks of trials.   
 
 When considering all one-hand responses, Samantha used her right hand (to cover the left 
bottom opening from the experimenter’s perspective) on 36 trials (72%) and her left hand (to cover 
the right bottom opening from the experimenter’s perspective) on 14 trials (28%).  Holly used her 
right hand on 56 trials (62.2%) and her left hand on 34 trials (37.8%).  Cassie used his right hand 
only on all 48 trials.  When considering consecutive one-hand responses only, Samantha swapped 
hands (right to left or vice versa) between trials 5 times out of 43 (11.6%) and Holly swapped hands 
25 times out of 85 (29.4%). 
 See Figure S4 for a depiction of Samantha and Holly using the optimal two-hand response 
strategy.  Samantha first used this strategy on trial 15, and used it on 34 total trials out of 84 
(40.5%).  Holly first used this strategy on trial 9, and used it on 4 total trials out of 96 (4.2%).  
Cassie did not use this strategy on any of his 48 trials. 
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Figure S4.  Depiction of Samantha (left) and Holly (right) eventually using the two-hand strategy 
after many trials of using the one-hand strategy. 
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Does Metarepresentation make Human 
Mental Time Travel Unique? 
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Preface 
 In the discussion section of the previous chapter, I suggested that spontaneously passing the 
forked tube task may typically rest on a capacity for forming metarepresentations.  Specifically, the 
participant reflects on a single represented version of the future event, understands that this 
representation could be incorrect, and simultaneously prepares for the alternative version.  The 
secondary, preliminary finding that three adult chimpanzees failed to spontaneously pass was 
therefore consistent with the failure of chimpanzees on other tasks requiring metarepresentational 
insight (e.g., Call & Tomasello, 1999), and with the suggestion that the capacity to form 
metarepresentations may be uniquely human (Suddendorf, 1999). 
 In the following chapter, I expand on these ideas and suggest that the capacity to form 
metarepresentations may be one fundamental element that makes human mental time travel unique.  
This chapter is written in the context of an ongoing debate in the comparative literature, between 
those who believe there to be qualitative differences between human and non-human mental time 
travel, and those who believe there to be quantitative differences only.  Suddendorf and Corballis 
(1997; 2007) defended the uniqueness view of human mental time travel for more than a decade, 
although in the last year Corballis (2013a; 2013b; 2013c) has changed his mind.  I discuss the 
neurological studies that caused this change in position, and behavioural studies of non-human 
mental time travel more generally, in the context of whether such studies can be taken as evidence 
for future-oriented metarepresentational insight.   
 This chapter is an adapted version of an article1 that has been accepted for publication.  
Therefore, many of the concepts and findings mentioned in the general introduction (Chapter 1) and 
review (Chapter 2) are briefly reiterated.  I retain the journal outlet’s use of ‘boxes’ to discuss issues 
that are relevant but not central to the main argument of the article. 
 
1Redshaw, J. (accepted). Does metarepresentation make human mental time travel unique? Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science. 
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Abstract 
Recent neurological evidence suggests that rats can mentally represent novel maze trajectories and 
then are more likely to follow these paths in the future.  Consequently, it has been proposed that 
human and non-human mental time travel capacities may differ in degree rather than kind.  As of 
yet, however, there is no evidence for the crucial and qualitatively distinct component of 
metarepresentation in any non-human animal, not even our closest great ape relatives.  
Metarepresentation allows humans to represent the relationship between current reality and mere 
representations of reality—including those of the future.  Drawing on parallels with dreaming and 
mind-wandering, I outline the future-oriented benefits associated with uncontextualised (non-
metarepresentational) representations of past and novel events, but propose that further, immense 
benefits flowed from the addition of metarepresentational insight.  I critique previous behavioural 
paradigms used to assess mental time travel in animals and suggest how future-oriented 
metarepresentation might possibly be demonstrated nonverbally. 
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 The ability to mentally travel in time to specific future episodes is one of the reasons 
humans have been able to dominate the environment and many other species on this planet 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  It allows us to actively shape the future to our own desire, seizing 
opportunities and avoiding potential harms (Suddendorf, 2006).  The debate about whether (or to 
what extent) non-human animals can engage in mental time travel, however, remains unresolved 
and has recently taken an interesting turn.  For more than a decade, mental time travel scholars 
Suddendorf and Corballis together defended the claim that there are qualitative differences between 
the human and non-human capacities (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007, 2010; Suddendorf, 
Corballis, & Collier-Baker, 2009), whereas others have emphasised continuity across species 
(Clayton, Bussey, & Dickinson, 2003; Dere, Kart-Teke, Huston, & De Souza Silva, 2006; Osvath, 
2010; Roberts, 2012; Zentall, 2005).  Yet, in the last year, Corballis (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) has 
recanted his position of human uniqueness, on the basis of evidence suggesting that rodents can 
mentally represent novel maze trajectories before taking these paths in the future (Gupta, van der 
Meer, Touretzky, & Redish, 2010; Pastalkova, Itskov, Amarasingham, & Buzsáki, 2008; Pfeiffer & 
Foster, 2013).  Suddendorf (2013a), on the other hand, rejects Corballis’ new stance, remaining 
committed to the proposal that there may be multiple limits to non-human mental time travel. 
 My intent here is not to provide a comprehensive account of all the potential similarities and 
differences between human and non-human mental time travel (instead see Cheke & Clayton, 2010; 
Clayton, et al., 2003; Feeney & Roberts, 2012; Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Zentall, 2006).  Rather, I wish to re-establish the crucial involvement of one qualitatively distinct 
and recently overlooked component of mental time travel—metarepresentation—that has not yet 
been demonstrated in animals.  This capacity allows humans to represent the nature of the 
relationship between current reality and alternative representations of reality (Pylyshyn, 1978).  
Without metarepresentational insight, the future cannot be represented as the future (Suddendorf, 
1999), which is a form of the temporal awareness central to conventional definitions of mental time 
travel (Tulving, 1985, 2005).  Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007) have previously argued for 
the decisive importance of metarepresentation to mental time travel, and there is no reason to reject 
the hypothesis of human uniqueness on the basis of current evidence.  In the hope of refocusing the 
debate at this critical point, I first specify the role of metarepresentation in mental time travel before 
distilling and defending four key claims: 
(i) In humans, mental representations of past and novel events are often dissociated from 
metarepresentational insight into the relationship between these events and current reality.  
Thus, even if animals are able to represent novel events, they may not have any ability to 
embed these representations within a specific future context. 
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(ii) There are numerous future-oriented adaptive benefits associated with uncontextualised 
mental representations of past and novel events, but there are further, immense benefits 
associated with metarepresentational insight into future events.   
(iii) Many previous behavioural paradigms used to assess mental time travel in animals do not 
(and cannot) provide conclusive evidence for metarepresentational insight, and are more 
parsimoniously understood in terms of uncontextualised representations. 
(iv) With careful controls, it is possible to provide evidence for metarepresentational insight in 
non-human mental time travel, if indeed the capacity exists. 
Metarepresentation and Mental Time Travel 
 The term metarepresentation has been used in various frameworks (Perner, 2012), but 
Pylyshyn originally described it as the ability to “represent the representational relation itself” (p. 
593).  In the context of mental representations, this can be considered a recursive operation 
(Corballis, 2007, 2011; Martins, 2012) in which the mind represents the function of minds as to 
represent reality as it currently exists (via perception); or as it previously existed, could potentially 
exist, or could not exist (via imagination).  Central to this capacity is the understanding that current 
reality exists independently of the mind, and that representations can be compared to this construct.  
Thus, an agent capable of forming metarepresentations can not only represent a belief, but also the 
notion of a belief and how it relates to the real world (Pylyshyn, 1978).  This notion includes an 
explicit understanding that beliefs about current reality can be incorrect (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 
1978; Harman, 1978), and so human children are considered to possess a capacity for 
metarepresentation when they become able to pass an explicit false-belief task (Perner, 1991; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  More generally, metarepresentation allows humans to embed alternative 
representations of reality within a specific representational context—whether that context be 
another mind, the past, the future, or mere fiction—and relate these representations to our 
continuously updating model of current reality (Suddendorf, 1999, 2013b). 
 Perner (1991) greatly expanded on Pylyshyn’s ideas about metarepresentation, arguing for a 
qualitative difference between (i) a genuinely metarepresentational mind that represents the 
representational function of mental representations, and (ii) a mind that more simply distinguishes 
between representations tied to perception and purely imaginal representations.  His case was that, 
since perception has been the most reliable source of information about current reality throughout 
evolutionary history, organisms must have evolved to give perceptual information precedence when 
interacting with the environment, without necessarily having any explicit theory-of-perception 
regarding why.  Accordingly, organisms must have evolved to not treat alternative representations 
of reality as reality itself (because doing so would be incredibly dangerous), without necessarily 
having any metarepresentational notion about what a representation is.  The difference between the 
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above cases (i) and (ii) is empirically demonstrated in the development of pretend play in human 
children. 
 Pretend play emerges during the second year of life (Leslie, 1987; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 
2004), and even very young children do not typically confuse their pretend representations with 
current reality (e.g., when a banana is being represented as a telephone; Lillard, Pinkham, & Smith, 
2011).  Thus, young children are clearly able to simultaneously represent perceptual and imaginal 
models of the same situation, and they are able to interpret and use their imaginal models 
appropriately.  Nevertheless, there is much evidence to suggest that, until around four or five years 
of age, children do not have a metarepresentational theory-of-pretence.  Many younger children, for 
instance, will mistakenly attribute pretend play to mindless objects, such as a toy bus that has been 
made to look like a horse, or a toy car that has been made to move like a mouse (Lillard, Zeljo, 
Curenton, & Kaugars, 2000).  Moreover, they will respond that a person hopping around like a 
kangaroo is pretending to be a kangaroo, even when told that the person has never seen a kangaroo 
before (Joseph, 1998; Lillard, 1993).  To the mind of a young child then, pretence evidently exists 
in the world rather than as an intentional mental representation of the world (Lillard, 1996, 1998).  
And so, in accordance with Perner’s theory, it appears entirely possible for an agent to represent an 
alternative version of reality without any metarepresentational understanding of the relationship 
between that representation and current reality. 
 The point I wish to make here is that, just as the capacity for forming metarepresentations is 
required to represent the representational perspective of pretence, so it is also required to represent 
the future representational perspective.  Without this ability, there can be no explicit understanding 
of how a representation of a plausible novel event can relate to current reality.  Thus, 
metarepresentation interacts with the episodic system insofar as it enables episodic representations 
to be embedded within a specific future (or past) context, imbuing these representations with the 
temporal subjectivity that Tulving (2005) emphasises is necessary for true mental time travel.  Yet, 
metarepresentation also interacts with the semantic system, insofar as it enables the encoding, 
storage and recall of a database of facts about the future context—for instance regarding the often 
uncertain nature of representations embedded within this context.  And once these facts are 
crystallised, they can be maintained and called upon even in the event that the episodic system 
malfunctions (Kwan et al., 2012; Kwan, Craver, Green, Myerson, & Rosenbaum, 2013).  Of course, 
a semantic database of facts about representations would be useless without a decision-based 
system to apply these facts appropriately, and so organisms capable of metarepresentation should 
possess mechanisms (potentially including episodic memory) that can set boundary conditions on 
semantic generalisations (Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2002).   The metarepresentational 
capacity may also interact with both declarative memory systems in other ways, for instance by 
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motivating agents to search for semantic information that will be useful only in specific future 
episodes (e.g., when business leaders invest millions of dollars in research and development; 
Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).   
 However, even when alternative representations of novel events are not embedded within a 
future context, this is not to say they are mistaken for the here-and-now (just as young children do 
not mistake pretence as such), because doing so would be disastrous from a survival perspective.  
Rather, these uncontextualised representations may sometimes function as lower-level ‘desired 
world states’ that can motivate present action (Boyer, 2008) or bias future action in an adaptive 
manner, without the agent having an explicit notion of the future representational perspective to 
which these desired world states belong.  Uncontextualised representations may even enable basic 
forms of short-term planning, insofar as an agent is motivated to take a path from current reality to 
the desired world state.  Yet, without metarepresentational insight, there can be no reflection on and 
judgement of these representations according to the particular features of future representations.  
In the next section, I show that uncontextualised representations are common even in adult humans, 
and so neurological evidence suggesting that non-human animals are capable of representing novel 
events cannot be used in and of itself to infer that they can engage in true mental time travel. 
Uncontextualised Representations in Humans and Non-humans 
 The presence of a fully developed capacity for metarepresentation does not imply that adult 
humans always have metarepresentational insight into mental representations.  Dreaming, for 
instance, clearly demonstrates the human brain’s ability to generate uncontextualised 
representations of novel scenarios, without any online understanding of the (discordant) relationship 
between these representations and current reality.  Except in the special case of lucid dreaming 
(Voss, Holzmann, Tuin, & Hobson, 2009), we only gain insight into this relationship when we 
wake and our capacity for metarepresentation is applied.  Curiously, a similar dissociation is seen in 
instances of involuntary mind-wandering to past and potential future episodes during wakefulness 
(Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Smallwood, Nind, & O’Connor, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2011).  
People often become aware of the nature and temporal context of these representations only when 
their mind-wandering is interrupted and they reflect upon it after the fact (Jackson, Weinstein, & 
Balota, 2013; Sayette, Reichle, & Schooler, 2009; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007).  
And yet, even when people mind-wander without any awareness of doing so, their behaviour is still 
driven by perceived reality, as demonstrated by the fact that they continue to perform appropriately 
(albeit less efficiently) on basic perceptual judgement tasks (Smallwood, et al., 2007).  Human 
mind-wandering has been characterised as a process in which the mind intermittently wanders and 
then catches itself wandering, inadvertently halting the spontaneity of the process (Schooler et al., 
2011).  Thus, humans appear to possess mechanisms able to generate representations of past and 
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potential future scenarios without any necessary metarepresentational insight into their relationship 
with current reality.  Such insight is an additional, rather than encapsulated ingredient of mental 
representation (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Illustration of four instantiations of metarepresentation.  A mind can represent an 
alternative version of reality (e.g., a dream, a past event, a novel event, or the content of another 
mind) without metarepresentational insight, which requires an additional, overarching 
representation of the relationship between that alternative version of reality and current reality.  
This represented relationship can be discordant (e.g., in lucid dreaming or fiction), post-occurrent 
(e.g., in episodic memory), pre-occurrent (e.g., in episodic foresight), or regarding the truth value of 
the alternative representation (e.g., in belief representation). 
 
 Both mammals and birds (but potentially not reptiles; Eiland, Lyamin, & Siegel, 2001) 
engage in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep (Hobson, 2009), which is closely associated with 
149 
 
dreaming in humans (Péters, Aerts, Delfiore, Degueldre, & Luxen, 1996; Stickgold, Hobson, Fosse, 
& Fosse, 2001).  In rats, REM sleep is often coupled with the reactivation of hippocampal place 
cells corresponding to previously explored locations (Louie & Wilson, 2001), and behavioural 
evidence shows that pontine-lesioned cats appear to physically ‘act out’ their dreams (Hendricks, 
Morrison, & Mann, 1982).  Furthermore, neuroimaging studies suggest that at least some 
mammalian brains have a human-like ‘default network’ (Barks, Parr, & Rilling; Lu et al., 2012; 
Mantini et al., 2011; Rilling et al., 2007), which has been implicated in mind-wandering during 
wakefulness (Mason et al., 2007).  Thus, it appears that certain non-human animals may be able to 
generate mental representations of alternative versions of reality.  And interestingly, as mentioned 
in the introduction, recent evidence suggests that rodents can represent novel movements through a 
spatial field (Gupta, et al., 2010; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013).  Indeed, during sleep and rest, novel 
representations may comprise up to 85% of the total running episodes generated by the rat brain 
(Dragoi & Tonegawa, 2014).  As in human mind-wandering, rats’ alternative representations during 
wakefulness are apparently not confused with current reality, as they are able to continue running 
on a wheel in an appropriate fashion all the while imagining alternative movements through space 
(Pastalkova, et al., 2008).  
 Even conceding the phenomenological validity of these neurological findings, however, 
there remains no conclusive evidence for the capacity to form metarepresentations (as measured by 
false-belief understanding) in even our closest extant relatives, the great apes (Call & Tomasello, 
1999; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009, 2010; Penn & Povinelli, 2007).  This leaves 
open the possibility that, while some animals may have mechanisms able to generate 
uncontextualised representations based on elements from memory, they lack any insight into the 
specific relationship between these representations and current reality.  And considering the 
numerous errors associated with memory (Schacter, 1999), it is not surprising that many of these 
representations would be novel, rather than accurate depictions of past events (evolution may even 
favour a somewhat imperfect memory that promotes the flexible recombination of memory 
elements; Schacter & Addis, 2007).  Yet, as long as they are not embedded within a specific 
temporal context, such representations are best characterised as mental space travel rather than true 
mental time travel (see Box 1).   As I reaffirm below, the capacity for metarepresentation is not only 
qualitatively distinct, but also exceptionally adaptive (Suddendorf, 1999). 
  
BOX 1: Mental space travel vs. mental time travel 
 The capacity I describe as ‘mental space travel’ (used similarly by Tulving, 2005) is closely 
related to cognitive mapping (Hartley, Lever, Burgess, & O'Keefe, 2014).  This concept was first 
introduced to explain the locomotive decisions of rats, including their ability to take novel short-
cuts during maze runs (Tolman, 1948).  Presumably, rats are able to do this because they have a 
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stored spatial representation of the maze and can mentally travel to different locations within this 
representation to implicitly deduce the shortest path between two points (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978).  
The more recent work directly examining hippocampal place cells (Gupta, et al., 2010; Pastalkova, 
et al., 2008; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013) only provides novel neurological support for this old cognitive 
theory.  Undoubtedly, mental space travel even has a ‘temporal dimension’ to it, insofar as the 
spatial representation is not a static image, but rather changes over time in a coherent fashion.  
Evidence from hippocampal sharp-wave ripples suggests that rats mentally replay and pre-play 
specific movements in space, albeit at a rate around 10 times faster than their actual movement 
(Diba & Buzsáki, 2007).  In this way, the mammalian hippocampus does indeed facilitate 
representations of ‘4D space-time’, as Corballis (2013c) suggests.  The temporal dimension 
associated with the hippocampus (Itskov, Curto, Pastalkova, & Buzsáki, 2011), however, exists 
only within the mental representation itself.  It does not allow the representation as a whole to be 
embedded in a specific temporal context relative to current reality.   
 There is no doubt that mental time travel co-opts the neural (hippocampal) and cognitive 
(representational) architecture provided by the more ancient capacity for mental space travel.  
Indeed, humans with hippocampal damage often struggle to represent past and potential future 
episodes (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002), clearly 
demonstrating continuity with the basic representational capacities of other mammals.  On top of 
mental space travel, however, humans have the metarepresentational ability to step outside their 
spatial representations, as it were, and see them for what they are (Suddendorf, 1999).  In mental 
time travel, this involves placing these representations in time relative to a simultaneous 
representation of current reality.  One recent study (Kwan, et al., 2013) suggests that, even though 
hippocampus-lesioned amnesiacs have trouble filling their representations with spatial content, they 
nevertheless still understand the relation between representations of the future and current reality 
(and they also have no trouble with false-belief tasks; Rabin, Braverman, Gilboa, Stuss, & Shayna 
Rosenbaum, 2012).  This finding is consistent with Klein’s recently articulated view that mental 
time travel is greatly enhanced by, yet can still be dissociated from, the episodic system (Klein, 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c).  The capacity for metarepresentation is probably powered not by the 
hippocampus, but rather by the expanded human prefrontal cortex (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; 
Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). 
 
Evolutionary Perspective: Uncontextualised Representations vs. Metarepresentations 
 One influential theory suggests that dreaming may have evolved to help us prepare for 
future threats (Revonsuo, 2000).  By experiencing a novel situation in a dream, we are able to 
mentally ‘practice’ certain adaptive behaviours (Alexander, 1989).  In this way dreaming would 
provide us with future-oriented benefits, although at the time of the dream and the applicable future 
situation we would usually remain unaware of these benefits.  This hypothesis has support from 
various domains (Valli & Revonsuo, 2009), including from self-report studies showing that dreams 
often contain survival threats and attempted evasive or defensive action on the part of the dreamer 
(Zadra, Desjardins, & Marcotte, 2006).  Indeed, a similar adaptive argument has been applied to 
uncontextualised representations of past and novel events during wakefulness.  Mind-wandering or 
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environmental cueing to such episodes may bias humans and certain non-human animals to engage 
in adaptive behaviours when relevant future situations arise (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; 
Schooler, et al., 2011; Stawarczyk, Cassol, & D'Argembeau, 2013).  Supporting this idea, rats that 
mentally represent spatial paths are more likely to take these paths in the future (Pastalkova, et al., 
2008)—including when the represented path is novel (Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013)—potentially 
allowing them to discover new rewards.  
 Conceivably, the future-oriented benefits of uncontextualised representations could also be 
grounded in present behaviour.  Consider the finding that human episodic memories often trigger 
limbic activity associated with the reactivation of emotional states from the actual past episode 
(Boyer, 2008; Damasio et al., 2000).  Without any evidence to suggest otherwise, we can 
parsimoniously assume these emotional states to be coupled with the phenomenological re-
experience of the episode itself, rather than any metarepresentational awareness of the episode’s 
relationship to current reality.  If so, then it could be that certain animals, too, can re-experience 
(and pre-experience) emotional states when engaged in mind-wandering.  Indeed, the chimpanzee 
default network seems to centre more on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is associated 
with emotional processing, than the human network (Rilling, et al., 2007).  Perhaps, emotional 
states associated with mind-wandering or environmental cuing could prompt animals into engaging 
in behaviours that would incidentally benefit their future selves.  A hungry chimpanzee that comes 
across some stones, for example, might be cued into a representation of using these stones to crack 
nuts (a ‘desired world state’), and thus experience a specific desire for carrying stones to a place 
where nuts are available (see Boesch & Boesch, 1984).  Even though the chimpanzee may be 
representing a removed spatial context, the adaptive behaviour could be triggered without any 
metarepresentational understanding of the specific temporal context of the represented episode 
(which may explain why they never refine stones for more efficient future use). 
 Without metarepresentational insight, however, the adaptive benefits of past and novel 
representations are limited.  Specifically, an agent without this capacity might be restricted to 
uncontextualised representations of events that are consistent with evolutionarily recurring themes 
(e.g., potential survival threats; Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne, van Arsdall, 
Pandeirada, & Blunt, 2012) or recombinations of personal past experiences (e.g., previously-taken 
and novel paths in a cognitively-mapped environment).  Any long-term future benefits would be 
merely incidental rather than insightfully planned (but still common enough for the cognitive 
process to be naturally selected).  An agent with a capacity for metarepresentation, on the other 
hand, is endowed with a general ability to embed their episodic representations into larger 
narratives (Suddendorf, 2013b).  Such an agent can exert purposeful and powerful constructive 
control over a given future representation (within the constraints of the particular environmental 
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context in which it was triggered), and prepare with specific knowledge of how their behaviour may 
affect the future (Suddendorf, 1999).  They can account for all (known) variables specific to a future 
context, such as the amount of time between a present behaviour and the future payoff, or the 
likelihoods of alternative versions of a future event occurring (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; 
Suddendorf & Redshaw, 2013).  Agents with metarepresentational insight are not clairvoyants, but 
their future-oriented behaviours are likely to be far more targeted and adaptive than those of mere 
mind-wanderers.   
Empirical Concerns 
 The empirical problem with the proposed qualitative cognitive difference between humans 
and non-humans, however, is that many of the future-oriented behavioural advantages it confers 
may be quantitative.  Agents with a capacity for metarepresentation might be able to act to achieve 
desirable future outcomes, but so might agents without this component—albeit with less flexibility 
and without the same understanding.  Indeed, there is no doubt that various instinctual, procedural, 
and semantic mechanisms can produce sophisticated future-oriented behaviour in many non-human 
species (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  And, more pertinently for the issue at hand, there remain 
non-metarepresentational explanations for evidence suggesting that certain animals can solve future 
problems using mental representations alone.  Consider the most commonly cited behavioural 
evidence for great ape foresight.  Studies show that individuals from these species can preferentially 
select a tool that will be useful in solving a future problem and gaining a reward (Mulcahy & Call, 
2006), even when they haven’t seen the tool before (but have seen and used similar tools; Osvath & 
Osvath, 2008).  These studies were designed only to answer the question of whether great apes can 
represent and act for novel episodes.  Nevertheless, even if we grant them this capacity, the 
evidence does not (and cannot) imply a capacity for metarepresentation.   
 In humans at least, episodic memories are easily cued by relevant information (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973), and recent evidence suggests that great apes too can be cued to representations of 
past events from up to three years earlier (Martin-Ordas, Berntsen, & Call, 2013).  Furthermore, we 
know that great apes are capable of solving means-ends problems mentally, rather than through 
trial-and-error learning (Suddendorf & Whiten, 2001).  Thus, when great apes are shown an array of 
novel objects, one of which can solve a previously experienced problem, they may be cued to their 
memory of the problem and become biased towards choosing the appropriate object.  As we have 
seen earlier, however, representations of past and novel events do not necessarily occur with 
metarepresentational insight (Schooler, et al., 2011; Smallwood, et al., 2007).  And so the apes 
could be cued towards selecting the right tool without any appreciation of the specific future context 
in which they can use it.  Later on, when the problem becomes available again, they may be 
similarly cued to their past choice of the tool and thus bring it with them to gain the reward in the 
153 
 
present.  Both of these behaviours are possible without any insight into the relationship between 
past, present, and future (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.  An alternative, non-metarepresentational explanation for an experiment (Osvath & 
Osvath, 2008; experiment 4) that appears to show great apes acting for a specific future episode in 
which a novel hose is required to retrieve juice from a box.  At time 1, the ape is aware of the 
general type of tool that is required to solve the problem (as they have already solved the problem in 
the previous experiments), but no specific solution is available.  At time 2, the appearance of such a 
tool cues the ape to an uncontextualised representation of how to solve the problem, even though 
the problem is not currently available.  This representation biases the ape towards choosing the 
appropriate object, albeit without any appreciation of the specific future context in which it can be 
used.  The problem solution at time 3 is similarly based on an uncontextualised representation of the 
past choice of the tool, and a desire to solve the problem in the present. 
 
 Similar concerns arise when considering the case of Santino the chimpanzee, who has been 
observed to gather collections of stones, sometimes hiding them under piles of hay, before later 
hurling them at visitors to his zoo enclosure (Osvath, 2009; Osvath & Karvonen, 2012).  Rather 
than necessarily requiring metarepresentational insight, such behaviour could have parallels with 
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the pretend play seen in human children less than four years of age.  As described earlier, these 
young children are able to simultaneously represent current and pretend versions of reality without 
confusing one for the other, albeit with no understanding of how the representations specifically 
relate.  Similarly, Santino’s stone-collecting behaviour could have been driven by an 
uncontextualised representation of zoo visitors appearing (which he had experienced many times 
before), without any understanding of the temporal context in which that representation would 
become actualised.  And when the visitors did eventually appear, he simply took advantage of the 
stones he had left in a convenient location (children, too, leave their toys lying around).  Although 
the behaviour clearly seems oriented to a specific future representational perspective, a careful 
analysis shows there is no need to ascribe any metarepresentational insight.  Indeed, the authors 
themselves raise this possibility when they suggest that Santino’s behaviour could have been 
produced without any ‘theory-like reasoning’ about his own or others’ mental states (Osvath & 
Karvonen, 2012). 
A Foresight Equivalent of the False-belief Task 
 The explicit false-belief task is the acid test of metarepresentation in the theory of mind 
domain because passing it requires the central understanding that mental representations are just 
representations and they can misrepresent current reality (Perner, 1991).  Human children younger 
than four may be able to implicitly track and switch between their own and others’ mental 
representations, but, as in early pretend play, they may not represent the function of these 
representations as to represent the world from a certain perspective (Perner, Rendl, & Garnham, 
2007)—and so they cannot pass the explicit false-belief task.  Along these lines, any acid test of 
future-oriented metarepresentation must be able to differentiate between (i) an agent that can 
represent the function of future representations, and (ii) an agent that can more simply represent and 
act on lower-level desired world states, with no explicit understanding of the future representational 
perspective to which these desired world states belong.  And, as for the theory of mind domain, 
perhaps the most empirically tractable functional element of future representations is that they often 
misrepresent the future.  Indeed, any agent that explicitly represented the future representational 
perspective might be expected to learn about the uncertain nature of future representations rather 
quickly.  Thus, any non-human animal that demonstrated compelling behavioural evidence of 
understanding future misrepresentation could be said to possess a future-oriented 
metarepresentational capacity.  
 Well established in the literature, the Bischof-Kӧhler hypothesis proposes that non-human 
animals cannot act with future desires in mind when they conflict with current desires (Suddendorf 
& Corballis, 1997).  Such action may rely on a capacity for metarepresentation because it requires 
an agent to understand that the current self tends to misrepresent certain aspects of the future self 
155 
 
and so behaviour should be adjusted accordingly.  As we have seen earlier, however, episodic 
memories can reactivate emotions associated with the memory (Boyer, 2008; Damasio, et al., 
2000), and so this may also occur when animals mind-wander or are cued to uncontextualised 
representations of past or novel scenarios.  In this way, an animal might be able to act with a future 
emotion in mind, simply because they are currently experiencing that emotion to a certain extent 
(e.g., in the case of Santino).  This low-level explanation could also apply to studies of specific 
satiety in corvids (see Box 2).  Thus, emotion-based tests of the Bischof-Kӧhler hypothesis may be 
inadequate if one is hoping to measure metarepresentational insight.   
 
BOX 2: ‘Planning’ by corvids: Metarepresentation or emotional cueing? 
 An excellent and long-standing program of research from Clayton and colleagues appears to 
demonstrate that various birds from the Corvidae family (corvids) can cache food with specific 
future desires in mind (Correia, Dickinson, & Clayton, 2007; Raby, Alexis, Dickinson, & Clayton, 
2007).  Here I will focus on just one of their studies, which a prominent sceptic recently called “the 
most convincing evidence of planning in another species” (Shettleworth, 2012, p.2795).  
 Cheke and Clayton (2012) tested Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius).  The authors based 
their paradigm on the concept of ‘specific satiety’, whereby an animal exhibits a reduced preference 
for a specific food (in contrast to other foods) after becoming sated on that food.  All experimental 
factors were counterbalanced across four subjects, but for ease of communication I will describe the 
procedure experienced by a single bird.  In three sequential stages over two days, this bird was:  
 (i)  allowed to cache food A and food B in both tray 1 and tray 2,  
 (ii)  pre-fed food A only, before being allowed to retrieve food from tray 1 only,  
 (iii)  pre-fed food B only, before being allowed to retrieve food from tray 2 only.   
This three-stage process was repeated over three trials.  In the first (baseline) trial, the bird was not 
pre-fed food A or food B before the first (caching) stage, and did not exhibit any preferences for 
caching specific foods in specific trays.  In the second and third trials, however, the bird was pre-fed 
food A before the first stage.  In these second and third trials, the bird cached a higher proportion of 
food A in tray 2 than tray 1.  Therefore, the bird was caching more of food A in the location that 
would be available when it would prefer this food in the future. 
 To their credit, the authors do not attribute a metarepresentational capacity to the birds 
without qualification.  Rather, they offer an alternative interpretation of their results that is 
consistent with the Bischof-Kӧhler hypothesis and the more general argument presented herein.  
They imply that, during the baseline trial, the bird could have associated the availability of tray 1 
with an emotional preference for food B (stage ii), and the availability of tray 2 with an emotional 
preference for food A (stage iii).  And, in the subsequent trials, these emotional preferences could 
have been reactivated upon the appearance of the trays during the first stage—thus over-riding the 
bird’s distaste for food A based on the pre-feeding.  The reactivated emotional preferences would in 
turn motivate caching behaviour that was incidentally consistent with the bird’s future preferences, 
without the bird having any explicit understanding of the specific relationship between their caching 
behaviour and the future retrieval event. 
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 On the other hand, it remains unclear to what extent motivational drives such as generalised 
hunger (in contrast to appetite for specific foods), thirst, and temperature sensitivity can be 
reactivated by episodic memory or mind-wandering.  In primates at least, such ‘interoceptive’ states 
arise directly from the peripheral nervous system (Craig, 2002, 2003), and so they may be less 
susceptible to reactivation and cognitive appraisal than emotions are.  If so, then these drives would 
make ideal candidates for testing the Bischof-Kӧhler hypothesis in this particular animal order.  
Studies that have claimed to provide evidence of great apes acting for future hunger levels (Osvath 
& Osvath, 2008) have failed to include a conflict with present hunger levels, and so it remains 
unclear which one the animal is acting upon (Suddendorf, et al., 2009).  A more sound experiment 
would require the animal to act to reduce a strong future drive even when they are completely sated 
(Suddendorf, 1994).  Illustrating the trouble that non-human primates may have with this behaviour, 
D’Amato observed that, day after day, cebus monkeys would throw food out of a cage when sated, 
only to later find themselves hungry and with nothing to eat (Roberts, 2002).  
 Nevertheless, although interoceptive state-based tests of the Bischof-Kӧhler hypothesis can 
potentially provide existence proof of future-oriented metarepresentation, in some ways they may 
be setting the bar too high.  Among humans, even 7-year-old children (and at times, adults; Nisbett 
& Kanouse, 1969) have great difficulty passing such tests (Atance & Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy, Grass, 
Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014), despite the fact they pass metarepresentational tasks in the theory of 
mind domain around age four (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  And so it may be fruitful to 
search for other means of testing the capacity based on an understanding that future events can be 
misrepresented, rather than the future self.  One possibility could be to test whether animals can 
prepare for multiple, mutually exclusive versions of a single undetermined future event.  Such a test 
may provide a first-person, future-oriented version of the false-belief task, because it would require 
the animal to recognise that a represented version of the future could be incorrect and also prepare 
for alternative versions.  In other words, it would require the animal to represent the uncertain 
nature of the relationship between current reality and the future (as it is represented by the mind).  
Importantly, the criteria for passing should involve preparing for multiple potential outcomes of the 
single event simultaneously, thus ensuring that the behaviour is not simply based on sequential 
uncontextualised representations of the outcomes.  Current evidence suggests that children become 
capable of such behaviour around the fifth year (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; 
Robinson, Rowley, Beck, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006).  
Conclusion 
 Non-human animals are capable of many impressive future-oriented behaviours, and they 
may even be able to mentally represent basic novel events.  As of yet, however, they have shown no 
evidence of metarepresentational insight into the relationship between future events and current 
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reality.  Without this capacity, they would be extremely limited in their ability to intelligently 
prepare for specific future episodes.  Future research may reveal otherwise, but for the moment the 
hypothesis that there are qualitatively distinct aspects of human mental time travel remains tenable. 
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 Episodic foresight has been defined as “the capacity to imagine future scenarios and use 
such imagination to guide current action” (Suddendorf & Moore, 2011, p. 296).  It can be 
considered the future-directed counterpart of episodic memory, and indeed there are many links 
between the abilities to imagine past and future events (Schacter et al., 2012; Suddendorf, 2010).  In 
Chapter 2’s review, however, I demonstrated that episodic foresight is more than just the ability to 
project past events into the future.  Rather, it is a multifaceted process involving several 
sophisticated and interconnected cognitive components that can be considered analogues of the 
roles involved in a theatre production—the stage, playwright, set, actors, director, executive 
producer, and broadcaster (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  These components develop along 
varying trajectories, with important milestones in each of them achieved between ages three and 
five.  The following four chapters involved empirical studies examining the development of several 
novel future-oriented behaviours in children around these ages.  These behaviours included solving 
deferred future problems (Chapter 3), seeking information for specific future episodes (Chapter 4), 
remembering to carry out an intended future action in the presence and absence of external cues 
(Chapter 5), and preparing for alternative versions of the future (Chapter 6).  Overall, the findings 
further substantiate the claim that episodic foresight shows crucial developments throughout the 
preschool years.  In Chapter 7, I built upon a discussion point arising from a preliminary study with 
chimpanzees in Chapter 6, and suggested that the capacity to form metarepresentations may make 
human episodic foresight unique. 
 In this general discussion, I will first summarise the findings of each empirical chapter 
before elaborating on them in greater detail and outlining potential avenues for future research.  I 
will then provide an age-based analysis of the findings, bringing together evidence from across the 
studies to consider the development of episodic foresight and future-oriented behaviour between 
ages two and five.  Afterwards, I will revisit the theatre metaphor and discuss whether any additions 
or alterations should be made to the components.  I will conclude with a short summary of the 
overall contribution of my thesis to the theoretical, developmental, and comparative episodic 
foresight literatures.  
Summary and Extended Discussion of Empirical Findings 
 In the following sections I summarise the findings of the empirical chapters (3-6) while also 
embedding them within the broader developmental literature and discussing them in the context of 
the theatre metaphor.  For each study I outline the novel methodological and theoretical 
contributions made, and suggest how future research might proceed. 
Chapter 3: Preparing for Deferred Future Episodes 
 Previous studies had shown that preschoolers can select objects to solve future problems that 
are merely hypothetical (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005) or occur almost immediately after the object is 
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selected (Scarf, Gross, Colombo, & Hayne, 2013; Suddendorf, Nielsen, & von Gehlen, 2011).  
Chapter 3’s study was the first to examine children’s ability to recall a problem from the past and 
act in the present to solve that problem in a deferred future episode.  I used a modified version of 
the two-room paradigm developed by Suddendorf and colleagues (2011).  In the crucial test 
condition, 4-year-old children were taken to a first room and exposed to a problem, but there was no 
solution available.  They were then taken to a second room and distracted for 15 minutes, before 
being told that (i) they would be going back to the first room when a familiar 5-minute sand-timer 
had completed a cycle, and (ii) they would be taking a bucket when they went.  After the children 
confirmed they understood these facts, the experimenter revealed a selection of six items (one of 
which could solve the problem in the first room) and told the children that they could place one of 
the items into the bucket.  The children placed the item that could solve the problem significantly 
more often than chance would predict, suggesting that many 4-year-old children can act in the 
present to solve deferred future problems. 
 Chapter 3’s innovative use of a sand-timer to examine children’s episodic foresight has the 
potential to be adopted in many future studies (see, e.g., Chapters 4 and 5).  The 4-year-olds solved 
the deferred future problem marked by the timer at a similar rate to the 4-year-olds from 
Suddendorf and colleagues’ (2011) original study, who only had to act for the very next future 
episode (‘now’).  Such a pattern of results may suggest that, as long as children can correctly recall 
a problem from the past, they can use the same cognitive mechanism to solve that problem for an 
episode in the immediate future and for an episode 5 minutes into the future.  This raises the 
possibility that children (and adults) can also use the same mechanism to solve even more distant 
future problems, again as long as they can recall the relevant past episode.  For example, as long as 
children can recall the problems that they typically face throughout a day at preschool, then they 
may be able to pack their bags with items that solve these deferred future problems (e.g., a hat to 
protect from the sun) using the same cognitive mechanism as if the problems were in the immediate 
future. 
 The central importance of episodic memory in the ability to solve two-room problems is also 
supported by a recent study from Atance and Sommerville (2014).  They found that variance in 3-5 
year-old children’s memory for the relevant problem could explain all age-based differences in their 
ability to select the appropriate item that could solve the problem in the future.  These findings and 
Chapter 3’s results are both consistent with the links between episodic memory and episodic 
foresight seen across domains (Suddendorf, 2010), and with the proposal that episodic memory may 
have evolved as a crucial design feature of the episodic foresight system (Klein, 2013; Suddendorf 
& Busby, 2003, 2005). 
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 In the context of the theatre metaphor, Chapter 3’s task examined whether there are extra 
demands placed on the set component of episodic foresight when the relevant future episode is 
moved beyond the very next event.  The results, when considered in tandem with those of 
Suddendorf and colleagues (2011), suggest that there may not be any such demands.  Nevertheless, 
in some situations where we must act for a deferred future episode, the goal of that episode directly 
conflicts with the goal that we have in the immediate future.  In these cases there may be extra 
demands on the executive producer component, because we must be able to inhibit the desire to 
achieve the more immediate goal.  Several previous studies have tested children’s capacity to do 
this, in the context of delaying gratification (e.g., Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Thompson, 
Barresi, & Moore, 1997) or acting for future rather than present food preferences (Atance & 
Meltzoff, 2006; Mahy, Grass, Wagner, & Kliegel, 2014).  Another way to test this capacity, 
however, could be to examine children’s performance on an item-choice paradigm in which the 
item that would solve an immediate (but inaccessible) future problem is not the same one that 
would solve a more distant (but accessible) future problem.  Solving the accessible problem would 
still require the children to act for a deferred future goal that is incongruent with an immediate goal, 
without also requiring them to inhibit strong physiological drives.  
Chapter 4: Future-oriented Information Seeking 
 Previous studies have shown that young children have an innate preference for certain novel 
information (S. Friedman, 1972; Slater, Morison, & Rose, 1984) and are able to seek specific 
information to achieve a present goal (Call & Carpenter, 2001).  Chapter 4’s studies were the first to 
directly examine children’s ability to seek and encode information that would only be useful in a 
future episode.  In Study 1, I again adapted the two-room paradigm previously used in Chapter 3, 
and gave 4- and 5-year-old children the opportunity to seek information that would solve a future 
problem in another room.  When low-level associative explanations were controlled for (in 
Experiment 1B), 5-year-olds but not 4-year-olds showed evidence of being able to selectively 
search for information that would be useful in the future.  Nevertheless, because the two-room 
paradigm also places considerable demands on episodic memory (see above), it was difficult to 
conclude why the 4-year-olds failed.  In Study 2, I relaxed memory demands and gave 4- and 5-
year-olds the opportunity to study information for a future test.  Again, 5-year-olds but not 4-year-
olds provided evidence that they could narrow their search to information that would be beneficial 
in the future, with analyses revealing that this explained the difference in test performance between 
the groups. 
 The results of Chapter 4 have important practical implications, considering that future-
oriented information seeking is particularly important during the schooling years when children 
begin to engage in activities like studying and homework.  Although 5-year-old preschoolers as a 
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group did perform above chance on two structurally distinct tasks, the fact that they did not perform 
even close to ceiling levels suggests there is much room for improvement.  Thus, future studies may 
wish to examine whether the youngest schoolchildren reach ceiling level.  If not, then it would be 
ideal to test whether children can be trained to enhance their performance.  One potential target of 
such training could be executive functions, given that selective future-oriented information seeking 
may require children to inhibit their natural preference for other novel information (S. Friedman, 
1972; Slater, et al., 1984).  Some research suggests that interventions can facilitate young children’s 
executive function development, and this effect appears particularly strong for children with poor 
executive functions to begin with (Diamond & Lee, 2011; Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). 
 Besides loading heavily on the executive producer component of episodic foresight, future-
directed information seeking tasks may also place strong demands on the actor component.  
Specifically, to perform optimally on such tasks, children must recognise that their future self will 
be relying on memory for information gained in the relative past (which is now the present).  In this 
way, they may understand that their future performance will benefit from active encoding and 
rehearsal of that information in the present.  In Chapter 4, I introduced the term ‘doubly embedded 
mental time travel’ to describe this capacity (see Figure 1), and suggested that differences in the 
propensity to use it may have been responsible for the various differences in task performance 
between the 4- and 5-year-olds.   
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Figure 1. Representation of the difference between singly and doubly embedded mental time travel, 
which may explain why future-oriented information seeking could be particularly difficult for 
young children.  To perform optimally on a future-directed information seeking task, you must not 
only consider your future self, but also how that future self will use knowledge gained in the 
relative past (now the present) to solve the problem. 
 
 The concept of doubly embedded mental time travel could provide a new framework 
bringing together evidence for the development of various cognitive and emotional capacities in 
children.  In Chapter 4, I described how this concept might also be important for prospective 
memory, in particular when children internally rehearse prospective intentions to enhance their 
future memory.  Consistent with the results of Chapter 4, such internal rehearsal appears to emerge 
around five years of age (Mahy & Moses, 2011; also see Chapter 5).  Interestingly, doubly 
embedded mental time travel in the opposite direction might be important in the experience of 
regret, in which one reflects on a past decision that could have resulted in a more appealing relative 
future (present).  Again consistent with Chapter 4’s results, the earliest evidence for regret may 
appear in 5-year-olds (Weisberg & Beck, 2010, 2012).  Future research may want to check for 
correlations between future-directed information seeking and these other versions of doubly 
Singly embedded                
mental time travel 
 
Doubly embedded              
mental time travel 
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embedded mental time travel, as well as other types of doubly embedded cognition more generally 
(e.g., second-order belief reasoning, which may also emerge around five years; Miller, 2009; 
Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994).  Incidentally, children begin to show evidence for 
triply embedded mental time travel (in the form of predicting future regret) only around age nine 
(Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008).  In the theory of mind domain, fifth-order mental state relations may 
typically be the highest form that humans can hold in working memory at any given time 
(Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007), and it would be interesting to 
examine whether similar constraints exist for mental time travel.  A fifth-order example of mental 
time travel might involve you imagining a future in which you will reflect on how you could have 
anticipated regret in the past (as a criminal faced with a long prison sentence may do). 
 Future research may also wish to investigate the relationship between future-oriented 
information seeking and the capacity to deliberately practice physical skills in order to improve 
future performance.  As described in Chapter 2, future-directed practice can explain much about 
why humans show such large differences in skills and competencies at the individual level, and one 
could say that future-oriented information seeking is a form of ‘deliberate practice for the mind’.  
There is very scarce literature, however, regarding young children’s physical practice, and I could 
find no published studies on their ability to selectively practice certain skills with future 
performance in mind.  The paradigms described in Chapter 4 could easily be adapted to examine 
this capacity.  Children could, for instance, be given a choice of a number of physical tasks to 
practice—including one that that will be tested in the future and several that will not.  Their 
subsequent behaviour could then be examined to see whether they devoted more time to practicing 
the future-relevant skill than would be expected by chance. 
Chapter 5: Time-based Prospective Memory 
 Previous studies of children’s time-based prospective memory have included cues (such as a 
visible clock) that allowed the children to off-load the need to internally rehearse and implement the 
future intention to an external source (e.g., Aberle & Kliegel, 2010; Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; 
Mackinlay, Kliegel, & Mäntylä, 2009; Voigt, Aberle, Schönfeld, & Kliegel, 2011).  Chapter 5’s 
study was the first to examine preschool children’s ability to remember to perform an action at a 
certain time in the future, in both the presence and absence of reminders.  I administered 3-, 4-, and 
5-year-olds a novel paradigm in which their basic task was to remember to ring a bell at the end of a 
familiar 1-minute sand-timer’s cycle.  The experiment involved a 2 x 2 within-subjects design.  In 
half of the conditions the timer was visible, and in the other half the timer was covered such that the 
children had no external cue for when to ring the bell.  In half of the conditions the timer appeared 
as a single task, and in the other half (the prospective memory conditions) the timer was moved 
around a picture board, with children having to say the names of the pictures as they were marked 
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by the timer.  The main results showed that children were less likely to remember to ring the bell 
when the timer was hidden and/or embedded within the dual picture-naming task, with performance 
across all conditions improving with age. 
 The children performed relatively well in the prospective memory condition in which the 
timer was visible and embedded within the dual task.  More than half of the 4-year-olds and nearly 
all of the 5-year-olds remembered to ring the bell in this condition, and most of these children did 
so at the appropriate time.  This suggests that the capacity to retain a future intention and carry it out 
when cued develops during the preschool years, consistent with much previous research in the 
developmental prospective memory literature (e.g., Aberle & Kliegel, 2010; Guajardo & Best, 
2000; Kliegel & Jäger, 2007; Kvavilashvili, Messer, & Ebdon, 2001).   
 The children experienced much more difficulty, however, in the novel condition where the 
timer was hidden and embedded within the dual task.  In this condition, none of the 3-year-olds, 
very few of the 4-year-olds, and just under half of the 5-year-olds remembered to ring the bell at 
any time during the task.  Without the sand constantly falling and reminding them of the 
requirement to ring the bell, the children had to rely more heavily on their own, internal reminders 
to do so.  Thus, the results are consistent with previous literature suggesting that the capacity to 
internally rehearse prospective intentions begins to emerge only around five years of age (Mahy & 
Moses, 2011).  Such internal rehearsal may place a particularly high demand on executive 
resources, as supported by the finding that executive function measures independently predicted 
performance and accuracy in the hidden conditions of the timer task but not the visible conditions.  
And so, in the context of the theatre metaphor, it could be said that performance in the hidden 
conditions relied more heavily on the executive producer component of episodic foresight.  It could 
also be said that performance relied more heavily on doubly embedded mental time travel (see 
above), given that internal rehearsal of prospective intentions may fundamentally rest on knowledge 
about how future memory can be improved. 
 Chapter 5’s results suggest that preschoolers will struggle to remember to perform specific 
tasks in the future unless there is an external reminder to do so (such as a parental request).  The 
capacity to act without reminders will become increasingly important as children become older, and 
so future studies may wish to investigate development beyond the preschool years.  As suggested in 
Chapter 2, future studies may also wish to investigate when and how children become able to 
generate their own prospective intentions.  In the Chapter 5 task (and all other published prospective 
memory tasks given to children and other populations), the participants were given the intention by 
the experimenter who explained the requirement to ring the bell.  The ability to self-generate future 
intentions could be tested by giving children the opportunity to spontaneously mark a piece of 
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information that will be relevant in the future, which may demonstrate an understanding of how this 
mark will assist their future memory.   
 The results of Chapter 5 have important implications for the broader prospective memory 
literature, given that nearly all previous measures of time-based prospective memory with all 
populations have included visible reminders about when to perform the crucial action (for reviews, 
see Kvavilashvili, Kyle, & Messer, 2008; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007).  Our results show that when 
such cues are removed and participants are forced to rely on their own, internal reminders, 
performance is greatly reduced.  The paradigm was designed to be used with very young children, 
as Chapter 3’s results had shown that preschoolers can work with sand-timers as concrete 
instantiations of time.  Nevertheless, the task can easily be adapted for use with other populations 
that may experience difficulties with prospective memory (see, e.g., Altgassen, Williams, Bölte, & 
Kliegel, 2009; Costa, Peppe, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2008; Henry, MacLeod, Phillips, & 
Crawford, 2004; Henry, Rendell, Kliegel, & Altgassen, 2007; Kliegel, Ropeter, & Mackinlay, 2006; 
Rendell, Mazur, & Henry, 2009).  In collaboration with colleagues (Thomas Suddendorf and Julie 
Henry), I have developed a computerised version of the paradigm that we are currently 
administering to a sample of older adults (using arithmetic problems for the dual-task instead of 
picture-naming).  This version allows more precision in measurements of performance and 
accuracy, greater control of the length of the timer’s cycle and its movement around the board, and 
full control over the size of the board and the arithmetic problems to be answered (see Figure 2).  
We hope to test several other populations in the future. 
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Figure 2.  A modified, computerised version of Chapter 5’s prospective memory paradigm that can 
be administered to older children and adults.  The familiar timer moves around the board in a 
pseudorandom order, while the participant answers the corresponding arithmetic problems and must 
remember to press the spacebar when the timer’s cycle is completed.  In one condition the timer is 
visible, in one condition the timer is covered, and in one condition the participants can press a 
button to reveal the timer for one second at a time. 
 
Chapter 6: Preparing for Alternative Futures 
 Previous studies of children’s ability to prepare for alternative versions of a single future 
event have included complex intermediate steps between the preparatory behaviour and the future 
outcome, while also relying heavily on language and unnatural behavioural responses (Beck, 
Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Robinson, Rowley, Beck, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006).  Chapter 
6’s study introduced the first minimalist behavioural paradigm assessing this capacity.  I 
administered 2-4 year-old children a novel task in which they were given the opportunity to catch a 
ball dropped into a forked tube with one opening at the top but two openings at the bottom.  Very 
few 2-year-old children, many 3-year-olds, and most 4-year-olds spontaneously covered both 
bottom openings of the tube when preparing to catch the ball on the first trial, suggesting they 
understood the particular contingencies of the task.  Many other children succeeded on later trials, 
but the specific pattern of results suggested this was due to simple trial-and-error learning.  I also 
administered a preliminary test of the same paradigm to three adult chimpanzees, with none of them 
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spontaneously covering both bottom openings on the first trial but one learning to reliably do so 
after many trials. 
 The results of this study show that many 3-year-olds and most 4-year-olds understand that 
the (immediate) future is uncertain and are consequently able to ‘hedge their bets’ and prepare for 
multiple alternative outcomes.  When children begin to understand the uncertain nature of 
representations embedded within the future context, they can begin to take advantage of these 
representations in novel ways.  To use a helpful spatial metaphor, children may no longer be 
constrained to envisioning and preparing for the future as if it were a single vector extending from 
the present—instead they may represent and prepare for the future as if it were a branching tree 
with multiple possibilities extending from each junction.  In the context of the theatre metaphor, this 
role is performed by the director analogue, and so the forked tube task could be considered a critical 
test of this component. 
 As suggested in Chapter 6’s discussion section, one component of episodic foresight that 
may be fundamentally important in spontaneously passing the forked tube task is the capacity to 
form metarepresentations (Perner, 1991; Pylyshyn, 1978; Suddendorf, 1999).  This ability allows 
humans to reflect on a representation of a single version of a future event, understand that this 
representation could be incorrect, and simultaneously prepare for an alternative version.  The 
developmental pattern observed on the forked tube task was similar to that seen on explicit false-
belief tasks (Rubio-Fernández & Geurts, 2013; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001), which require 
children to recognise and act on the incorrect mental representation of another agent (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983) or their own incorrect representation from the very recent past (Gopnik & Astington, 
1988).  This parallel raises the possibility that passing both tasks typically requires a capacity to 
form metarepresentations, although future research could check for correlations more directly.   
 Future studies could also modify the forked tube task in many ways to more conclusively 
narrow down the cognitive components that are typically required to spontaneously pass.  One 
simple modification could be to make the tube transparent, such that it becomes obvious which 
bottom opening the ball will fall from on any given trial.  In this case the future outcome is not 
uncertain, and so one might expect children with insight into the contingencies of the task to use the 
one-hand response more often than they would with the original opaque tube.  Such a result would 
diminish the likelihood that children typically pass the original task with a low-level, non-
metarepresentational strategy such as “cover all holes where balls have previously fallen from”.    
 Two other potential modifications (using regular opaque tubes) are depicted next to the 
original apparatus in Figure 3.  In the first proposed apparatus, there is again a single future event 
that children must prepare for, but this time there are more than two possible outcomes, meaning 
that the children cannot cover all holes when preparing to catch the ball.  In the second proposed 
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apparatus, however, there are two future events (two balls) that children must prepare for at the 
same time, but only one possible outcome given that each ball can only come out of one hole.  If my 
interpretation of Chapter 6’s data is correct—that young children do not spontaneously use the two-
hand response on the original task because they struggle to understand alternative outcomes—then 
the same young children should have difficulty spontaneously using the two-hand response on the 
first proposed apparatus but readily use this response on the second proposed apparatus. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Representation of the original apparatus used in Chapter 6 alongside two proposed 
apparatuses.  Proposed Apparatus 1 is conceptually similar to the original apparatus because there 
are multiple possible outcomes of a single future event; whereas Proposed Apparatus 2 is 
conceptually distinct because there is only one possible outcome for two future events. 
 
 Once the components required to pass the forked tube task are narrowed down, it would be 
interesting to examine the performance of populations other than typically developing children.  
Autistic children, for example, are known to struggle with false-belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith, 1985), with some theories (Perner & Leekam, 2008) and data (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, 
& Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005) suggesting they have a more general deficit in the capacity for forming 
metarepresentations.  If they do have such a deficit, and if spontaneously passing the forked tube 
One future event,      
two possible outcomes 
CHAPTER 6 APPARATUS PROPOSED APPARATUS 1 
One future event,      
several possible outcomes 
Two future events,    
one possible outcome 
PROPOSED APPARATUS 2 
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task does typically rely on metarepresentational insight, then one might expect children with autism 
to use the two-hand response on the first trial at a lower rate than IQ-matched control children. 
 The forked tube task can also be easily administered to non-human primates, as the 
preliminary test with three chimpanzees demonstrated.  These subjects showed no evidence of 
spontaneously using the two-hand response, although because the sample was small I recommended 
further testing with other chimpanzee individuals and other primates more generally (such testing 
could also incorporate the proposed task modifications discussed above).  Nevertheless, as 
suggested in Chapter 6, the preliminary results do raise the intriguing possibility that humans’ 
closest living relatives cannot envision or prepare for alternative versions of even immediate future 
events.  If spontaneously passing the forked tube task does typically rely on a capacity for 
metarepresentational insight, then a general inability of chimpanzees to pass in this manner would 
be consistent with their repeated failure on false-belief tasks (Call & Tomasello, 1999; Krachun, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2010; Krachun, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2009).  It would also be 
consistent with the proposal that metarepresentations may be uniquely human (Suddendorf, 1999), 
and with the more specific idea proposed in Chapter 7 that the capacity to form metarepresentations 
is one fundamental attribute that makes human mental time travel unique. 
 The original forked tube task and proposed modifications each involve an immediate future 
event in which the behavioural preparation and future outcome occur in the same context.  As 
suggested in Chapter 6, such minimalist tasks have the advantage of not conflating the central 
capacity of interest—preparing for alternative future event outcomes—with other capacities like 
imagining an appropriate spatial and temporal context for these alternative outcomes.  Nevertheless, 
it remains possible that children find it more difficult to reason about alternative futures when the 
problem is not directly in front of them, because doing so places extra demands on the stage, 
playwright, and set analogues of the episodic foresight theatre metaphor.  Future studies should 
investigate this possibility, although it is difficult to imagine how such studies could retain the same 
high level of experimental control and reduced language demands that make the forked tube task so 
appealing. 
Age-based Summary and Analysis of the Findings 
 The four empirical chapters included participants aged between two and five years old.  
Although none of the studies tested children from all of these age groups, each study (with the 
exception of the experiment described in Chapter 3) included a group that performed at a baseline 
level on the critical task, and so it is fairly safe to assume that younger children would also perform 
at this level.  One can therefore consider the aggregation of results in the context of what they say 
about the episodic foresight capacities of children as they move through the preschool years, with 
reference to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.   
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Two-year-olds 
 Two-year-old children were tested in Chapter 6’s forked tube study.  Very few of them 
spontaneously prepared for alternative future outcomes when given the opportunity, although many 
more demonstrated that the physical coordination required to pass the task was within their capacity 
on the later trials.  This lack of spontaneous success may suggest that 2-year-olds typically fail to 
represent even immediate future events as being uncertain.  If so, then it could be that they lack a 
metarepresentational notion of future representations.  Specifically, they may lack insight into the 
fact that they represent future events from a certain perspective, and this perspective may or may 
not turn out to be correct in its representational content.  Two-year-olds are certainly proficient at 
imagining alternative scenarios of the world as in pretend play (Lillard, Pinkham, & Smith, 2011; 
Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2004), but without a notion of the future representational perspective they 
cannot embed such alternative scenarios within a particular future context (see Chapter 7).  In this 
case, 2-year-olds would be limited in their capacity to demonstrate flexible, intelligent future-
oriented behaviour. 
 This is not to say, however, that 2-year-olds would be indistinguishable from younger 
children in their future-oriented cognition and behaviour.  There is much evidence to suggest that, 
throughout the second year, children become able to bring past event sequences to mind (Bauer, 
1996; Bauer & Leventon, 2013) and they also become able to generalise these past event sequences 
to novel contexts (Bauer & Dow, 1994).  Furthermore, many 2-year-olds appear able to represent 
and execute novel action sequences in order to achieve an immediate goal (Bauer, Schwade, 
Wewerka, & Delaney, 1999).  These capacities may have some parallels with the uncontextualised 
representations I discussed at length in Chapter 7, which potentially provide non-human animals 
and young children with future-oriented benefits even if they lack a metarepresentational notion of 
what future (or past) representations are.  Specifically, 2-year-olds’ uncontextualised 
representations of immediate goal states could function to motivate short-term means-ends 
reasoning and action (see Boyer, 2008; Hesslow, 2002; McCormack & Atance, 2011; Suddendorf & 
Whiten, 2001).  Uncontextualised representations could also be involved in the basic talk about past 
and future events shown by 2-year-olds in conversations with their parents (Fivush, 2011; Fivush, 
Gray, & Fromhoff, 1987; Hudson, 2002, 2006).  In theory, there is nothing to prevent children from 
discussing the content of their representations when cued, even if they struggle to embed these 
representations within a particular temporal context (see Perner, 1991). 
Three-year-olds 
 Three-year-old children were tested in Chapter 5 and 6’s studies.  Unlike the 2-year-olds, 
many 3-year-olds were able to spontaneously prepare for alternative future outcomes in Chapter 6’s 
forked tube study, suggesting they represented the uncertain nature of the immediate future event.  
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This might indicate that children typically begin to form a metarepresentational notion of future 
representations late during the third year of life.  Three-year-olds struggled, however, on Chapter 
5’s prospective memory tasks, with few of them remembering to carry out the future intention when 
they had an external cue and none of them remembering to do so without the cue.  Three-year-olds 
also struggled in the original study that Chapter 3’s two-room task was based on (Suddendorf, et al., 
2011), suggesting they would experience similar difficulties with recalling a problem from the past 
and acting to solve that problem for a deferred future episode.  To summarise, although many 3-
year-olds may have some notion of the future, I found very limited evidence that they could apply 
this notion in contexts other than reflecting on the uncertainty of immediate future events. 
 The ability of many 3-year-olds to spontaneously prepare for alternative futures on Chapter 
6’s forked tube task may have parallels with the finding that same-aged children can reason 
counterfactually about very recent past events.  Many 3-year-olds, for example, understand that a 
messy floor would have remained clean if a character had taken their dirty shoes off before walking 
on it (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996).  Indeed, the ability to reflect on past alternatives may require 
many of the same cognitive components as the ability to reflect on and prepare for future 
alternatives.  But if many 3-year-olds can reflect on temporally-removed representations, then why 
do they struggle to show flexible future-oriented behaviour in other contexts?  This is an important 
question for future research, and one candidate is a general deficiency in executive functions 
compared to older children.  As described in the executive producer section of Chapter 2, many 
future-oriented behaviours necessarily require an ability to inhibit present-oriented action.  This 
may be particularly difficult for young children, given the typically weak salience of future 
representations when compared to perceptions of current reality.  Several studies have found 
fundamental shifts in executive functions between ages three and four (see, e.g., Carlson, Davis, & 
Leach, 2005; Diamond & Taylor, 1996; Espy, 1997; Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Zelazo & 
Carlson, 2012), as children become increasingly competent in their ability to inhibit automatic 
action according to complex novel rules. 
Four-year-olds 
 Four-year-old children were tested in all of the empirical chapters’ studies.  Consistent with 
Chapter 2’s review, they demonstrated some level of success on most of the tasks.  The large 
majority of 4-year-olds were able to spontaneously prepare for alternative future outcomes in 
Chapter 6, suggesting that children may well and truly possess a metarepresentational notion of 
future representations by this age.  In Chapter 3, 4-year-olds demonstrated an ability to apply this 
concept by selecting an appropriate item that could solve a deferred future problem.  Moreover, in 
Chapter 5, the majority of 4-year-olds demonstrated an ability to carry out a prospective intention in 
the presence of an external cue, suggesting they possess the capacity to retain future intentions 
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when engaged in secondary ongoing tasks.  These findings add to the growing body of literature 
regarding the future-oriented cognitive and behavioural competencies of 4-year-olds, and are 
consistent with the view presented in Chapter 2 that initial developments in all of the central 
episodic foresight components are seen by this age.   
 This is not to say, however, that 4-year-olds performed well on all tasks, consistent with the 
view that certain future-oriented behaviours may develop later than others due to differential loads 
placed on the relevant episodic foresight components.  For example, despite their strong 
performance on Chapter 5’s prospective memory task when the event-based cue was available, only 
8.3% of 4-year-olds could carry out the future intention without the cue.  Furthermore, 4-year-olds 
as a group showed no evidence of being able to seek and retain information for a specific future 
episode when low-level associative explanations were controlled for in Chapter 4’s studies.  The 4-
year-olds’ difficulties with the internally-demanding prospective memory task and the future-
oriented information seeking tasks could potentially be explained by a limited propensity to engage 
in doubly embedded mental time travel (see earlier), which would allow them to reflect on how they 
will need to use their memory in the future.  The general ability to generate multiple levels of 
recursive embedding (Corballis, 2007, 2011; Dennett, 1983; Dunbar, 2008) may therefore be one 
important sub-component typically lacking from 4-year-olds’ mental time travel.  Levels of 
recursive embedding may be fundamentally constrained by limits in working memory capacity, as 
multiple representations and the relations between them must be held in mind simultaneously (see 
Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Read, 2008; Suddendorf, 2013).  And indeed, working memory 
capacity appears to increase in a linear fashion well beyond the fourth year (Alloway, Gathercole, & 
Pickering, 2006). 
Five-year-olds 
 Five-year-old children were tested in Chapter 4 and 5’s studies.  In Chapter 5’s prospective 
memory task, nearly all 5-year-olds demonstrated an ability to carry out a future intention in the 
presence of an external cue, suggesting they are proficient at retaining such intentions when 
engaged in other activities.  And, unlike 4-year-olds, a substantial proportion of 5-year-olds (37.5%) 
demonstrated a capacity to carry out the future intention in the absence of the cue, suggesting they 
were able to internally rehearse the intention.  Also unlike 4-year-olds, 5-year-olds as a group 
demonstrated compelling evidence of future-oriented information seeking and encoding across two 
structurally distinct tasks in Chapter 4.  These results suggest that many 5-year-olds have the 
capacity to reflect on how their memory will be useful in the future and use this information to 
guide their behaviour in the present.  As described earlier, this developmental trajectory is 
consistent with findings suggesting that children also begin to demonstrate a capacity for doubly 
embedded cognition around age five in other domains (Mahy & Moses, 2011; Miller, 2009; 
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Sullivan, et al., 1994; Weisberg & Beck, 2010, 2012).  Nevertheless, it must be noted that 5-year-
olds did not perform anywhere close to ceiling levels on my tasks requiring this capacity, and so 
future research may wish to examine the performances of children as they continue to move through 
the early schooling years. 
 The future-oriented behaviours measured in Chapter 4 and 5’s studies are of course not the 
only ones that may begin to emerge later than the fourth year.  As described in Chapter 2’s review, 
for example, 5-year-olds but not 4-year-olds were able to perform above chance on tasks requiring 
them to reason about future event sequences (McColgan & McCormack, 2008; McCormack & 
Hanley, 2011).  Specifically, they were able to place an item in a location that would assist a 
character in achieving a future goal, instead of a location where the character would have already 
missed their chance to achieve the goal.  This finding suggests that developments in the set 
component of episodic foresight continue beyond the fourth year (also see Busby Grant & 
Suddendorf, 2009; W. J. Friedman, 2000).  More generally, it reminds us that improvements in 
future-oriented behaviour from age five onwards are not just due to increases in levels of recursive 
embedding, but also due to many other (potentially independent) changes in the critical episodic 
foresight components. 
Revisiting the Theatre Metaphor 
 Having developed, tested, and considered the results from several novel measures of future-
oriented behaviour in children, it is now appropriate to revisit the theatre metaphor of episodic 
foresight (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) introduced in Chapter 2.  In particular, it may be useful to 
evaluate whether it has been effective, and also to examine whether any additions or alterations 
should be made to the theatrical components. 
 The theatre metaphor aided my investigation into a vast (and underexplored) field by 
providing a useful framework in which to interpret and design empirical studies.  In all seven 
theatrical analogues I found distinctive material to review, and indeed, aspects of all seven 
analogues were examined by my novel measures.  Chapter 3’s two-room task placed demands on 
the stage, playwright, set, and actor analogues, as the children had to imagine an event from a 
removed spatial and temporal context in which they would use their selected item to solve the 
problem.  This task also involved the executive producer and broadcaster analogues, as children 
had to inhibit their natural preferences when choosing the correct item and were also invited to 
express the reason for their choice.  The two-room tasks in Chapter 4’s Study 1 placed similar 
demands on the stage, playwright, set, and executive producer analogues, while also placing novel 
demands on the actor analogue as children had to consider how their future selves would rely on 
memory to solve a problem.  Chapter 4’s Study 2 task required these same components, although it 
relaxed demands on the stage, playwright, and set analogues because the future-oriented behaviour 
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occurred in the same context as the future problem.  Chapter 5’s task similarly reduced the demands 
on these analogues, and the results suggested that the executive producer component may have been 
particularly important in children’s ability to carry out a future intention in the absence of a cue.  
Chapter 6’s task again relaxed demands on the stage, playwright, and set analogues, while critically 
testing the director and executive producer analogues as children had to consider and prepare for 
alternative future outcomes.   
 One useful addition to the metaphor may be the concept of doubly embedded mental time 
travel, first introduced in Chapter 4 and referred to several times throughout this general discussion.  
Doubly embedded mental time travel could be considered analogous to the theatrical plot device 
known as the ‘play-within-a-play’.  Shakespeare famously used this device in Hamlet, in which 
Prince Hamlet writes and showcases a play he calls The Mousetrap in order to determine the guilt 
of his uncle in the murder of his father.  Likewise, humans often reflect on how their future selves 
will reflect on or use information encountered in the relative past (and more generally embed 
information from one temporal context into another).  As suggested above, this capacity could be 
regarded as the role of an actor in the metaphor, considering that it involves reflecting on one’s own 
future mental state.  Nevertheless, in order to embed an entire ‘play’ within an actor’s mind, the 
playwright must also have direct access to all of the other theatrical analogues, and the director may 
play a crucial role in comparing and evaluating doubly embedded scenarios.  
 It is important to remember that the theatrical analogues are just that—analogues—and they 
should not be mistaken for discrete capacities, modules, or worse, homunculi.  Rather, they simply 
refer to the diverse roles that must be played by various cognitive processes if episodic foresight is 
to fulfil its function of producing flexible future-oriented behaviour.  The measures introduced in 
my thesis assessed aspects of all these roles, and my interpretation of the results establishes the 
existence of at least one novel way in which the roles can combine.  The roles may be performed by 
numerous cognitive capacities working in concert (see Chapter 2), and some of these capacities may 
have an overarching function in several roles.  
The Function of Metarepresentational Insight 
 One capacity that may have an overarching function is the ability to form 
metarepresentations, which I discussed at length in Chapter 7 as a potentially uniquely human 
component of episodic foresight.  In Chapter 2 (and Suddendorf and Corballis’ original exposition 
of the metaphor), this capacity was considered mainly in the context of the actors and director 
analogues, because it allows us to understand that our own and others’ future mental states can be 
inconsistent with those from the present, and it also allows us to generate and reflect on alternative 
future events.  A more inclusive analysis, however, also highlights the potential involvement of 
metarepresentations in all of the other metaphorical theatre’s analogues (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Potential Function of Metarepresentational Insight in Each Theatrical Analogue 
Theatrical analogue Potential function of metarepresentational insight 
Stage 
Allows the stage be represented as a stage (a representational 
mind) on which a virtual ‘play’ (a representation) occurs. 
Playwright 
Allows the virtual play to be written (imbued with imaginary 
content) with the explicit understanding of what is being written (a 
purely imaginary scenario). 
Set 
Allows representation of the future representational perspective, 
which enables the imaginary scenario to be embedded within a 
particular future context relative to current reality (see Chapter 7). 
Actors 
Allows the understanding that one’s own and others’ future mental 
states can be inconsistent with those from the present. 
Director 
Allows the understanding that single future events can have 
multiple possible outcomes (see Chapter 6), which is a crucial first 
step before deciding which version of the future to pursue. 
Executive Producer 
Allows explicit knowledge of how present actions can shape a 
particular (represented) future event. 
Broadcaster 
Allows the understanding that rough copies of the imagined future 
scenario can be transferred into the minds of others.  
 
 In their review and discussion of future-oriented behaviour in non-human animals, 
Suddendorf and Corballis (2007) proposed the ‘multiple limits hypothesis’, which claims that 
animals may be limited in one or more of the episodic foresight components outlined in the theatre 
metaphor.  In Chapter 2 I extended this hypothesis to young children, whose deficits in one or more 
of the components could explain their inability to demonstrate certain future-oriented behaviours 
available to older children and adults.  What I hope to have established in Table 1 (and implicitly in 
Chapter 7), however, is that metarepresentational insight may have a crucial function in all of the 
components.  If so, then without this capacity, young children and non-human animals would be 
severely limited in their ability to imagine, prepare for, and actively shape specific future events 
(also see Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  Tasks like the one introduced in Chapter 6 may therefore 
be particularly important as future research tries to narrow down just how present-oriented infants 
become prudent older children, and why non-human animals show such little evidence of flexible 
future-oriented behaviour. 
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 The capacity to form metarepresentations can be considered as one instantiation of the more 
general ability for recursive mental operations, because it involves a procedure that calls itself (i.e., 
a representation calling a representation).  One could therefore make the case that it is not 
metarepresentational insight per se that is responsible for the functions outlined in Table 1, but 
rather the recursive faculty that permits metarepresentations to be formed.  Consistent with this 
idea, Corballis (2007, 2011) has extensively argued that recursion may be the critical element 
separating human minds from those of other animals, and older preschooler minds from those of 
younger preschoolers.  Recursive operations are crucial not just in forms of mental scenario 
building like mental time travel and theory of mind (Suddendorf, 2013), but also in other domains 
with potentially uniquely human elements, such as language, number and music (Chomsky, 1965; 
Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002). 
 Metarepresentational insight (and recursion more generally) may be necessary for many of 
the episodic foresight components to function normally, but it is certainly not sufficient.  Other 
capacities undoubtedly also play overarching roles in many of the theatrical analogues.  It is hard to 
imagine how any of the components could function well, for instance, without sufficient working 
memory capacity to bring to mind and manipulate offline information.  And more specifically, the 
broadcaster component would be useless if humans were not motivated to share imagined scenarios 
with others (Suddendorf, 2013; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005).  Indeed, I am 
not claiming that metarepresentational insight is the one and only ‘magic ingredient’ in episodic 
foresight.  Rather, I simply wish to point out the limitations potentially faced by agents lacking this 
capacity, which could provide a framework for designing and interpreting empirical research. 
 Potential Limitations  
 My thesis, like any academic work, is not without potential limitations, and I have attempted 
to discuss and address these throughout the body chapters.  Nevertheless, there are two more 
general issues worth explicitly mentioning here.  The first issue regards my empirical questions, 
which were largely concerned with what future-oriented behaviours emerge when, rather than why.  
Indeed, although the data permit firm conclusions about the development of four future-oriented 
behaviours (acting for deferred future episodes, future-oriented information-seeking, time-based 
prospective memory, and preparing for alternative future outcomes), they do not permit firm 
conclusions about the episodic foresight components that were driving the developments.  In this 
general discussion I have attempted to outline the components that may have been particularly 
crucial for each task, but it should be reiterated that these are hypotheses only, rather than 
statements of fact.  The benefit of my approach, however, is that it has opened four domains of 
enquiry into the why of future-oriented behaviour development, instead of just one.  As described 
throughout the current chapter, there now exist numerous opportunities for future research into the 
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mechanisms of developmental change for each experimental task.  These opportunities would not 
have been so numerous were my thesis to have taken an alternative approach.  
 The second potential limitation concerns whether the successful child participants were truly 
representing the consequences of their behaviours as being located in the future.  Throughout the 
studies in chapters 3-5, I attempted to necessitate the use of episodic foresight by including sand-
timers that marked when in the future the children’s behaviour would have an effect.  It remains 
conceivable, however, that some children were able to pass using simpler, atemporal strategies.  
This problem is shared by much of the research reviewed in Chapter 2, as many ostensibly future-
oriented behaviours can be explained by low-level cues, associative learning mechanisms (see, e.g., 
Suddendorf, Corballis, & Collier-Baker, 2009), or uncontextualised representations of 
familiar/novel events (see Chapter 7).  One way that future research could potentially resolve this 
issue would be to introduce non-temporal control conditions and examine whether the children’s 
performance declined when the requirement to use episodic foresight was added.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to imagine how such control conditions could remain exactly equivalent to the future-
oriented conditions on all non-temporal dimensions (e.g., the conditions would likely have distinct 
language demands).  Alternatively, instead of requiring children to simply act on the basis of future 
representations, one could take the metarepresentational approach of assessing what children know 
about future representations (e.g., do they know that such representations can be misleading?).  The 
forked-tube task introduced in Chapter 6 goes at least some way towards assessing this capacity, 
and the results appear to suggest that most children represent something about the nature of future 
representations from the fourth year onwards. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, my thesis has made many novel contributions to the theoretical, 
developmental, and comparative episodic foresight literatures.  I have provided the first 
developmental review of the critical cognitive components implicated in episodic foresight and the 
future-oriented behaviours these components enable.  I have developed and implemented several 
novel measures of future-oriented behaviours, with the results substantiating the claim that crucial 
developmental milestones in episodic foresight are achieved throughout the preschool years.  The 
overall findings also support the proposal that different future-oriented behaviours develop at 
different ages because they place different loads on the various cognitive components.  On another 
note, I have demonstrated the potential for sharing experimental methods between developmental 
and comparative psychology, by creating a nonverbal paradigm useful for measuring the future-
oriented capacities of both children and non-human primates.  Finally, I have provided a novel 
theoretical proposal that may explain much about why children eventually become capable of many 
future-oriented behaviours that appear out of reach for other animals. 
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 In many ways, my thesis provides only the first step towards understanding certain aspects 
of episodic foresight and future-oriented behaviour.  The experimental methods and ideas contained 
herein may lay the foundation for much further work in developmental psychology and other 
domains.  Indeed, I hope that my thesis contributes considerably towards shaping the future of 
future-oriented psychological research. 
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